Introduction
On September 9th, Christian Tybring-Gjedde—member of the Norwegian parliament and populist Progress Party—nominated US president Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. Tybring-Gjedde was shortly followed by Swedish MP Magnus Jacobsson, and most recently four Australian law professors led by Dr. David Flint. All of these come ahead of the recent peace deals between Israel and the Persian Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Bahrain. These three parties have issued their support for Trump on grounds of their personal appreciation for his sentiments regarding the corruption of Western governments and unfettered immigration. This is not even the first time Tybring-Gjedde has espoused his support for Donald Trump, with the MP formally nominating Trump in 2018. The peace deal in the Middle East instead serves to underline how these individuals have interpreted the success of Donald Trump’s administration at home and abroad. Understandably, a fair deal of press has begun to circulate over this issue. Not only has partisan debate arisen concerning the nature of the deals themselves, but additionally over whether the President is deserving of these nominations.
In regards to the Abraham Accord (the Israeli-Emirati treaty), the Director for the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated: “This will radically change the way Arab states will deal with each other and their problems.” Not only is this a win for Israel and its people, it is telling of a marketed shift away from the hegemonic control of Saudi Arabia and more autonomy in how the Gulf States—and the Arab World as a whole—deal with interstate issues. However, other commentators are less impressed. In mid-August, Steven A. Cook of the Center on Foreign Relations (CFR) correctly predicted Bahrain’s deal, but noted silence from Saudi Arabia and opposition from Qatar, Turkey, and most notably Iran.
Similarly, Trump’s nomination has received an apparent partisan reaction. For Republicans, these peace deals have provided an easy point of praise for the Trump administration in the foreign policy realm. Jared Kushner—who was heavily involved with the deal—took the opportunity to praise Donald Trump for his “historic peace effort”. Alabama 2nd District candidate Barry Moore similarly expressed that the UAE-Bahrain-Israel peace deal was “truly a historic moment”. Opponents to Trump have conversely flipped his praise to contrast it with his failings in the foreign policy arena. Some have claimed that Trump has destroyed the US reputation for foreign policy entirely, and that this is only a drop in the bucket in a history of failures. This is the same debate which has prompted whether the successful Middle East summit is truly a landmark win.
Aside from partisan divides in Congress, negative reactions to the Abraham Accord have gained traction mostly out of their comparative analyses. Though some journalists praise the work of Trump’s Emirati-Bahraini delegation in securing the treaty, they report that this success follows a similar trend of foreign policy in the Trump Administration. Rather than nurturing friendships and maintaining alliances, critics of the “Trump Doctrine” laude it for comprising of diplomatic stunts; policies made to impress and awe rather than inspire change. For instance, Trump’s talks with North Korea are lauded as an act of grand-standing. They do more to inflate the ego of the administration than do anything productive.
Still, supporters and opponents alike argue the possible historic weight of these talks. Rather than looking to the past to influence policy in the Middle East, the Abraham Accords have attempted to “look forward”. Where treaties with other countries have been mostly done out of a means to discontinue armed conflict and align interests with the US, the Abraham Accords have been signed purely out of the interest of opening new roads for discussion with Israel and paving the road to increased measures of diplomacy in the region. The ramifications of the Abraham Accords are far-reaching, and it’s necessary to grasp them fully before judging the weight of them completely.
Before the Abraham Accord
It is no secret that Middle Eastern politics are complicated, but they become near unnavigable when the debate over Israel is thrown into the mix. The origin of this issue has to do with the creation of Israel post-World War II to give a homeland for displaced Jews. This decision fell in line with proposals from Zionists since the dawn of the 20th century, who were eager to escape persecution in the West by having their own ethnic homeland. Unfortunately, regardless of historical claims to the region, over the millennia, the region had become home to a significant Muslim Arab population. In a textbook example of decolonization, the British Mandate of Palestine was partitioned to arbitrarily grant land to the new Jewish population. As history suggests, the outcome of this plan led to a bloody civil war. Although this civil war is long over, its outcome has culminated in a micro-level cold war between Israel and Palestine.
The Arab World has had mixed approaches to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Historically, Arab leaders of Sunni and Shi’ite stripes opposed the state’s very creation, and went out of their way to avoid interaction with it. While more moderate clerics and liberal politicians have been open to acknowledging Israel’s existence and opening talks, few countries have been willing to open diplomatic relations. Prior to the Abraham Accord, the only Arab nations to have recognized Israel were Turkey (1949), Egypt (1979), and Jordan (1994). In spite of their recognition of Israel, there remain complications to their relationships.
Turkey’s recognition of the state of Israel was certainly important for the era, yet primarily derived from Western influence on Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. Egypt’s relations similarly came out of the involvement of the United States with the Camp David Accords. Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt, was seeking a closer alliance with the US and thus acted to service the broader interests of his own country. The treaty between Jordan and Israel was most deliberately influenced by the Westwith US president Bill Clinton politically pressuring and promising to forgive Jordanian debts for a peace deal with Israel after years of conflict. None of the countries who signed peace deals possess a significant amount of kindness toward Israel in their populace. According to an opinion poll from Vox, as of 2013, Turkey and Egypt held a favorability rating of Israel amounting to 8% and 1% respectively. Much of Jordan’s population is descendent from Palestinian refugees, who near-universally view Israel and its Jewish population with animosity.
The source of this animosity between Arabs and Israelis is at once simple and complicated. According to the Anti-Defamation League, well over 74% of the Middle East harbors anti-semitic views. For everyday Arabs in the Middle East—specifically those of the Muslim faith—Israel is an extension of Western imperialism and Jewish conspiracy. Thus, Zionism (the ideology advocating for the establishment of a Jewish state, specifically in the historic area of Palestine), its advocates, and Israel itself must be eradicated. Although more liberal elements of the Middle East have tried to claim that they are simple anti-Israel rather than anti-Jewish, it is clear that this is merely a dog-whistle to justify anti-semitic policies in the Middle East.
However, the more complex part of this equation is that there are social and political barriers to peace between Israel and Arab states as well. While individuals in the region value their religion greatly—the very name of the Abraham Accord is an eponymous reference to Jews and Muslims being children of Abraham—support of Palestine remains a key issue for Arab officials. Bolder countries like Qatar have directly supported Palestinian paramilitary groups, but for a majority of the Middle East, the question of supporting Israel cannot even be approached because it effectively abandons their support for Palestine. Thus, not only are Israelis left with little hope due to cultural divides, but for political and social obstacles as well.
On a geopolitical scale, the Middle East’s concentration of power has gravitated toward Saudi Arabia in recent years, primarily in response to the growing threat of an Iranian superpower. The reasons for this are varied. There is certainly something to be found in the rivalry toward Sunni and Shi’a sects of Islam for which the Saudi and Iranian governments serve to respectively represent. In the absence of a modern caliph, modern Sunnis have the House of Saud to look to in the containment of the Shi’ite threat of the Ayatollah Khamenei. For modern Shi’a Muslims, the revolutionary theocracy of the Ayatollah is a necessity to spread a Pan-Islamic revolution outside of the bounds of Iran.
It is because of this divide between Muslims then that Middle Eastern states act mostly in allegiance to Saudi Arabia. For instance, it is the means for the Saudis (and to an extent the Qataris) to justify their intervention in the Yemeni Civil War in providing arms to fight against perceived Iranian influence and the growth of Shi’ite Islam. Thus, the common foe of Iran has served to unite the Gulf and Levant states around Saudi Arabia, just as the problem of Israel has served to divide them.
Impact of the Abraham Accord
Through the Abraham Accord, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have broken away from the common consensus among the Saudi-led coalition that Israel should be disavowed and Palestine should be supported. While the duo are far from the first countries in the Middle East to normalize relations with Israel, they do follow a common trend in the quest for closer relations with the United States by extension. These treaties represent more of a political move by the elite than a rising consensus among the populace. Whether the rest of the Arab World is to follow remains unclear, and highlights a discrepancy in the allegiance of these ambitious Gulf States to their counterparts as well as their hegemon: Saudi Arabia.
To understand why the UAE and Bahrain agreed to normalize relations, a quick recap of recent events between the US and these countries is needed. The Abraham Accords point out that its signatories are “Recalling the reception held on January 28, 2020, at which President Trump presented his Vision for Peace.” The direct reference of this quote comes from the ambitions of the Trump administration to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. Critics of the plan—while noting its complexity and adherence to a two-state solution—have lambasted it for being too one-sided and giving preference to Israel over Palestine.
However, whether the Vision for Peace is possible is a digression. The point is that the involvement of the United States in this agreement is salient even in the wording. Mention of the United States are only made three times, but it is where they count: in outlining the US’ future involvement in a “Strategic Agenda for the Middle East” and in “Expressing deep appreciation to the United States for its profound contribution to this historic achievement”. Just as with the Camp David Accords, there is a reason that Donald Trump is an official signatory of this treaty: because it is part of a larger goal to divert states in the Middle East toward recognizing and opening ties with Israel.
Interestingly, just as with Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, neither the UAE nor Bahrain have particularly favorable views of Israel or its people. In the former, the lead-up to the Abraham Accord was one of skepticism and outrage toward the government. The phrase “Normalisation is Treason” trended among Emirati citizens, though particularly among ethnic Saudi youth. A petition—the Palestine Charter—opposing normalization reached more than one million signers from the Emirates. Only because of fear of government crackdown and the desire for a closer relationship with the US did Bahraini citizens quiet their dissent against the treaty. While the elites of these countries have signed the deal, its people are not so sure.
In addition, there are definitely ramifications for the greater Muslim World at stake, especially in the Gulf. Although Oman—and, surprisingly, Sudan—have agreed to seek relations with Israel, other states like Kuwait have condemned the treaty and Saudi Arabia has specifically demanded the condition of Palestine incorporating the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem as its capital for peace. Iran more ardently opposed the treaty alongside Turkey and the people of Palestine. These actors claimed that the peace deal of the UAE and Bahrain with Palestine was not only wrong, but a violation of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative which had been reaffirmed by both signing parties in 2017.
The future of the Middle East is an uncertainty. It is clear now that we will not be seeing a universal recognition in the Middle East of Israel any time soon—there is simply far too much ground to cover. But there is more to this peace deal than the outcome of Israeli sovereignty. For one: the Abraham Accord denotes a marked shift in the power dynamics of the Middle East. Where the UAE and Bahrain might have gone along with the indifference of the Saudis toward Israel—perhaps even outwardly supporting Palestinian revolutionaries—just a few years ago, this move has revealed a weak link in the armor of the Saudi coalition. Not only are the two Gulf states now more isolated from their Sunni brethren, but the alliance itself is now more unstable than it was previously.
Ultimately, what will be the final result of the Abraham Accord is hard to say. Brzezinski of the CSIS who I referenced earlier acknowledges: “The biggest losers are probably the Palestinians.” The heaviest role of the Middle East in refusing to acknowledge Israel was a sense of pan-Arab solidarity. Sans the influence of outliers, it was part and parcel of Middle Eastern policy since the Bush administration that Israel was in an underdog battle with the US in its ring against the rest of the Arab World. Now, it has put that dynamic into flux. While we will have to wait and see what the future holds, one can only hope that the redefinition of Middle Eastern policy will follow a more peaceful, more cooperative path in the wake of the Abraham Accord.