At the end of 2019, there were approximately 80 million forcibly displaced persons. This incredibly high number is the culmination of a decade marked by political and social unrest. While cases of forcible displacement can be found in virtually every region of the world, Myanmar produced one of the highest volumes of refugees. This is due to the ongoing genocide of the Rohingya people, a Muslim minority group who have historically resided in the northwest state of Rakhine. In August 2017, security forces launched a campaign of extreme violence specifically targeting the Rohingya; close to a million people were forced to flee to Bangladesh which is currently home to Kutupalong, the world’s largest refugee camp. While a cursory examination of the crisis may pinpoint the 2017 attacks as a catalyst, the persecution of the Rohingya, and subsequent displacement, spans decades. The Rohingya’s vulnerable status within Myanmar is deeply intertwined with a story of citizenship, identity, and nationalism. In order to fully understand the root causes of the genocide, it is necessary to understand how the rise of Buddhist nationalism has shaped Myanmar’s perception of citizenship and their relationship to the Rohingya.
An Introduction: Who Are the Rohingya?
The Rohingya have often been treated as a stateless people with no country willing to claim them. In Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move, Reece Jones asserts that Myanmar’s government has long perpetuated the notion that they are immigrants who illegally crossed over from Bangladesh thus denying them citizenship and the rights associated with it; Bangladesh, of course, denies being an origin point. While Myanmar’s government has labeled the Rohinyga as undocumented immigrants, the ethnic group, which practices a Sufi variation of Sunni Islam, can trace their origins to the 15th century kingdom of Arakan. Other Rohingya arrived in the region throughout the 19th and 20th century during British colonial rule. Since independence, Myanmar has refuted the Rohingya’s historical claims and has severely diminished their legal status to virtually nothing. Furthermore, the Rohingya are no strangers to large-scale attacks against them. In 1978, the military displaced 200,000 people in a campaign of killings and rape that mirrors the 2017 attacks. Another campaign in 1991 to 1992 drove an even larger number to Bangladesh.
In 1982, the military government passed the Citizenship Law which is seen as a violation of fundamental principles under international law as it discriminates on the basis of a hierarchical, “ethnic-based” concept of citizenship. Under this controversial law, there are three categories of citizens: full citizens, associate, and naturalized. Full citizens are recognized as one of the main ethnic groups of Myanmar; naturalized citizens, on the other hand, can only achieve citizenship if they can prove they entered and resided in Myanmar prior to 1948, the year of independence. This effectively shut out the Rohingya whose historical claims in the region were denied and there was no feasible way for most of them to prove their presence prior to 1948- they were stateless.
The Citizenship Law was just one example of Myanmar reinforcing and exacerbating the Rohingya’s ambiguous legal existence. In 1995, the government began to issue temporary registration cards that afforded the Rohingya the right to vote as “temporary citizens”- these were later nullified in 2015. Current identification cards label them as foreigners. Additionally, Rohingya could only register in the 2014 census if they identified as Bengali; any attempt to label themselves as Rohingya was rejected. The government has used any legal means necessary to ensure that the Rohingya are left with no power. This serves multiple purposes. For the government it is practical to deny Rohingya citizenship due to the fact that under the 1982 Citizenship Law, if the Muslims in Rakhine are formally recognized as Rohingya then they would be technically allowed an autonomous area; this would not only force the government to give up land, but the military also fears that an autonomous area could be grounds for a possible breeding ground for terrorist groups. However, while the government and military may perceive the dehumanization of the Rohingya to be a strategic matter, it also undeniably serves to further reinforce a particularly potent phenomenon: Buddhist nationalism.
The Rise of Buddhist Nationalism
Following the passage of the Citizenship Law in 1982, a book titled Fear of Extinction was anonymously published; it cautioned the Buddhist majority of Myanmar to keep their distance from Muslims. This anti-Muslim sentiment would lay the groundwork for years to come, including the attacks that would take place in the 2010s. By October 2012, mobs, that consisted of Buddhist villagers, police, and soldiers, targeted the Rohingya, attacking them with machetes, spears, and petroleum bombs. Property was destroyed and looted. These attacks not only displaced 140,000 people, they would also lay the foundation for the 2017 campaign that would formally kickstart what we know to be a genocide.
Sri Lanka and Myanmar, both of whom have majority Buddhist populations, have both experienced a rising movement that has fused together Buddhism and nationalism. While the religion is not typically associated with violence, there are those within the Theravada strain who perceive an existential threat posed by the presence of Islam. In Myanmar, extremist monks paint a picture of a potential Islamic invasion- despite the fact that if anything there has been an exodus, not an invasion. Furthermore, at the forefront of the many campaigns of violence against the Rohingya, Buddhist mobs have been leading the way. A monk known as Ashin Wirathu is the perfect embodiment of this extremism. Once jailed for hate speech, Wirathu has rejected the peaceful teachings of Buddhism to embrace militarism in the face of a nonexistent threat. Wirathu, along with many other clergy members, have referred to Muslims as “subhuman.”
After Myanmar's military junta dissolved in 2011 and the country began a process of political liberalization, extremists established the group known as MaBaTha which consists of monks, nuns, and lay people dedicated to protecting Buddhism at all costs. The Crisis Group characterizes it as a “broad-based social and religious movement dedicated above all else to the protection and promotion of Buddhism at a time of unparalleled change and uncertainty in a country where historically Buddhism and the state have been inseparable.” While the government has attempted to curtail the group, it has been largely unsuccessful
It all begets the question: why does the Buddhist majority feel threatened by a severely persecuted minority? Like most things it can be traced to colonialism where the British forcibly removed Buddhism from the system of state governance and brought in Hindu and Muslim moneylenders and landholders. This not only angered local elites, it also sowed the seeds for later resentment. However, while colonization plays a foundational role, there are contemporary drivers behind the resurgence of Buddhist nationalism. For starters, the liberalization of the country has led to people being able to express their fears and hatred in a way not previously seen. There are also demographic and economic anxieties that groups like MaBaTha play into. The economic model that was instituted by the British has led to the development of a “business class of traders with strong cross-border ties;” these networks are seen as exclusionary to the Buddhist majority thus reinforcing a deep-seated resentment.
It is believed that “to be Burmese is to be Buddhist.” The questions of national identity and citizenship are inextricably linked with Buddhist nationalism which is fundamentally anti-Muslim. From the very beginning of Myanmar’s independence, the Rohingya were never given a chance to be citizens as their very existence defied what was considered to be ‘Burmese.’ Furthermore, the persecution and violence that the Rohingya have been subjected to throughout the decades has been a mechanism to fortify the central tenets of Buddhist nationalism.
Refugees In Their Own Country
While attention is paid to the Rohingya refugees who currently reside in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, it is important to also consider the conditions in which the Rohingya who are still in Myanmar are living. If anything, these conditions are another product of Buddhist nationalism as they serve to bolster the exclusion of the Rohingya from mainstream society and further dehumanize them. After the violence of 2012, the Rakhine state government segregated displaced Muslims and ethnic Rakhine in a supposed attempt to resolve the situation; Muslims have been forced to stay within these camps which are now viewed as open-air detention facilities. Living conditions are “squalid” and severe limitations on access to various resources have led to dire social and economic consequences. Lack of healthcare has led to an increase in morbidity and mortality. Additionally, lack of economic resources has produced an atmosphere of dire frustration that has forced occupants to seek out dangerous modes of escape.
The conditions in which Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), who are virtually all Muslim, are forced to reside are just another example of the way Buddhist nationalism operates. As Muslims are deemed “subhuman” so too are the conditions in which the government forces them to live. These camps not only serve the military’s purpose in curbing potential “threats” by keeping the remaining Rohingya physically segregated, it also serves to legitimize the rhetoric of Buddhist nationalists. The conditions of these camps are an embodiment of the idea that the Rohingya are interlopers who are not deserving of basic human rights as a consequence. These camps, alongside the campaigns of terror, are useful tools of nationalists to protect a society they believe is being encroached upon by Islam; it maintains that so-called threat and keeps Muslims in their “rightful” place.
One of Many Policy Recommendations
There are many policy initiatives that must be implemented by Myanmar’s government to end the genocide and create a safe environment for the Rohingya’s return. However, one of the most crucial initiatives will be to end the 1982 Citizenship Law which is fundamentally exclusionary and cannot exist in its current form. Not only does it serve to legitimize the rhetoric that degrades the Rohingya population, it also creates the necessary conditions to exclude the Rohingya and subject them to abuse. The fact that it does not recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group deserving of citizenship, and does not provide any feasible means for them to prove their existence prior to 1948, marginalizes them as a community and strips them of any political and social power they may utilize to protect themselves. Not only would the repealing of such an inherently discriminatory law help restore rights associated with citizenship to the Rohingya, it would also counter Buddhist nationalism’s claim that the Rohingya are an encroachment. By stripping nationalistic elements away from laws having to do with citizenship, Myanmar can begin to create a genuinely pluralistic society that protects minority rights.