In late January 2017, two presidents were inaugurated. Donald Trump took over as the President of the United States on the 20th in front of a decently large crowd on the national mall in Washington. He would take charge of the world's most powerful military and largest economy in a turn of events that sparked fears of a rising autocratic government. One day later, on the other side of the Atlantic, long-standing President of Gambia Yahya Jammeh stepped down and allowed the democratically elected leader Adama Barrow to assume office. In contrast to the situation in Washington, the resolution of the Gambian crisis marked a major success for advocates of democracy, global governance, and peaceful conflict resolution. Using the Gambian Crisis as a blueprint, we can determine how the international community can support a similar democratic transition in the future.
The Gambia is an incredibly small West African country that is surrounded by Senegal and is only about 10,000 square kilometers large, with roughly 2 million Gambians along the shore of the Gambia River. The Gambia's woes started in the late 17th century, with Britain and France exchanging control over the region until Britain made it a colony in 1856. It was then granted its independence in 1965. Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara would serve as president from 1970 to 1994, when Jammeh, a military officer, would take power in a coup against the government. Jammeh took over from a corrupt, though incredibly democratic government that had taken some strides towards economic development. Despite only being the 168th largest economy, based around tourism and agriculture, Jammeh was able to suck the country dry over his 22 years in office. He would embezzle nearly $1 billion in public funds and illegal timber revenue during his reign, leaving the country severely underdeveloped. In 1993, just before Jammeh took over, the nation’s GDP per capita stood at $710 per capita. In 2016, the last year of his rule, it stood at $620 per capita.
Jammeh would also prop up his rule with what Human Rights Watch described in 2015 as a “State of Fear,” heavily featuring summary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, and torture against “journalists, human rights defenders, student leaders, religious leaders, political opposition members, judiciary officials, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, and security force personnel, among others.'' He governed with boastful claims and a cult of personality, once claiming that he could cure AIDS with magical powers as nearly 21,000 Gambians were left without necessary anti-HIV medication. The oppression of the Gambians was mostly ignored. The Gambia was and still is viewed by many nations and international actors as a strategically unimportant backwater, both in political and economic terms. Also, the outbreak of civil wars in nearby Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Sierra Leone drew regional and international attention away from his regime.
Things would come to a head on December 1st, 2016 when Gambians went to the polls for the presidential elections. Jammeh had won the last three elections, though they, according to the UN, featured “widespread rigging and voter intimidation.” Standing for the opposition was Adama Barrow, a former real estate developer who was largely unknown to the Gambian public and was a unity candidate selected by a previously fractured opposition. This unity and general anger at Jammeh lead to an electoral upset, with Barrow earning 45.5% of total votes, while Jammeh received 36.6 percent. As the results shocked the country, Jammeh would shock the country even further by offering his concession and congratulations to Barrow, saying “the Gambian people have spoken and I have no reason to contest the will of the mighty Allah,” promising “guidance on your transition and when selecting a government.” Jammeh would, however, quickly reverse course. On December 9th, Jammeh called for a new election, citing irregularities. Barrow would flee over the border to neighboring Senegal the same day. The stage was set for a confrontation that would determine the future of the country.
The international community quickly took the side of Barrow. The most notable Barrow ally was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional block which contains 15 states, most notably Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal. Barrow was signed in as President on January 19th in the Gambian embassy at Dakar. The United Nations Security Council unanimously threw their support behind ECOWAS if Jammeh did not step aside, though emphasized the desire for a political resolution first. Thousands of western tourists evacuated and tens of thousands of Gambians would flee across the Senegalese border in anticipation of violence. Jammeh would, eventually, step aside. He resigned on January 22nd just before the ECOWAS intervention was scheduled to begin. He did not have much choice in the matter. The Gambian army only numbered about 900 soldiers. In contrast, the ECOWAS force significantly outnumbered them as well as assumed complete control of Gambia’s airspace and waterways. To make matters worse for Jammeh, Chief of Defence Staff Ousman Badjie announced that he would surrender against an ECOWAS intervention force. Barrow would take full power over the country on the 26th, and then the crisis was over.
Barrow has had mixed success in his nearly three years in office. The country's human rights record has improved, and Barrow was able to raise nearly 1.7 billion Euros at a May 2018 International Donor Conference. But corruption, poverty, and political gridlock have been roughly the same as they were when Jammeh was in power. While some of the blame lays on Barrow, some of the issues are caused by excess security spending and a high level of debt inherited from Jammeh. Even with the mixed record, the situation in The Gambia can only be described as a success for the international community. The international community was able to swiftly enforce the will of the people in a nonviolent fashion to remove an authoritarian and corrupt leader from office. But how was this model so effective, and could it be applied in future situations?
First, it is important that international consensus in favor of intervention is reached quickly and delivered forcefully. The best way to achieve this international consensus is to shift the focus from large global bodies such as the UN Security Council to smaller regional organizations such as ECOWAS. Since there are fewer states in a regional body consensus is far easier reached there as compared to global bodies with far more stakeholders involved. The case of the Gambia shows that if the regional body is willing to take on the burden of intervention and peacekeeping, global bodies like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will quickly approve the mission. This is because they don't want to take on the burden of these types of missions, so an opportunity to punt the responsibility will be quickly taken. This holds for areas that are viewed as strategically unimportant by the west, such as The Gambia, where this type of crisis more frequently occurs. Also, this shift would lead to a less hierarchical world order. The era of non-African nations trying to govern Africans from the UNSC would diminish, and the idea of “African Solutions for African Problems” would finally take hold.
Second, there must be an exit strategy for the dictator. No one will relinquish power if they feel that their life would be threatened if they did. In contrast with most comparable situations, ECOWAS was civil with Jammeh. The former president is in exile in Equatorial Guinea, with most of his ill-gotten wealth. The final agreement guarantees “the dignity, respect, security and rights of former President Jammeh.” Some might question the morality of such a clause. It can be argued that we are letting human rights abusers off the hook for their crimes. But if immunity isn't guaranteed, then the abusers would never peacefully relinquish power. Less death and destruction is always the best outcome, even if justice is not fully served. Most likely it wouldn't have been served either way as most dictators don't let themselves fall into enemy hands alive. Take two case studies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Tunisia let its old dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, take exile in Saudi Arabia without facing justice. Libya’s dictator, Moammar Gaddafi, got hit with an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court. On paper, Libya got the better deal. While Tunisians would never get justice for the crimes committed against them, Libyans would. This is not how things panned out. Tunisia would become one of the only democracies to emerge out of the Arab Spring, in part because it was free from the influence of its old leadership. In contrast, Libya collapsed into an incredibly violent state of anarchy and civil war, with Gaddafi dying at the hands of rebels before he ever faced a courtroom or true justice. Libya's fate was at least partially caused by Gaddafi's unwillingness to surrender in the face of a near-certain life sentence at the Hague.
Third, the security services are the key. One of the main reasons Jammeh resigned was because his army was unwilling and unable to defend his rule. When the army deserts the dictator, two things become true. First, the intervention is given near-guaranteed success because they face no opposition. Second, the amount of death and destruction in the country will be significantly lower as the transfer of power becomes significantly more peaceful. The question of how to get the army to desert depends on the situation. One of the best ways would be to exploit the political nature of militaries in much of the developing world. Promises of additional power and some measured support to military leaders could make all the difference in the world. Another, as was the case in the Gambia, is the deployment of overwhelming force. Militaries have historically surrendered in the face of overwhelming opposing forces rather than face certain death. This is because the decision to surrender is usually one made out of self-preservation. We saw this in The Gambia, with the Gambian military refusing to fight against the far superior ECOWAS force. Regardless of how it is achieved, flipping the military should be the priority. It is the founding pillar of the state. Take it out and the state cannot stand.
The case study of The Gambia does, however, have its shortcomings. First, Barrow has not fully transitioned the Gambia away from the issues that plagued Jammeh's regime. This cannot be fixed using the model of regional interventionism since the people will have already chosen their leader. The advantage still lies in the comparative. Even if Barrow isn't great, he is far better than Jammeh. Besides, leaders chosen domestically in elections are inherently more sustainable than leaders pick in other ways because they must have had popular support to be elected. Second, this model of regional intervention must require the region to want to intervene. The Gambia was in some ways unique because it was situated in a region that has experienced an upswell in democratic norms and a desire for legitimate governance. Combine that with Jammeh's regional unpopularity and ECOWAS has a strong motive to intervene. The Gambia is also so politically and economically small that there is no chance of major destabilization in the region or world. It is unknown whether the lessons learned in The Gambia can apply to the far more economically and politically important Egypt, for example.
The successful resolution of The Gambian crisis heralds a potential new method of international governance and stability. A world where each region manages its internal security with global support and consent. A world where an attack on the will of the people in one country is an attack on the will of the people in all countries in the region. A world where the action is quick, peaceful, and decisive. It would certainly be a brave new world, one that will only exist if the nations of the world learn the lessons of the smallest nation in the least developed continent on the globe.