Albert Einstein once wrote: “As long as there are sovereign nations possessing great power, war is inevitable. That is not an attempt to say when it will come, but only that it is sure to come. That was true before the atomic bomb was made. What has changed is the destructiveness of war.” The global nuclear arms race that ensued would come to define an era of international politics and media images of mushroom clouds and air raid sirens would be seared into the minds of many Americans. While the timetables and justifications vary, members of the foreign policy apparatus from both American political parties have stated their aspirations to forge a world without nuclear weapons. We find ourselves, therefore, at a crucial and paradoxical juncture in world history: a time in which the shared dream of a world without the possibility of nuclear war is within reach but political actors just cannot seem to agree on the proper first step.
Former President Barack Obama and Vice President Joe Biden spent much of their second term agonizing over the United States (U.S.) strategic doctrine on nuclear weapons. Obama, who ran on reducing the military footprint of the United States and rebuilding American credibility in international affairs, weighed endorsing a nuclear “no first use” (NFU) policy. Such a policy is not complex: it dictates that the United States could only deploy nuclear weapons if the enemy deploys them first. Embracing this policy would have been a dramatic shift in American nuclear policy. However, the United States has always kept the option of a preemptive strike on the table.
While the Obama Administration ultimately declined to endorse NFU in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the debate about the merits of NFU rages on. In the July 2019 Democratic primary debate, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Governor Steve Bullock (MT) sparred over the issue of NFU, with Warren endorsing restraint and Bullock dissenting, exclaiming that “I don’t want to turn around and say, ‘Well, Detroit has to be gone before we would ever use that.’” Bullock’s statement captures the fears of many NFU skeptics, who believe that the policy will undermine American allies like Japan and NATO countries (by making them feel abandoned as a result of the U.S. ruling out a first strike against their regional allies North Korea, China, and Russia), that uncertainty is essential to deterrence, and that such a declaration would be interpreted as a show of weakness.
This is a common, conventional take on this issue. But these are uncommon, unconventional times and uncommon, unconventional weapons. The Cold War may be over, but the risk of nuclear war is as real and horrific as ever. According to Harvard University’s Elaine Scarry, if even one percent of the world’s total nuclear arsenal was used in combat, over 44 million people (roughly the total population of Argentina or Ukraine) would be killed in a single hour and as many as one billion could be killed in the first month. Currently, the risk of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be completely mitigated, but an NFU policy followed by tangible and comprehensive steps to reduce nuclear proliferation would be an ideal first step.
The History of NFU, Globally and Domestically
Today, eight states acknowledge that nuclear weapons play at least some role in their defense policies. Each of these eight--the U.S., the United Kingdom (U.K.), France, Russia, the People’s Republic of China (China or PRC), North Korea, India, and Pakistan--have adopted an official nuclear policy that addresses their technical capabilities and the conditions under which they would launch a nuclear strike. Notably, Israel has not acknowledged that it possesses nuclear weapons but is generally regarded as a nuclear state.
China has consistently rejected the first use of nuclear strikes since they tested its first nuclear missile. For decades, China has taken steps to make its NFU pledge appear more credible, including separating its ballistic missile and nuclear warhead units, investing heavily in conventional military modernization (so as to make nuclear weapons an ever-unlikely and unnecessary escalation to conventional warfare), and encouraging nuclear weapons states to sign a multilateral NFU treaty. The only other nuclear state with a declared NFU pledge is India. India’s 1999 draft nuclear doctrine asserts that it “will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence fail.” Yet India’s 2003 doctrine carves out two major exceptions regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons. In total, the 2003 doctrine states that India would build and maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, adopt NFU, adopt a no-use posture towards non-nuclear weapons states, and reserve the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked by chemical or biological weapons. Due to the illegal and unconventional nature of chemical and biological weapons, other international nuclear actors like Russia recognize nuclear weapons as a proportionate response to an attack using chemical or biological weapons.
The other nuclear weapons states have carved out various first-use exceptions for themselves. Russia, the nation with the largest nuclear stockpile, argues that conventional attacks that threaten the survival of the country and chemical and biological weapons attacks are justifiable cause to ‘proportionally’ respond with nuclear weapons. Pakistan and North Korea have not ruled out first-use, especially in the event of a perceived imminent military threat from India or the United States, respectively. France, motivated by fears that the U.S. would renege on their alliance during the Cold War, has long maintained support for first-use and taken differing stances on nuclear issues from its Western allies (such as keeping its nuclear weapons separate from NATO defense coordination). The U.K. has adopted the most ambiguous stance, stating its commitment to using only the minimum nuclear capability necessary for deterrence (that is, the nuclear capability that is just enough to deter its enemies from striking first but not so aggressive as to make Britain the leading nuclear superpower). The British posture neither rules in or out first-use of nuclear weapons. NFU is still a minority position globally, but it should be a welcome sign to NFU advocates that several major nuclear actors have put restraints on the use of their nuclear weaponry.
The only time that nuclear weapons have ever been used in combat was by the U.S. in an attempt to end a conflict that was being fought with conventional weapons. Since then, nuclear weapons have been understood as being something more than just another big conventional bomb. During the 1960s, as political scientists and the public alike began to realize the existential threat that nuclear war presented to global security, NFU began to emerge on the fringes of political discourse in the United States. It remained on the margins of national security until the Obama Administration debated its inclusion in the NPR as what some in the administration saw as the next logical step beyond the mainstream view in the national security world--that the U.S. would use nuclear weapons only under extreme circumstances. This position is quite vague and different presidents have taken it to mean different things. More hawkish presidents have taken extreme circumstances to mean cyberattacks or the use of chemical or biological weapons against the U.S. Richard Nixon was brutally candid in his explanation of why the U.S. could sign bioweapons treaties: “We’ll never use the damn germs. So what good is biological warfare as a deterrent? If someone uses germs on us, we’ll nuke ’em.”
Why Would (and Should) the U.S. Adopt NFU?
Before making her plea for NFU at the Democratic debate, Warren introduced a bill to implement NFU in the U.S. Just 12 words and a single sentence long, the bill would state that the official policy of the United States would change to forbid the first-use of nuclear weapons. On its own, the proposed legislation would not do much. It would not stop the U.S. from continuing to build new nuclear weapons and could lack credibility absent other policy changes.
This is where the critics of NFU outline their fundamental break with NFU supporters. One never knows when a country is going to use nuclear weapons until they actually do. This uncertainty, they argue, means that states must both be prepared to retaliate in the event that another state strikes first and act swiftly in the event that nuclear force is desired for a first strike of their own. In an international system with actors capable of decimating life on the planet as we know it several times over, misplacing trust in a nuclear actor could be fatal. NFU critics, therefore, argue that American allies could be caught off guard by an NFU declaration or could lose trust in American commitment to taking military action to secure these allies from malign actors. To this point, NATO supports a policy of “flexible response,” which leaves open the possibility of the alliance to be the first to bring nuclear weapons into a conflict. Likewise, NFU critics argue that enemies of the U.S. would become emboldened not only to use nuclear weapons first, but also deploy chemical and biological weapons.
These criticisms all tend to rest on a single premise: that a decision to bar the first use of nuclear weapons is a symbol of weakness and a quixotic first step to full-scale pacifism. However, this premise ought to be rejected. NFU alone would not seek to end war or rule out the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, NFU reflects a desire to change the rules of war, as the world agreed to do at the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions. In treaties resulting from those conventions, the international community, led by some of the most powerful states in the world, established limits on how states could conduct war. Having established rules reduced the uncertainty and strength of their regional and global rivals in the international system. NFU is no different in that regard.
Secondly, the assertion that states that adhere to NFU pledges are perceived as weak is not compatible with historical evidence. Countries that have adopted NFU policies have always been countries with conventional forces strong enough to win any conventional war. It is no coincidence that China is the most powerful country in East Asia and has disavowed first-use. Nor is it purely altruistic. Barring intervention by another major power, China would likely win a conventional war against South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or Vietnam. But if one of these states were to acquire nuclear weapons, China’s relative strength and strategic advantage would be weakened. A regional nuclear arms race would weaken China’s regional hegemony as a result. China therefore has vowed to not even raise the possibility of a nuclear first strike to mitigate this possibility.
The dynamic is similar for India in South Asia. India has proven that it has the capability to defeat Pakistan in conventional conflicts and annually spends five times more than Pakistan on defense. While Pakistan also has nuclear weapons, India’s refusal to strike first means that Pakistan does not build an overwhelming second-strike capability. It’s in India’s best interest to therefore to issue an NFU maxim so as to maintain its strategic advantage in South Asia.
The United States is arguably an even better fit for NFU than its predecessors. The U.S. has one of the strongest economies in the world (like India and China), unparalleled diplomatic clout, powerful and numerous allies in every region of the world. The U.S. also faces no true threat to its power in its own hemisphere. Encouraging other states to capitalize on the uncertainty of a potential U.S. first strike and develop their own nuclear weapons in violation of international law would not only weaken the power of the U.S. as a responsible actor for the global normative goal of nuclear nonproliferation but could also weaken the U.S.’s military advantage.
It is possible that U.S allies such as Japan, South Korea, and NATO would feel less secure if the U.S. adopted NFU. However, those feelings of insecurity are much more preferable to the alternative: the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons first against China, Russia, or North Korea, which would encourage retaliation and put these allies’ very existence into question. At the same time, it is possible that nonnuclear countries and those with few nuclear weapons but a fear of the U.S. could be reassured by the fact that the U.S. viewed its nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence, not aggression, and maybe those states would agree to collaborate on arms control and disarmament measures with the U.S. serving as a responsible partner. At the very least, it may decrease the likelihood of a first strike against the U.S. in the midst of a crisis, according to former defense leaders.
Barack Obama’s “world without nuclear weapons” is a lofty goal. While the immediate strategic benefits of an NFU policy are worth noting, it is this lofty, idealistic aspiration that is the true guiding principle of the NFU movement. Rebuilding the U.S.’s reputation as a nation that supports disarmament after President Donald Trump, who withdrew the U.S. from several arms control agreements, will not be achieved by NFU alone. However, rejecting the calculus of fear that permits the first-use of nuclear weapons is necessary to eventually get to a nuke-free world.
This is why NFU is necessary. NFU’s political and military benefits extend beyond the United States to its allies and the international system that reflects their values. By alleviating opponents’ concerns about a nuclear first strike, a credible NFU pledge reduces the chance that nuclear weapons are used accidentally or intentionally in a crisis, thereby preventing escalation that would drag the entire world into a conflict arising from an unclear posture. Without any credible regional rivals-and thus any incentive to keep open the first strike option- the U.S. will retain regional military supremacy and prevent an arms race in its own backyard (benefiting its allies in the region and states committed to non-proliferation globally). Likewise, the political benefit of the U.S. recommitting itself to disarmament would be to restore the reputation of the U.S. as a credible partner (enhancing its leverage and legitimacy in the eyes of the world) and bolster the international non-proliferation regime. Once these arguments are read to American allies, these allies will likely recognize it as legitimate when faced with the grim alternative to accepting that U.S. conventional forces are sufficient to defend them: developing their own nuclear weapons in contravention of the NPT, which would undoubtedly isolate them from both the U.S. and the international community (from which the state would face strong condemnation, if not sanctions). The least bad option for them, therefore, is to accept an American NFU declaration. If the U.S. is serious about reducing the threat of nuclear war, NFU should be at the top of the list of changes to U.S. nuclear policy.
Changing the world requires changing international politics. And changing international politics quite possibly requires changing the rules of war yet again. If this past century of arms races and world wars has taught the world anything, it is that without efforts to confront humanity’s unfortunate propensity to destroy and divide, humanity cannot build a better future and unite countries in cooperation and collective interests. Take it from Barack Obama:
For we see around the world today how even the crudest rifles and barrel bombs can serve up violence on a terrible scale. We must change our mind-set about war itself. To prevent conflict through diplomacy and strive to end conflicts after they’ve begun. To see our growing interdependence as a cause for peaceful cooperation and not violent competition. To define our nations not by our capacity to destroy but by what we build. And perhaps, above all, we must reimagine our connection to one another as members of one human race. For this, too, is what makes our species unique. We’re not bound by genetic code to repeat the mistakes of the past. We can learn. We can choose. We can tell our children a different story, one that describes a common humanity, one that makes war less likely and cruelty less easily accepted.”