In what has become an increasingly common theme across the world, citizens took to the streets last month to protest price hikes ordered by a conservative national government, in this case, that of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Just like their counterparts in Chile and Lebanon, Iranians demonstrated principally in response to economic austerity measures, but they also indicated broader distrust toward government rule; “We will reclaim our rights but not be oppressed,” Iranians chanted in Ahwaz, a city of over one million near the Iraqi border. Dissimilar to manifestations elsewhere, however, was the manner in which the Iranian regime responded; on November 17th, just two days after the protests had begun, Iran’s central government shut down internet access for virtually all of its 80 million inhabitants.
The nationwide blackout marked a substantial development in Iranian domestic cyber suppression technology, as well as its willingness to use it. Iran’s development and heightened aggression forms part of worldwide trend toward ‘digital authoritarianism,’ a loosely defined term that refers to the censorship and surveillance of a population by a government via its cyber capabilities as a means of political control. From Africa to Asia, several states have harnessed the power of budding technology–not to advance the interests of their people, but to dominate them. With its unprecedented attack on its own citizens, Iran joins these ranks.
The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism
Digital authoritarianism is loosely defined as the censorship and surveillance of a population by a government via its cyber capabilities as a means of political control. A 2011 study, among the earliest on the subject, observes that the global rise of information technology (IT) over the latter half of the 20th century sparked hope that liberal democracies would flourish; the logic goes that authoritarian regimes, rendered incapable of suppressing dissent, would go extinct. Clearly, this has not been the case; not unlike interstate cyberwarfare, the IT revolution only offered a new theater of competition in which intrastate opponents –the state and its dissidents– engage.
Unlike interstate cyberwarfare –in which sabotage of financial and government institutions provides perpetrators with diplomatic leverage– censorship plays a central role, as dissent alone can jeopardize a state’s grasp on society. In the absence of robust government cyber capabilities, domestic-based dissidents can communicate freely, allowing them to plan rebellious-natured activity; by blocking messaging apps like Telegram and WhatsApp, states stifle protests and coordinated attacks on security targets. Furthermore, censorship is among the least offensive weapons in the repertoire of state oppression, so states choose it to avoid condemnation from trading partners and other members of the international community relevant to their interests. Fredrik Erixon and Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, the authors of the 2011 study, also make note of the “wide net” authoritarian regimes cast when they perceive a viable threat to their power; targets of censorship may “range from telecommunication and broadcasting networks to infrastructure and simpler conveyors of information.” In short, censorship in cyberspace can be a low-cost, high-efficacy means for authoritarian regimes to maintain political control.
China as the Digitally Authoritarian Superpower
Cyber specialists and political analysts widely agree that the first and most egregious perpetrator of digital authoritarianism was China. Erixon and Lee-Makiyama posit that China is “increasingly reshaping” the internet’s “usage, regulation, and role in society,” underscoring its influence on other authoritarian states’ domestic cyber policy. In 2013, researchers analyzed Chinese online censorship practices, concluding that the state allows “even vitriolic” criticism of the state but snuffs out any move toward social mobilization, evidence of the state’s sinister desire to maintain a semblance of freedom while safeguarding its centralized political structure. Adrian Zenz, whose research centers primarily on China's ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Uyghurs, more recently warned of Chinese facial recognition technology and identification scanners outside of mosques and churches, in addition to an algorithmic “social credit system” that “could result in a nationwide apartheid-like system.”
China’s domestic cyber policy has far-reaching effects; some have argued that depreciating costs for cyber censorship and surveillance as a result of rapid advances in artificial intelligence will only make digital authoritarianism more appealing for anocratic states, and those already headed down the autocratic path –like Iran– will be extremely difficult to influence for the better.
Origins of Iran’s ‘Halal’ Internet
Iran’s 2009 ‘Green Movement,’ which saw thousands of citizens take to the streets of Tehran in defiance of the government, is not only significant in itself –demonstrations were among the largest since the 1979 revolution– but in relation to the development of Iranian domestic cyber policy as well. The flurry of protest videos and photographs posted to social media prompted Western observers to refer to the movement as the “Twitter revolution,” and although the impact of networking sites on the protests’ proliferation is contested, the international media hubbub induced the Iranian government to ban Twitter and Facebook. A decided shift toward cyber authoritarianism soon followed.
Writing for Wired, Lily Hay Newman notes that historically autocratic countries like China and Russia “architected their internet infrastructure from the start with government control in mind.” Iran did not, but since the Green Revolution a decade ago, it has sought to centralize its national internet by “retrofitting traditional private and decentralized networks with cooperation agreements, technical implants, or a combination.” The result is an increasingly closed, easy-to-police network known as SHOMA. Jon Gambrell, the Associated Press’ lead reporter on Iran, refers to SHOMA as ‘halal’ internet, a reference to Islamic law. “It is essentially a net neutrality supporter’s nightmare: The network has some 500 government-approved national websites that stream content far faster than those based abroad, which are intentionally slow,” Gambrell reported in 2018. “Search results also are gamed within the network, allowing the government to censor what users find.”
What’s Next? The U.S. ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign and Iranian Domestic Repression
SHOMA’s highly-centralized structure enabled November’s nationwide blackout, which then served as a shroud for the arrests of thousands and murders of at least 200. Previously, the Iranian state had been either unwilling or incapable of disabling internet access for its 80 million people; protests at the start of 2018 resulted in the blocking of popular mobile messaging applications, but nothing occurred on the scale of a countrywide blackout.
Iran’s move toward digital authoritarianism may have been inevitable, as the country has long shown little compunction in cracking down on its citizens. President Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign, however, has only accelerated this trend; in its 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Trump Administration reinstated crippling economic sanctions on the Iranian government, which eventually led to the recent fuel hikes and widespread civil unrest.
President Trump would probably tell you his plan is working –indeed, he tweeted solidarity with the protestors in early December and lamented the Iranian government’s violent response– but in actuality, the demonstrations are unlikely to unseat the present regime or influence it toward more responsible behavior. The administration’s aggressive policy only serves to score political points at home by creating a self-fulfilling prophecy; in other words, the crackdowns serve as justification for current policy, not a consequence of them. President Trump can present himself as a defender of human rights and a courageous commander-in-chief – all the while, common Iranian citizens suffer heavy-handed oppression, on the streets as much as in cyberspace.