The AfD and New German Parliament

Kay Nietfeld/Pool Image via Getty Images

In February, Germany held a snap national election to determine a new Bundestag, their national parliament. While its winners, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), were unsurprising to many observers, the real story lies in the breakthrough of the far-right political party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Coming up with 20.8% of the vote, this doubles their share of votes and seats from the last election in 2021.

Who are the AfD? Now led by Alice Weidel, the political party was formed as a Eurosceptic party in 2013 and has since grown in popularity for its anti-establishment attitude. Frequently, they endorse policies that are less mainstream across the continent, including opposing military aid to Ukraine. Moreover, the party has capitalized on the promotion of harsh anti-immigration policies, a stance that has grown increasingly popular in Germany and Europe writ large. 

While the AfD supports populist far-right beliefs that are rising in popularity around the world (including anti-“woke,” pro-fossil-fuel, and secure border protections), it had been kept on the fringe in post-World War II Germany. As Germany carries the weight of its Nazi past, international and domestic leaders have discouraged the extreme right from holding power in Europe’s largest economy. Marine Le Pen, France’s far-right opposition leader before being disqualified from running for office on embezzlement charges, has publicly distanced herself from the AfD, describing them as the “radical fringe.”  

Moreover, they are closely associated with their antisemitic and Islamophobic statements. They have a pattern of trivializing the Holocaust through the adoption of Nazi slogans (including Alles für Deutschland or “Everything for Germany”) and the promotion of the belief that anyone with migrant heritage is not “properly German.” Beyond that, they’ve focused their anti-immigration efforts on restricting the entry of Muslims into the country. Making matters worse, they are currently under investigation for purported extremism and anti-democratic practices. A German court in Münster ruled that there was reason to believe that they intended to promote a system of illegal discrimination towards those who have immigrated to the state. It is for these reasons that the political party’s rise to power is so monumental. Although they did not win a majority of seats, (an unlikely feat that has only happened once, in the parliamentary term 1957–1961, by the CDU) the systemic features of the German government still give them substantial power, the most that any far-right party has had since the Nazis.

German Bundestag

Understanding the Bundestag

The Bundestag is made up of 630 seats, with the number of seats a party has depending on its share of the national vote. This means that because the AfD won 20.8% of the vote, they are allotted 152 seats. Following a federal election, the Bundestag votes to decide who will serve as Chancellor. To win, the candidate must form a coalition to achieve a parliamentary majority. This process is currently underway with CDU/CSU leader Friedrich Merz, and he hopes to have this secured by mid-April.  

With the AfD winning over 20% of the election, Merz must meet their demands if he wishes to secure their support. In the process of negotiations, he has promised to take steps to limit immigration and agreed to refuse all undocumented migrants (regardless of if they are asylum seekers) at the borders. As he works to form a coalition, he must balance the policy priorities of both the Social Democrats (SDP) and his partners, the Christian Social Union (CSU), to secure a majority without working with the AfD. 

Additionally, the new government plans to increase defense spending at a level of ambition not seen since the Second World War. The spending boost reflects the broader sentiment held by European leaders and their plan for increasing EU strategic autonomy. Instead of relying on other countries in important policy areas like defense and the economy, leaders in the EU are looking to increase state capacity to act independently. As the Trump administration continues to insult European leaders and has shown that an American defense is undependable, many leaders are turning to secure their own defense funds.

Making sense of this election

To understand how the AfD rose to a position of power, we can analyze both international and domestic points. Internationally, the party received support from SpaceX and Tesla CEO Elon Musk, who used his platform to amplify their message. In endorsing them on X, he has said that the AfD is the only party that can “save Germany.” With his support, they have been able to move their messaging from more obscure social media platforms, such as Gettr, Telegram, and VKontakte, to mainstream platforms like X. This mobility helped normalize and legitimize the AfD and its hard-right stances, no matter how extreme they may be. 

Writ large, the rise of the AfD and the outcome of the elections reflect the growing sense of domestic political, economic, and societal turmoil. First, the state’s deep political fractures have only worsened in the past few years. In November 2024, the three-party governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz collapsed due to disagreements over economic policy, plunging the already struggling German economy into further political chaos. 

Adding to this, Germany is in a period of serious economic recession and is facing the longest spell of economic stagnation since the end of the Second World War. While the coronavirus pandemic significantly diminished foreign trade and tourism, their industrial and manufacturing sectors were hit the hardest. This was especially significant because roughly a quarter of Germany’s GDP lies in industry. What was created was a vicious cycle in industrial production where decreases in production would decrease consumption, which, in turn, would further decrease production. The direct consequence is record-breaking unemployment, reaching its highest level in 10 years. This further exacerbates individuals’ economic anxieties and their fears towards immigration. 

Finally, deep societal divisions persist even a generation after Germany’s reunification. The East-West divide continues to define local and national politics and shape policy preferences to this day. Despite the attempts of the German government to integrate East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, more and more it seems to create its own parallel political reality. Political leaders from East-Germany who were previously defined by intense far-left stances, like Sahra Wagenknecht, have forged new anti-establishment policy preferences that veer so far left they have become far-right. This ideology was coined by Wagenknecht as “left conservative,” deeming those on the left as the threat to democracy. She views the move towards clean energy as responsible for deindustrialization, advocates hard-right migration policies, and seeks close relations with Vladimir Putin to secure Russian natural gas. The former East Germany is a fertile ground for this ideology with historically high unemployment and slow economic growth in comparison to West Germany. Overcoming this polarization will require the government to address lingering systemic inequalities. 
Ultimately, the recent elections and the rise of the AfD mark a turning point in Germany’s postwar political development. The shift from traditional parties to support for anti-establishment far-right parties reflects the deep-seated frustrations toward domestic concerns and trends in the international order. Despite not being included within Merz’s coalition, Weidel and the AfD will continue to hold power and maintain influence over the Bundestag as the largest leading opposition force.

Trump’s Decision to Invite Zemmour

French far-right pundit Éric Zemmour - Stefano Rellandini, AFP

When creating the guest list for his inauguration, American president Donald Trump carefully chose which international attendees he wanted there. So when far-right politician Éric Zemmour arrived from France, instead of President Emmanuel Macron, or his counterpart Marine Le Pen—who has lost to Macron in the past two presidential elections—it may indicate a change of pace in US-Franco relations for the next few years. 

Tensions between Trump and Le Pen are not a new phenomenon. In January 2017, Le Pen waited hours to see Trump at his New York City hotel, but the meeting never took place. This caused a rift between the two politicians, decreasing Le Pen’s admiration for Trump and leading her to ban lower-ranking members of her party from commenting on the 2024 election, stating that his style is “incompatible” with her party. 

On the other hand, Éric Zemmour has gained media attention since he boasted of a “warm” 40-minute phone call with Trump back in February 2022, where the American president told him: “Don’t give in to anything, stand your ground, remain courageous, it’s tenacity and endurance that pay off.” 

Despite receiving Trump’s backing, Zemmour’s party – Reconquête, meaning “win back” – did not win a seat in either the 2022 or 2024 parliamentary elections. Being invited to Trump’s inauguration indicates that Zemmour is likely to remain on the fringes of French society, despite Trump’s politics becoming more mainstream in the United States. While there are certainly far-right sentiments in France, even those citizens are concerned with their safety and prosperity. As such, while they may agree with Trump’s politics, his disregard for European interests is worrying for those on the continent. 

This is where Marine Le Pen comes in. Le Pen might be taken more seriously by the French in the next election precisely because of her absence from Trump’s inauguration. Le Pen represents far-right tendencies while also protecting the nation rather than disregarding French concerns about Trump. 

“If she wants to claim to govern and defend the interests of France, she cannot appear as someone who’s in the immediate proximity of Donald Trump, especially since Trump has a very aggressive discourse towards Europe,” states Olivier Costa, director at the Sciences Po Center for Political Research. 

Le Pen’s distance from Trump may help her win the presidency next, and it will be interesting to see the direction that French far-right politics takes in the coming years. With Macron unable to run for a third term in 2027, Le Pen is the front runner in polling, with projections giving her about 37% of the vote, placing her far ahead in the first electoral round. If given the choice between Zemmour and Le Pen, will supporters side with a fringe American-backed politician, or a more established candidate doing more to protect French and European interests? 

Although Trump’s first presidential term was difficult for Europe, many fear his second could be worse. France and the European Union are already steeped in political and economic struggles of their own. These could be exacerbated by tensions between the United States and China, and Trump threatening to pull out of NATO would mark a decisive turn for the war in Ukraine. 

Trump’s decision to invite a fringe far-right French politician—instead of the republic’s president—demonstrates that he is not interested in maintaining traditional relations with France. Instead, he favors non-mainstream alternative elements of the country, such as parties and individuals not actually representing the French people. Trump wants to pick and choose how he handles transatlantic relations, doing it on his own terms rather than following traditional diplomatic customs. 

However, it is curious that Macron was not invited to Trump’s inauguration, as Trump was invited to the reopening ceremony of Notre-Dame de Paris in December. Unfortunately, Trump’s inauguration guest list seems to be evidence that Macron’s attempt to get in the U.S. president’s good graces was ineffective. 

Macron echoed the fears of many Europeans when he stated: “The United States of America has two priorities. The USA first, and that is legitimate, and the China issue, second. And the European issue is not a geopolitical priority for the coming years and decades.” While it remains to be seen how Trump will navigate the future of transatlantic relations, it is clear that the nation’s link with France will change during the first two years of Trump’s presidency, as well as after the upcoming French elections in 2027.

Hungarian Spy Scandal with the EU

Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán speaks at the European Parliament - EP/Flickr

Last month, the European Parliament reviewed concerns about illegal espionage conducted by Információs Hivatal (IH), Hungary’s civilian foreign intelligence service, on European Union (EU) officials between 2015 and 2017. This information was first revealed in an investigation by the Belgian daily newspaper De Tijd and the Hungarian NGO Direkt36 published last December. In their article, journalists Szabolcs Panyi and András Pethő detail how the Hungarian government initiated multiple espionage attempts against the EU’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). This came at a time when the office was investigating the Hungarian Prime Minister's son-in-law’s company, Elios, on the suspension of corrupt tenders. The espionage included phone tapping and IH officers stalking the officers, with the latter activity eventually leading to their discovery, as they were unable to maintain their cover.

More recently, the Hungarian government has continued to spy on its own citizens. In a 2021 interview with the Committee to Protect Journalists, Panyi discussed how the IH used Pegasus spyware to surveil journalists, inhibiting their ability to conduct investigative journalism. Panyi, an outspoken critic of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and a member of one of the few remaining Hungarian news outlets insulated from government influence, was a top target for the attacks. In both instances (2015-17 and 2021), the Hungarian government has not denied their involvement in the espionage, instead maintaining that it was used legally to investigate “national security threats.”

This intrusion is yet another instance of Orbán’s broader crackdown on independent media in Hungary, and a symptom of the broader democratic backsliding that’s happening in the state.  This blatant violation of democratic norms fractures their trust with the EU and the other democratic members in the alliance. Despite these tendencies, as of February 11th, the EU has not taken any concrete action against Hungary in regards to their espionage or established any additional laws protecting against espionage. The EU’s hesitation likely stems from fears of further increasing tension with Hungary, , though the national security risk that this poses would seem to merit a swift and decisive action.

More broadly, as the war in Ukraine continues, and pressure from Russia and China intensifies, the EU needs to project unity to protect themselves from foreign interference. Without a firm condemnation of Hungary, they risk setting a dangerous precedent for other global powers or EU members to gather intelligence on the EU. This precedent could also lead to the erosion of the integrity of democratic norms, both in Hungary and other EU countries, as Hungary continues to spy on their citizens. Ultimately, this dispute exacerbates the already existing rift between the EU and Hungary, as Budapest has increasingly pushed back against the alliance (including recently threatening to withhold support for the EU’s prolongation of sanctions on Russia).

A Fractured EU Navigates a 2nd Trump Term

French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock

While President Donald Trump returned to office in the United States, leaders throughout the European Union (EU) were busy mapping out their own course at the World Economic Forum. At the latest conference, held in Davos, Switzerland, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined a plan for Europe’s future on the world stage. While von der Leyen avoided direct criticism of the U.S. president, her speech marked a crucial pivot in EU foreign policy: independence from the U.S. Seeking to avoid a repeat of the tariff headaches from Trump’s first term, it seems the EU president has opted for Europe to separate its political fortunes from the volatile superpower. Amongst the alliance, however, the response has lacked cohesion; factions have emerged as leaders reconcile and navigate the converging crises of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Some European leaders, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have stuck close to the American business mogul. Meloni, who attended Trump’s inauguration, has been a stalwart ally of the GOP strongman, leading some to call her Europe’s “Trump whisperer.” The Italian PM’s close ties with Trump, and the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) head Elon Musk, suggest her administration may maintain warm relations with the U.S., and move in lockstep with its transatlantic partner for the next 4 years. Similarly, several members of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party also made an appearance at Trump’s inauguration. While the conservative Christian Democrats party, led by Friedrich Merz, are best positioned to win Germany’s upcoming elections, the AfD may still influence a strengthening of German-American relations and an increased closeness to the Trump administration.

Conversely, French President Emmanuel Macron, who has long been the EU’s top proponent of strategic autonomy, has responded to Trump’s inauguration by calling for an increase in defense expenditures among EU countries. While Macron’s pleas for European strategic autonomy fell on deaf ears during the Biden administration, Trump’s return–and the continued Russia-Ukraine war–have reignited talks of the EU forging its own path, independent of the U.S. Indeed, Macron’s ambition has been reinvigorated, as he’s urged his fellow European leaders to face the realities of the Trump administration and end the EU’s reliance on the U.S. for defense. The alliance may be positioned to achieve this feat, as EU defense spending hit record highs in 2023 and 2024, and is expected to balloon this year, with 22 of the 27 EU states increasing their defense spending.

Support for stronger European defense has been echoed by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has condemned the U.S.’ inability to pass legislation that would provide more aid to Ukraine. Poland, whose estimated defense expenditures as a share of GDP (%) in 2024 were the highest among the NATO alliance (at 4.12%), has given dozens of packages in military aid to Ukraine and served as one of Kyiv’s most steadfast allies in their fight for sovereignty.

Tusk’s concerns are undoubtedly geographically motivated, as Poland’s proximity to Russia makes conflict a perennial concern. This geopolitical anxiety has also motivated the Nordic-Baltic states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden) to increase their military spending in recent years. Beyond that, in November, Tusk and other leaders of Nordic-Baltic countries held a security summit in Sweden, issuing a joint statement on the need to take greater responsibility for their own defense. This recognition of the necessity of European strategic autonomy was music to the ears of Macron, who attended the conference virtually. While the U.S. has historically been the champion of the liberal international order and Western security, these moves from Europe suggest a willingness to take the mantle in the event that Trump abdicates the throne.

Meanwhile, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has charted a different course: a pro-Russia one. Since his return to office in 2023, Fico has met with Putin, ended Slovakian military aid to Ukraine, and pushed back against EU sanctions on Russia. While the Slovakian PM has defended his move, citing the necessity of developing strong relations with both sides, the Slovakian people haven’t bought it. Tens of thousands of protestors throughout the country have called for Fico’s resignation in recent months in opposition to his foreign policy pivot.

Similarly, in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to condition his support for Ukraine on the maintenance of a pipeline to provide Budapest with energy. Orbán has defended this stipulation by arguing that Hungary, who imports 80% of their oil from Russia, has lost €19 billion from EU sanctions on Russia. While the Hungarian PM backed down and voted to continue sanctions, his threats should not be dismissed, as they’re emblematic of a broader cohesion problem that the alliance is facing. While the unanimity requirement for EU decisions didn’t prevent action this time, if Orbán’s hesitation grows, or Fico drags his feet too, it could damage the ability of the bloc to show resolve against Russia–and illiberal values–and support for Ukraine–and democratic values.

As the EU navigates a period rife with uncertainty, it remains to be seen which factions will shape the alliance’s foreign policy going forward. Only time will tell whether Macron’s plans for the alliance manifest in the coming years or are destined to remain a pipe dream forever.