President Donald Trump made the abrupt and heavily criticized decision to pull American military personnel out of the Turkey-Rojava border in early October 2019, allowing Turkey to invade the Kurdish-controlled land and for Russian troops to quickly occupy the space that had previously been occupied by United States (U.S.) troops. Since then, the international community has been speculating about Russia’s new role as a mediator in the Middle East, as their rocky past of national-interest-driven policy in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region has led some to call for an examination of Russia’s priorities in the MENA region. If Russia’s future endeavors prove successful, Russia has the potential to replace the United States as the most influential non-regional power in the Middle East.
As the successor state to the Soviet Union, Russia inherited all of the experience and influence that the Soviets had earned when politicking in the Middle East. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were constantly participating in proxy wars. Many of these proxy wars took the shape of civil wars and political coups in the Middle East and Africa, including the Congo Crisis and the Angolan Civil War. However, Middle Eastern and African allies of the Soviet Union were often “disappointed” with the quality of their support: weaponry and training provided by the USSR was less advanced than those provided by the U.S., and the Soviet Union failed to prevent the defeat of their allies. As a result, the general opinion of the Soviet Union--and later, the Russian Federation--gradually declined among Arabs and many states instead turned to the U.S. for monetary and military assistance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s influence and involvement in the region has diminished as the state’s leaders focused on domestic growth and reform. The United States assumed the helm of the most influential non-regional power in the MENA region and has managed to protect this title without serious competitors until President Trump withdrew American troops from the contested area in northern Syria in October 2019.
Now, the tables have turned. Russian involvement in Middle Eastern politics was renewed in the early 2000’s, shortly after Russian President Vladimir Putin took office. Attempts to regain influence in the MENA region were generally unsuccessful, as before 2011 the only significant mode of influence that Russia pursued were arms sales. Middle Eastern politics were not a priority of Russia until the Arab Spring of 2011, when the protests and revolutions that occurred during this tumultuous time had the potential to destroy any remaining allies that Russia had been able to retain in the Middle East. As their allies in the region began toppling one by one, Russia began to support Syria in earnest through their diplomatic powers in the United Nations. When faced with the possibility of being deposed, the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, began using violence against Syrian protesters and revolutionaries. Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria fought forcefully for their lands, resulting in Assad withdrawing troops from the region (now called Rojava), leaving nearly ¼ of Syria’s territory to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a mostly-Kurdish militia. Thus, Russia’s eventual military intervention on behalf of Assad in September 2015, ordered under the guise of fighting terrorism in Syria, was welcomed by the Syrian president, and the deployed Russian forces were ordered to put down the rebels that were threatening Assad’s grasp on the rest of the country. It was this military intervention that cemented Russia’s role as a major player in Middle Eastern politics.
Russia’s decision to support Assad was not simply an attempt to retain allies in the Middle East; it was also a political power play of Putin to indicate Russia’s dedication to sovereignty and centralized government, which simultaneously affirmed Russia’s disapproval of Western leadership structures and military interventions. During the Arab Spring, protests in defiance of Putin and the illiberal policies of the Russian government were occurring throughout the Russian capital of Moscow. Instead of supporting the newly created liberal democracies like Western states (particularly the U.S.), Russia made a point to support the centralized, autocratic governance of Bashar al-Assad and, in doing so, was defending Russia’s own domestic interests. Allowing liberal democratic reform to completely destroy any relationships that Russia had in the Middle East would not only lessen the power and influence that the Kremlin had in the region, but would also diminish Putin’s own legitimacy as a strongman president.
Since the intervention in 2015, Russia has helped Assad regain control of nearly every major Syrian city outside of Rojava, launched peace talks, negotiated a demilitarized zone with Turkey, and maintained a significant military presence within Syria. Russia’s intervention is widely accepted by foreign policy experts as the only thing that ensured the continuation of Assad’s presidency, and the creation of de-escalation zones has helped Assad recapture large areas of land within Syria. Both Assad and Putin have also been heavily criticized by the international community for their use of drones and chemical weapons throughout the duration of the conflict. Russian drone strikes are estimated to have killed around 7,000 Syrian civilians alone, and more than 150 cases of chemical warfare have been reported within Syria since 2015. Although the international community has attempted many times to hold Bashar al-Assad responsible for these war crimes, Russia has proven itself to be both a difficult obstacle for the West and a steadfast ally of Syria. Turkey has been particularly vocal in their condemnation of Erdogan’s and Putin’s actions, as more than 3.6 million refugees of the Syrian Civil War have already fled to Turkey.
Turkey protested heavily when Assad allowed the lands in northern Syria to be occupied by the YPG, as the Turkish government believes the YPG to be associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization that has been leading an insurgency in Turkey for many years. When the U.S. troops withdrew, Turkey’s military was able to stage an incursion into the Kurdish-controlled lands of northern Syria, displacing thousands of Kurdish people. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has stated that he plans to resettle Syrian refugees in the northern Syrian lands occupied by Turkish soldiers. Outraged and at risk, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Syria’s Kurdish militia alliance with whom the U.S. had partnered with in an effort to fight the Daesh in Rojava, were forced to make a deal with Assad that allowed his army to advance to the border of Turkish-claimed territory. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal has incited anger and conflict in a region where they had once hoped to prevent further violence.
Acting as a mediator, Russian forces directed the SDF and the Syrian army to the land which had been besieged by Turkey for the past month. On October 22nd, Russian President Putin and Turkish President Erdogan met in Sochi to negotiate a ceasefire. They reached an agreement which created a 75-square mile “safe-zone” along the Turkish-Syrian border, away from which the YPG militia was forced to fall back. Since then, a joint force of Russian and Turkish military has been patrolling the new safe-zone and nearby borderlands to ensure the YPG doesn’t return, and the U.S. has promised to assist in keeping the Kurdish out of the area. As of the time at which this article was written, clashes within the safe zone continue.
Although the Turkish incursion into Kurdish territory has upset many in the West and caused many deaths, Turkey, Russia and Syria have all benefited from the strife. Turkey received a new swath of land in which they can resettle refugees, Syria has further cemented their alliance with Russia, and Russia has gained a new role in this important region. The incursion also occurred during a time in which Russia was already seeing an increase in approval in the Middle East, which can be largely attributed to their “Astana process” dialogue between nations in the region and their well-trained diplomats. Now, having filled the space that the U.S. has abandoned as a mediator, Russia may be able to exert more influence than ever before.
In contrast, the U.S. is showing a decline in popularity within the region due to various foreign policy errors and military failures. President Donald Trump’s ban on migrants from several Muslim countries outraged the Arab community, and the U.S.’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq have led some to doubt the American military’s ability to succeed in Middle Eastern conflicts. American approval in the region plummeted from 63 percent in 2016 to 41 percent in September 2019, before the U.S. troops were even removed from Northern Syria. This recent misstep, preceded by several years worth of unsuccessful operations and uncertain foreign policy have granted Russia many opportunities to improve their standing in the MENA region--all of which they have used to their advantage.
Since the Cold War, Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East has been defined by competition with the West. Now that the U.S.’s influence has diminished and their reputation in the Middle East damaged, Russia is taking on the role of mediator between Syria, Turkey, and the Kurds. So far, Russia has taken to this role rather well by using the mistakes that the U.S. has made to their favor and putting the national interests of Russia ahead of the interests of the region.
Most of the actions that Russia has already taken thus far in the MENA region have been entirely self-serving in nature, and either directly or indirectly serve to improve Putin’s grasp of leadership on the world stage. The jihadist threat that created conflict in Chechnya and Dagestan has contributed to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, as part of their national defense strategy is to prevent terrorism within Russia by fighting jihadist and Islamic terrorist groups while they remain outside of Russia. Additionally, having allies within the Middle East will give Russia access to negotiations regarding oil; as a major oil exporter, Russia would gain from the ability to negotiate international oil prices with other oil rich countries throughout the Middle East.
By courting Turkey and Syria simultaneously, Russia accomplishes two goals--maintaining influence and power within the MENA region, and pulling Turkey away from its NATO allies. And they’re succeeding--Turkey’s western allies have been withdrawing arms deals, expressing outrage, and threatened sanctions for their recent treatment of the Kurds, engagement in Russian arms deals, and Erdogan’s newfound friendship with Vladimir Putin. Despite the complicated relationship that Turkey and Russia have had in the past, both Erdogan and Putin are more than likely to agree to a new, more friendly relationship if it proves beneficial for both leaders in the long run. Currently, Russia provides Turkey with more than half of its natural gas and almost a quarter of its oil. Additionally, a flourishing trading agreement and the status of Turkey as a popular tourist destination for Russians give Russia and Turkey a very positive economic relationship. This relationship couldn’t come at a better time for the two countries, who are both languishing under Western sanctions. All of these factors are only certain to push Turkey further into the grasp of the Kremlin, as they will be more than happy to continue providing Turkey with arms while simultaneously pulling them away from NATO.
Russian influence and presence in the MENA region is self-serving and interest-driven; however, the presence of the Russian military in Syria and the negotiations and peace talks occurring under the Russian flag have caused some to wonder whether or not a new influence is needed in the Middle East. Others argue that if the non-Western solution means selling out the Kurds, the solutions aren’t worth ponderance. Many opportunities to mediate the conflict have arisen from failures on behalf of the West, and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s skillful navigation of the relationship between Syria and Turkey has astounded policy makers throughout the international community. As Russia continues to engage in peace talks and negotiations, the world watches with bated breath. If Vladimir Putin truly wishes to restore Russia’s status as a major player within the Middle East, he’ll have to continue successfully mediating a conflict that seems to have no easy solution.