After his 2001 Slovenia Summit with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, American President George W. Bush reiterated his belief that a constructive and productive dialogue between the U.S and Russia was possible. Per Bush, “We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul. He's a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country and I appreciate very much the frank dialogue and that's the beginning of a very constructive relationship.” As four consecutive American presidents have faltered in their stated efforts to improve relations with Moscow while simultaneously leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is evident that American policymakers underestimated the ambitions and capabilities of Putin.
Through the invasion of sovereign states and interference in foreign politics, Putin’s Russia has undermined European confidence in NATO and democracy. In at least some regard, the blame lies at the feet of American foreign policy analysts, whose interpretations of Russia in the early post-soviet period were largely colored by predisposed attitudes about the country and who were too eager to project the idealism of the unipolar moment onto the past two decades. For a former KGB agent like Putin who conceptualizes and compartmentalizes threats, the world is a zero-sum game where the restoration of Russia’s prestige comes at the expense of the rest of the world. This push-pull dynamic of U.S. provocations and outright Russian bellicosity has shaped U.S.-Russian relations today and demands a new strategy.
The Pre-Putin Days
Understanding Putin’s geopolitical calculus requires studying U.S.-Russia relations in the era before he came to power. For Putin, the end of the Cold War was a formative experience. He has called the breakup of the Soviet Union and erosion of Russian power “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”
When the U.S. came to power in this unipolar moment, as Charles Krauthammer among others would coin it, the U.S. was essentially the closest thing imaginable to a global hegemon and thus played a prominent role in the settlements of post- Cold War Europe. In particular, at the February 1990 meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker and then-Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Baker told Gorbachev that “there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east” and agreed to terms that “Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.” As a former imperial power and superpower, the new Soviet leadership was petrified of a post-USSR world order in which the U.S. played a sizable role in Europe and challenged Russia diplomatically and militarily in Eurasia.. The U.S., meanwhile, wished to stabilize and securitize Europe without being overly adversarial toward Russia. These goals, not necessarily in contradiction of each other, have largely remained the same but the way each party approached achieving that means led to the thaw.
Presidents Bush and Clinton, two presidents who saw their duty as Commander-in-Chief as defending the international liberal order, sought a policy of “enlargement.” By bringing more countries into the democratic, U.S.-led order, the logic went that the U.S. could keep Europe from takeover by a resurgent revisionist Russia. Poland and a reunified Germany joined and they were followed by more than a dozen other states including Albania and Montenegro most recently. To this day, the door remains open to Ukraine as it is embroiled in a hot war with Russia over the Donbass.
Presidents Bush and Clinton were presented with three real options for a post-Cold War NATO, as Benn Steil wrote: ignore Baker’s promise and expand NATO on the basis that Russia would always behave like the imperial Great Power it conceived itself, wait until Russia took concrete actions that infringed on the sovereignty of its neighbors (George Kennan’s position), or “expand NATO on the cheap,” figuring that the alliance faced no true enemy anymore. Bush chose the third position and Clinton continued the policy, despite the advice of Sam Nunn, the former senator of his own party, who argued, “Are we really going to be able to convince the Eastern Europeans that we are protecting them while we convince the Russians that NATO enlargement has nothing to do with Russia?” Nunn’s criticism gets to the root of the issue with Eastern European NATO expansion: while NATO has admittedly succeeded greatly in building an alliance of democracies and intervening to put an end to crimes against humanity in the Balkans, it would have had to be seen as legitimate by both the allies and Russia to avert violent resolution of disputes and it has failed to do so. The choice fundamentally was between isolating and building up against Russia in a fit of post-Cold War triumphalism and using America’s status as the sole superpower to urge Russia to behave like a responsible actor in exchange for being treated like one. Instead of isolating or cautiously integrating Russia, the United States made the well-intentioned but fatally flawed decision to ignore it.
The Reality of NATO Enlargement
The claims of NATO expansion promoters are contradicted by the historical record. While they claimed that Eastern European countries that had been threatened before by the Soviets remained vulnerable in the post-Cold War era and needed to be welcomed into the alliance, Russia was incredibly weak in the 1990s. Secondly, while the world will assuredly never know whether Vladimir Putin was fully intent on pursuing an interventionist foreign policy in his own backyard before NATO enlargement, it can be noted that tensions grew after enlargement.
In reality, the expansion of NATO’s influence into the Balkans and the proposed bids to Russian neighbors represents an unnecessary and somewhat predictable strategic mistake. In its well-intentioned bid to establish a single Europe free from an Eastern threat and united in values and security, NATO isolated Russia. In extending membership and security guarantees to the weakest European states that would simultaneously be the most difficult to defend once Russia recovered, NATO left itself with two undesirable options. The first was to let Russia have what it wants and undermine the solidarity of the alliance in the name of not having a dog in the fight. The second option was to contest every Russian challenge and put NATO troops at risk over the status of countries that are either minuscule in size or internally rife with rising authoritarianism and corruption. Washington and Brussels could live with these contradictions because they never envisioned these security guarantees would need to be fulfilled.
Eventually, however, Putin sought a more expansionist agenda. Two major strategic decisions by the U.S. and most of its European allies served as catalysts for deteriorating U.S.-Russian relations: the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Russia is the closest ally of Serbia, which continues to dispute Kosovo’s claim) and NATO’s Bucharest Summit, held that same year, which guaranteed future NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. Both decisions crossed a red line for Moscow, as statements by Russian leadership made clear. Former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, before the Russian war in Georgia, elucidated a clear position laying out Russia’s perception of greater European integration in Eastern Europe, calling Ukrainian and Georgian accession a threat to Russian security. At the same time, then-Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that Georgian accession would “lead to another stage of confrontation.” In this way, what followed, in the form of Russian instigation of wars in Georgia and Ukraine, should have been foreseen by American officials. Putin was not as much a brilliant strategist creating chaos and disorder out of post-Cold War kumbaya but rather he was taking advantage of and responding to American foreign policy on the fly. Yet in its hubris, Washington added to its security burdens and provoked Russia while getting next to no benefit out of the enlargement.
It is also worth noting that the democratizing benefit of NATO was widely oversold beyond Central and Western Europe. There has been a great worry among NATO watchers about democratic backsliding in several NATO powerhouses and some of the newer or proposed members from recent periods of expansion. Turkey, which has the second-largest military in NATO, is rated as Not Free by Freedom House for the first time in the history of the report as Recep Erdogan has concentrated his own power and persecuted political opponents. The country once billed by the U.S. as a model secular democracy in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe is now essentially a theocracy with more journalists imprisoned than any other country in the world. In Hungary, Viktor Orban has shuttered universities, promoted white nationalist theories about immigrants, criticized liberal democracy, and now made himself a dictator for the foreseeable future through a new law granting him authority to rule by decree. Montenegro, Ukraine, and Poland each struggle with corruption and have experienced recent democratic backsliding. With this, the very democratic solidarity at the root of NATO is endangered and NATO expansion did not stop any of it from occurring.
Russia has noticed, leveraging its relationships with Turkey and Hungary to exacerbate discord within NATO. Putin sees Orban and Erdogan as ideological allies in the campaign against the European Union and European integration writ-large, and the NATO alliance did not stop Putin from politically and financially supporting anti-democratic forces aligned with them. Nor did it stop Turkey from seeking closer military ties with Russia, through the purchase of S-400 missile systems despite bipartisan congressional urging. The acquisition of the S-400 system will presumably hurt NATO’s security cooperation. Turkey’s critical role in NATO has not stopped it from turning toward Russia.
Putin and Make Russia Great Again
Another point of contention between common narratives about Putin and the historical record is whether his aspiration to “Make Russia Great Again” is (a) the main motivating factor of his foreign policy and (b) actually achievable. “[Putin] came to believe that he had been chosen for a special mission—to save Russia,” Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar wrote in Time. To some, especially those of all political stripes who have spent the past half-century projecting their worst fears onto Russia whether justified or not, it may seem that Russia will always have an interest in maintaining authoritarianism at home and behaving like an empire abroad.
The problem is that that is not the only factor at hand, and Russian interests, imperial or otherwise, are no more immutable than those of any other country. As Rutgers-Newark professor and scholar of empire Alexander Motyl writes, “As anyone with an appreciation of Russian, or any, history knows, no state can pursue identical interests for the duration of its historical existence, because states and their surroundings are always changing… As a result, foreign policy becomes a function of geopolitics, national interests, and ideologies, but also of regime type, personality of the leader, historical timing, context, and many other factors.” Take the example of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. It may be that Putin authorized the action in part because he wanted to restore Russian prestige, but it is impossible to ignore that the Maidan revolution that ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych made Ukraine politically unstable, and thus more vulnerable than ever before. At the same time, a revolution in his own backyard led by the populace would make any dictator sweat. Thus, Putin also saw the Ukrainian state as an easy target for expansion, wanted to send a message to the West that it was overextending its sphere of influence through NATO expansion, and wanted to assert his power in the face of regime vulnerability. In the end, it was not just ideology that motivated Putin, but also geography, the stability of rival states, and vulnerability at home, a more reactive, less ideological conclusion than the prevailing wisdom.
Furthermore, Putin’s Russia does not pose the existential threat that it once did to the United States. In a very real way, Putin has not and cannot “Make Russia Great Again.” Economic growth in Russia has slowed to a crawl, in part due to falling oil prices and inequality but also due to U.S. sanctions placed on Russia for its repeated abuses of human rights and international law. Its GDP is roughly the same as it was in 2008. While Russia has improved relations with several major players in international politics like China and Turkey, it still has very few real allies. Even among the few powerful countries with which it has good relations, such as Saudi Arabia and India, the United States has a serious claim to being a closer ally. In the same sense, since being kicked out of the G-8 for the intervention in Crimea and condemned widely for foreign assassinations, Russia has lost institutional power in recent years. Finally, militarily, Russia is relatively weak compared to its rivals. The European members of NATO alone spend four times as much as Russia on defense even as some of them fail to meet the suggested guideline of 2 percent of GDP and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and India, as well as the declining great power of France, all spend more on defense than Russia.
That is not to say that Russia is not going to continue to be an important consideration for policymakers. It is not to say that Russia will not continue to be a major player beyond its own region. Indeed, through its backing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and facilitation of peace talks in Libya and Northern Syria, Russia plays a much larger role in the Middle East than China does. Furthermore, Putin has reoriented Russian foreign policy towards the region since the Arab Spring, regaining some of the lost diplomatic clout from the Crimea invasion. Instead of a pariah state that had been absent from the region since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Russia is now being treated by even its most ardent rivals as a major player in Middle Eastern affairs. This is because the Iraq War and the U.S. intervention in Libya projected a form of regime change politics and created instability that reduced Russian trust in the U.S. while the Arab Spring showed that popular democratic movements could change international politics, a notion the ever-cautious Putin feared would manifest in regime vulnerability. It is important to note this caveat to understand why dialogue with Russia and consideration of its interests will continue to be essential even if it is not as capable of projecting power as it once was.
A New Strategy
Though often made out by those on both sides of the aisle as a master grand strategist, Putin’s foreign policy successes can be better understood as ample improvised reactions to American policy at best and outright boom or bust gambles at worst. The Blob, as former Obama Administration National Security Council staffer Ben Rhodes derogatorily refers to the network of the governmental, think tank, and media foreign policy establishment has long projected its fears onto Russia, from the Cold War to Putin’s alleged quest for world domination. To them, Putin is a brilliant strategist with a coherent worldview synonymous with decimating the institutions of the post-Cold War international order. In their eyes, there is no democracy Putin and his cronies cannot hack, no U.S. ally he would not squeeze, and no border dispute he would not settle violently in his favor. This lens, while common for the reasons outlined above, is not entirely valid.
A new Russian strategy must be devised to account for this new perception of Putin’s worldview and capabilities. With 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons on either side of the negotiating table, war must be averted at any cost. To date, the American strategy has been too militarized and focused on competition rather than a more nuanced position that acknowledges that cooperation is necessary to reduce the nuclear threat and define the rules of the road, even as the U.S. must stand ready to call out Putin’s Russia when it violates international law and foments instability. The primary challenge in this strategy of getting to peace and disarmament for U.S. policymakers will be to determine where valid Russian interests cease and where realistic red lines must lie.
A more coherent and nuanced Russia strategy would continue to reiterate that the former Soviet republics bordering Russia are entitled to their sovereignty under international law and Russian violations of that sovereignty will be condemned accordingly. Yet at the same time, the U.S. should make clear that it does not intend to expand its sphere of influence through NATO or other means up to Russia’s border. Georgia and Ukraine’s NATO bids should be withdrawn, as they only give greater credence to the conspiracy theory that NATO exists to encircle and isolate Russia, a theory that has drawn Russia to foment war in both of those countries. Concurrently, the U.S. and its allies must cooperate to ensure that Ukraine’s territorial integrity is preserved and Russia abides by the terms of the Minsk Protocol in Donbass. Finally, in Eastern Europe, Russia must not be rewarded for its reckless and illegal annexation of Crimea, which should not be recognized. Reckless land grabs have no place in 21st century Europe and international politics, and as long as this principle remains intact, the U.S. should not recognize the annexation.
In Syria, Moscow’s support for Assad’s regime has brought great harm to the Syrian people. Unfortunately, U.S. military misadventures in the Middle East have validated the Russian view that Washington seeks to destabilize the region through destructive regime change wars. This view may be motivated by Russia’s own interests, but that alone does not discredit it. As such, the U.S. has to be willing to negotiate an enduring peace settlement that includes all of the various factions and ultimately dramatically scales back both the U.S. and Russian presences in the region, even if it means Assad controls a sizable part of the country.
The U.S. missed a major opportunity when it chose to prioritize NATO expansion over the Partnership for Peace, which included Russia and aimed to create trust between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, the Partnership for Peace was not just a military alliance, as it facilitated cooperation on science and environmental issues, disaster response, policy planning, and civil-military relations. The Partnership was uniquely able to thread the needle posed by Nunn between assuaging Russian concerns about NATO enlargement, supporting democratic values, and preparing aspiring members for consideration. In short, it reached beyond the alliance to forge trust between NATO states and non-NATO states. While non-recognition of the Crimea annexation would preclude readmission to the G7 for good reason, the U.S. should seek to build similar low-risk institutions like the Partnership for Peace that engage with, rather than isolate Russia to facilitate cooperation on non-security issues and reduce distrust on security issues.
As stated earlier, 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons are in the hands of the U.S. and Russia. Those who huddled under desks during the Cuban missile crisis and those in the Obama Administration who worked tirelessly to approve the 2011 New START treaty that dramatically limited the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by either side need no reminder of the danger of these weapons. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush and Trump administrations took dead aim at the various arms control and disarmament treaties governing these weapons. In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems each party could possess. Russia responded by building up its nuclear capabilities. Last September, the White House officially withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which led to the elimination of almost 3,000 nuclear missiles. Even if the U.S. claim that Russia had been cheating on the deal was true, remaining a party to it would have been preferable because now Putin gets to tell the world that the U.S. cannot keep its word and that its interest in nonproliferation is not serious. Furthermore, with New START itself in danger of not being reauthorized (despite U.S. conclusions that Russia abides by the deal’s terms) by 2021, it is quite possible that there will be no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals for the first time in 50 years. Forty-five years of nuclear chicken was enough. The transparency and restrictions on proliferation and deployment instilled in these treaties reduce the likelihood of a third world war, and it is imperative that U.S. strategy prioritize getting back to the negotiating table.
Finally, Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian petrostate regime is as repressive as they come. The current president’s foreign policy is largely defined by his willingness to cozy up to dictators, including Putin himself. On the other end of the table, Putin has exported his particular brand of xenophobia, homophobia, all across Europe in the form of backing far-right parties and leaders like Orban. The U.S. has an obligation to support democracy and human rights through peaceful means in Russia and across Europe, as transparent, stable governments that can be held accountable by their voters make for good allies because they are sympathetic to the liberal worldview that benefits the U.S. and behave in predictable and rational ways. As Putin’s government bars his opponents from running against him, murders scores of journalists, and tortures LGBTQ people in Chechnya, the U.S., as the leader of the free world, must call him out and hold him and his cronies accountable every step of the way.
While the last two decades of U.S. Russia policy has largely been characterized by a misreading of Vladimir Putin’s motives and capabilities that emboldened him, this new proposed Russia strategy builds upon the successes of the time period in arms control and the Global Magnitsky Act and reorients U.S. policy towards shared interests and challenges while condemning Russia’s many misdeeds. Russia may not be the imperial power some believe it to be, but its importance cannot be overstated in 21st century Eurasia and in international forums. To confront it when its actions demand it to be confronted and to cooperate and reduce tensions when changes in interests occur, nuance is essential. The status quo must go.