Introduction
Italy, the European Union’s third-largest economy, is well acquainted with political uncertainty. Its crisi di governo are incredibly frequent, resulting in 19 different governments since the fall of the Berlin Wall, with each having an average lifespan of slightly over 18 months. No strangers to political restructuring, Italians have seen their fair share of snap elections, coalition construction, and new prime ministers.
This winter’s political turmoil followed this trend. The government of Giuseppe Conte collapsed following disagreements over the distribution of coronavirus relief funds. After Conte failed to patch together a new coalition, President Sergio Mattarella tapped a replacement: Mario Draghi, the former European Central Bank chief who famously promised to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. His new government is unique, as University of Birmingham Professor Daniele Albertazzi notes, in that it includes almost all major Italian parties from both the left and right wings. They certainly don’t call him “Super Mario” for nothing.
But it also includes a roster of many ambitious politicians, all with their own divergent political motives. Amidst a pandemic that has claimed over 100,000 Italian lives at the time of writing and decimated the economy, Draghi radiates hope. However appealing and necessary he may be at the moment, including to a wider Europe, his success in forming a government likely does not end Italy’s persistent political minefield. Regardless, Draghi’s entry offers an opportunity to investigate the roots of Italian political discord and the challenges they pose for one of Europe’s most crucial countries.
Politics As Usual
The 2010s saw the end of longtime Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s controversial tenure and the shock waves of the global financial crisis, which devastated Italy. After a series of mainstream leaders, voters punished traditional parties in the 2018 parliamentary elections, instead favoring two populist Eurosceptic alternatives: the left-wing Five Star Movement (Italian: Movimento Cinque Stelle) and the far-right League (Italian: Lega). The resulting government chose Conte as prime minister, an unknown lawyer accepted by President Mattarella. Against the odds, Conte maintained his post through two governments — including by presiding over a second cabinet of erstwhile enemies Five Star and the Democratic Party — and maintained impressive approval ratings. The christened “people’s lawyer” seemed to be Italy’s new rising star.
The coronavirus pandemic only deepened public faith in Conte. But when it came time to oversee relief funds issued by the E.U., conflict brewed with a small party in his coalition: Italia Viva, started by former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. The “Demolition Man,” as Italians know Renzi, lived up to his name by pulling his ministers, thus denying Conte his parliamentary majority and triggering his departure. President Mattarella, as Renzi likely wanted all along, tapped Draghi to move forward. Renzi may note that he owes this effective political maneuver to the fact that he hails from Florence like Niccolò Machiavelli; yet however successful he was, his low approval ratings suggest Italians see him as more of a dunce than a prince.
The ensuing unity government, buttressed by parties across the political spectrum, has fostered a sense of optimism among many. However, these parties and their leaders are rather strange allies, likely united more by opportunism than patriotism. This haphazard cast of characters presents a key challenge for Draghi: to keep all satisfied in perpetuity, even those who may find incentive to work against him. Like before, politics remains in flux, contributing to sustained unpredictability. Regardless of this, the new administration is a temporary boon: after some weeks of volatility, a nation enduring sweeping health and economic crises has regained leadership under an undeniably competent figure. But it remains to be seen if Draghi can maintain a dynamic enough presence to put an end to the constant infighting that has come to emblematize Italian politics, or if he even wants this role for long. Many of his new bedfellows have their own aspirations; likely, Draghi is just one more cumbersome step in the way toward political success. With an election set for early 2023 at the latest, it is conceivable that future maneuvers may imperil Draghi’s government before then and thus reopen the floodgates.
Five Star and PD: Changing Fates on the Left
The Five Star Movement’s (M5S) considerable victory in 2018 gave it the most seats in parliament. It was founded by comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo in 2009, famous for encouraging vulgar protests against the political class. More confounding is its ideological position; scholars Lorenzo Mosca and Filippo Tronconi find it does not fit neatly on the left-right spectrum, but instead advocates an “eclectic populism” of sorts. It has prioritized some key left-wing positions like strident environmentalism and a reddito di cittadinanza — a universal basic income — in combination with Grillo’s key ingredient: fury against the elitist, corrupt governing casta, which encompasses both domestic elites and external ones, like the E.U. While victorious at the polls, this stance made the transition into governance quite difficult. It has, albeit at different times, partnered with both the rightist League and its erstwhile enemy, the Democratic Party, as part of fractious coalitions.
Today it stands at risk of political implosion. At near 15%, M5S polls below the Democrats and two right-wing competitors. Its partnerships with other parties likely make it less authentic to many who supported it in a rage against the machine. When they asked their supporters online whether or not to back Draghi, a tepid 59% responded ‘sì,’ even with a question with wording some considered skewed to favor this outcome. On the day of voting to confirm Draghi’s government in parliament, at least 15 M5S members voted against him; more party defections have followed. Many cited working in coalition with Berlusconi as the final straw.
Even so, new elections would likely yield substantial losses. Thus the technocratic, establishment Draghi is a bitter pill to swallow, but digest it M5S must for now. (One development to watch is if Conte accepts offers to serve as a new party leader, which some polls suggest could revive M5S’s support.) Meanwhile, the center-left Democratic Party (PD) has reversed its fortunes since 2018, when it won the fewest number of votes in its history, and is now rising again in the polls. With Renzi having broken off for his personal Italia Viva project, the PD has again become a force that could improve its standing in the future. All three parties have joined forces with Draghi to govern. Whereas M5S is making a largely tactical move, PD and Italia Viva have a prime minister much more to their liking — for now at least. Draghi’s success and brand could also help rejuvenate theirs if he remains popular.
Salvini and Friends: The Shadow of the Far Right
The right side of Italy’s political equation, on the other hand, includes some of the country’s most notorious politicians. The ubiquitous Matteo Salvini of the League is a far-right, Eurosceptic populist and immigration hardliner with a formidable social media following. As the former Minister of the Interior, he proudly denied boats carrying migrants from docking, contrary to international asylum principles. He also impressively helped to transform the League from a pro-northern, anti-southern regionalist party to a full blown right-wing populist outfit. Considering this political acumen and popularity, Salvini has certainly earned the title of “most feared man in Europe.”
His decision to back Draghi is a strategic one as well. The term ‘far-right’ has been an albatross around the League’s neck, and at the urging of some in parliament and a sizable northern moderate constituency, Salvini has chosen to downplay his Euroscepticism and support a mainstream government. The last time he saw an opportunity — albeit one that did not go quite as planned — to sink a government to consolidate power in a snap election, he did so. Salvini, without doubt, wants to be prime minister one day, and could bargain to collapse the government eventually if he smells blood. He would also have some allies to fall back upon. The right-wing Brothers of Italy (Italian: Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) has gained markedly in the polls, picking up much of any support Salvini has lost, claiming the title of Italy’s third most popular party at the moment. A consistent far-right option, party leader Giorgia Meloni could be a potential ally to Salvini, sharing his views on immigration, Islam, and other social matters. More than this, she has chosen to steer clear of joining Draghi’s government, allowing her to receive attention as the opposition and remain insulated from potential government controversy. The brash Berlusconi and his Forza Italia (FI) party have also reentered the limelight, granting support to Draghi.
For all the fears of a Marine Le Pen victory in France, Italy could very easily produce a far-right government in the hands of Salvini, with the backing of Meloni and Berlusconi. In the event of another shakeup, Salvini and Meloni likely fare well in elections and could be ready to form a replacement bloc. This is not to say the two do not also have reason to compete; if Brothers continues its growth and League remains on its current trajectory, their positions on the hierarchy could switch, rendering them Italy’s premier electoral competitors. Yet it is clear that Salvini’s ambition, which sometimes requires him to water down some positions and rhetoric, even those positions which have become integral to his identity, is not purely ideological. His will to power is clear.
Draghi’s Challenge and Italy’s Purgatory
“Why Italy wants Mr. Draghi is easy to see,” commented the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, but “why Mr. Draghi wants the job… is a mystery for the ages.” It is true, premiers receive few thanks and suffer many headaches, as governing in Rome has not been easy. The last time a technocrat rode in on a white horse to “save Italy,” it was Mario Monti, who shepherded bitter austerity measures from 2011 to 2013. This time, explains Carlo Invernizzi Accetti of Foreign Policy, the E.U.’s coronavirus recovery aid will help Rome avoid this fate again, but this presents the challenge of how best to distribute it, a lesson Conte learned all too well. Draghi could be successful in reversing long-term decline in Italy’s economy using new stimulus, but could be constrained by entrenched obstacles and the need to satisfy his new allies as well.
Many politicos also favored Draghi in order to avoid new elections, which many see as an invitation for a right-wing, decidedly Eurosceptic coalition to enter government. But this is quite a double-edged sword. However successful he may be, selecting leaders in this fashion is an unsustainable strategy, as it simply pushes off inevitable consequences at the ballot box. Moreover, it can serve to shake faith in establishment politics. Continuing to push forth a chosen savior, technocratic figure when the going gets tough can create popular mistrust, fueling the rise of anti-establishment challenger parties. The potentially fractious nature of his coalition means that, beyond just governing, Draghi will need to hold together quarreling parties while also preserving his own political aspirations. Rumor has it he may hope to replace Mattarella as president in the coming years, for which he will need the continued support of parliament.
What is clear is that Italian politics have become no simpler. Draghi may have calmed the waters, but sharks still circle. The party system fluctuates over the span of a few years, leading to rapid change, inconsistent fortunes, and inherently unstable compromise governments. Short-lived coalitions, however, have been endemic to Italy throughout its postwar democracy. But in an era where economic circumstances have changed, usual institutions are under duress, and the impacts of a global recession a decade ago continue to reverberate, Italy — and other European countries — suffer from this uncertainty.
Looking Abroad
Despite its large economy and cultural significance, Italy has a less prominent profile in European affairs than one might expect. As Karolina Muti and Arturo Varvelli at the European Council on Foreign Relations note, despite Italy’s rather consistent pro-European and transatlantic sentiments, “chronic internal instability tends to undermine its credibility and reliability in the eyes of both NATO and EU allies.” Increasingly though, Rome seeks a more outsized role in security, including by bolstering its military capabilities as part of a European framework and settling issues like the Libyan conflict on favorable terms. Draghi seems well positioned to bolster Italy’s profile within the E.U., given France’s Emmanuel Macron is concerned with his own reelection fight next year, Germany’s Angela Merkel is in the final year of her chancellorship, and the United Kingdom has sailed away. If successful, he could conceivably play a role in mitigating the dominant Franco-German partnership over the E.U. and reorient Rome as a renewed ally for Washington. In fact, there is reason to believe that U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration may be celebrating Draghi, especially as it looks to rejuvenate the transatlantic partnership.
Other European leaders also have reason to pray for his success. After all, the rise of Eurosceptic parties in Italy is hardly comforting and Draghi may well stave them off for long enough. The prospect of real reform in one of Europe’s most debt-ridden economies is also cause for cautious celebration. Last but not least, Italy is a founding member of the E.U. and a beacon of culture and history for the continent with untapped potential in the modern era. But the distinct possibility of a short-lived government dampens long-term hope. The favorable reception to Draghi is probably not sufficient to keep allies from fearing they may have to communicate with a new voice in Rome in due time. On the other hand, if Draghi manages to position Italy well during his tenure, it could provide an incentive for future governments to continue on a similar — or at least not totally dissimilar — path.
Conclusion
Draghi is clearly a capable leader for uncertain times in Rome. However, his arrival does not resolve the existing factors driving frequent turnover in Italy’s government. The party system fluctuates often, contributing to unpredictability and troubling discontinuity. Euroscepticism and populism have become part of mainstream politics, while the establishment increasingly relies on selected technocrats to hold together temporary coalitions. It is worth noting that Italy has long experienced this sort of turmoil, but modern trends like rising debt and shaken faith in the European project make them all the more worrying. If Rome could stabilize its politics, pursue fiscal reforms without resorting to austerity, and augment its role in foreign affairs, it could shake many of the stumbling blocks and fault lines which have grown to characterize its civic identity. Draghi certainly has his work cut out for him, but could begin to tackle these challenges if his premiership ultimately proves successful. Thus, the hope for Italy is not that he is simply triumphant, but that he is transformative.