When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to Texas in September 2019, he was greeted by over 50,000 people — and introduced by none other than then-American President Donald Trump. The Texan-style cries of “Howdy, Modi!” lifted through the air at one of the largest mass rallies for a foreign leader in United States history. “I’m so thrilled to be here in Texas with one of America’s greatest, most devoted, and most loyal friends,” exclaimed Trump, part of a series of affectionate remarks between the two leaders. In turn, Modi introduced his “family,” a jubilant nod to the many Indian-Americans in the crowd, to Trump. The years-long, sometimes-called “bromance” between Modi and Trump was on full display.
Despite grandiose moments like this, U.S. ties with India remain far less discussed than those with competitors like Russia or China, or allies like Japan or Germany. Though these relationships are not uniform and simple, they are far easier to classify as cool or warm. In contrast, New Delhi’s posture toward Washington and vice versa is more complicated, with areas of agreement and others of divergence. However, the U.S.-India alliance will likely grow with time. Undoubtedly the rapid growth of India’s population and economy plays a role. It is also worth noting a growing community of Indian-Americans and Kamala Harris’s recent election as America’s first Vice President of Indian ancestry, in addition to being the first woman and person of color to hold the post. Her triumph was celebrated by some in India and highlighted by Modi when congratulating her and President Joe Biden on their victory.
Though Modi will find a very different counterpart in Biden, and may adopt a different strategy toward the relationship as a result, the U.S.-India alliance will nevertheless continue to grow in importance. While the latter half of the 20th century saw some estrangement between the two countries, U.S. administrations since President Bill Clinton’s have developed an ever closer rapport with their Indian counterparts. However, as currents bolster this partnership, several issues will soon become key, some of which will draw the two countries closer, like wariness of China. Others, like the global retreat of democracy and human rights, may make this still-burgeoning relationship more awkward. Furthermore, these themes raise and reflect key debates in contemporary U.S. foreign policy. This juncture thus affords an opportunity to investigate these deepening bilateral ties’ implications moving forward.
America and India: An Evolving Relationship
India’s first post-independence prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru famously trumpeted his country’s stance of nonalignment in the Cold War, signaling that New Delhi would adopt a track of neutrality in global geopolitical disputes. This irked Washington, especially as this opened the door to some Indian ties with the Soviet Union. In much of the 20th century’s latter half, India had its fair share of conflicts with Pakistan and China, many of them over border disputes, leading New Delhi to race toward nuclear proliferation. To make matters worse, clashes between India and Pakistan sometimes brought the U.S. to support the latter, such as in 1971. While communication between India and the U.S. continued, the relationship was not close. As C. Raja Mohan writes for Foreign Policy, India in this time “became a champion” for the global south, took a sharp leftward turn economically, and even voted more frequently against the U.S. than the Soviets at the United Nations.
This trajectory began to reverse with Clinton’s 2000 visit to India. During his successor President George W. Bush’s administration, relations continued to strengthen. In a rejection of India’s previous skepticism of military cooperation with America, closer defense ties were reached, and agreements over nuclear proliferation and trade resulted. In the War on Terror era, India’s own concerns with terrorism also rendered the U.S. a logical ally. President Barack Obama’s administration increasingly — and rightly — recognized India’s growing power. While Modi’s election in 2014 presented reasons for strain, not least because of Modi’s nationalist outlook, the Obama administration chose instead to welcome him for a visit to the U.S.
The Trump years were truly strange for many American alliances. India, however, seemed impervious to many of these tensions. Modi was quite capable in appealing to Trump’s fondness for close personal bonds with foreign leaders, especially when greeting the American president with a bear hug at one of their first meetings. As Institute of South Asian Studies researcher Amitendu Palit tells the Financial Times, “India was one of the few countries that got used to working with Trump.” This could have to do with similarities between the two leaders. Scholars Duncan McDonnell and Luis Cabrera argue that Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) shares several similarities with the European right-wing populist party grouping to which Trump’s politics have often been compared. While there is a tendency to refer to comparable leaders as simply permutations of Trump in foreign countries, this urge often obscures concrete differences and dynamics. However, Modi’s BJP has been characterized as Hindu nationalist, protectionist, and anti-elitist, trafficking in discourse not altogether different from that of Trump’s, albeit adapted to a different societal context.
This is not to say there have not been areas of discord between the two leaders. Trade is one. Trump went as far as to end India’s special trade status with the U.S., citing India’s market as unfair for American companies, prompting Modi to unleash tariffs on some American goods. Even through spats like this, however, the two remained cordial. Despite rough patches, Modi avoided the mercurial jabs Trump launched at other world leaders who once fêted him, like French President Emmanuel Macron.
Today, Modi realizes well that Biden is quite different from Trump. But this does not mean the two leaders’ contrasts will necessarily derail warming ties. After the events of January 6, 2021 in the U.S. Capitol, Modi joined a chorus of foreign leaders condemning efforts to delay the transfer of power between administrations. Since his victory, Biden has been embraced by Modi, particularly during recent talks on China. Biden will likely continue this convergence, as areas for partnership with New Delhi abound.
The Indo-Pacific and Beyond: Areas of Agreement
This March, Biden was joined by his Indian, Japanese, and Australian counterparts for a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, nicknamed the Quad, an informal strategic grouping revived during the Trump administration focusing on Indo-Pacific affairs. Central to its current agenda is the distribution of vaccines in the region and combating further responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. But the Quad certainly has additional motives in a region fraught with danger. Through this venue, the U.S. and India may find themselves working together more frequently.
The largest task of the Quad moving forward was not lost on observers: an increasingly strong and assertive China. Tensions between Washington and Beijing have been building for years over a vast array of issues, but the recent U.S.-China summit in Alaska was perhaps the most blatant show of discontent yet between the two sides. Dignitaries swapped their usual pleasantries for harsh critiques, with Chinese officials condemning American police brutality and American officials condemning China’s crackdown in Hong Kong, among other complaints. The areas of competition between China and the U.S. continue to grow over technology, trade relations, stewardship of the international order, the internment of Uighurs, and military relations in East Asia, to name a few.
India and China have long been adversaries, but enmity between them has also been on display in recent years. Their infamous border disputes have flared up again multiple times, sometimes leading to casualties, usually patrolling soldiers. But the tension has even deeper roots. As Vijay Gokhale argues for Carnegie India, a general divergence between the two countries’ geopolitical goals — and their perceptions of one another — have fueled distaste between them, including the feeling in New Delhi that Beijing sees it necessary to box out India to lock in control of the Indo-Pacific. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, bringing it closer to nations like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and especially Pakistan, has certainly not helped to turn down the temperature. This tension was reflected in a recent poll: a staggering 83% of Indians view China as a security threat, yet 63% still hope for better relations. However, the same poll found that a larger 75% of Indians want relations with the U.S. to strengthen. Washington’s growing coziness with New Delhi is without doubt partially about combating Beijing, especially as India has increased its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
Other matters of global significance are also factors. For one, India is a significant partner on climate change, as underscored by a trip from U.S. climate envoy John Kerry. With its large border with Myanmar and rapport with its armed forces, India could use some leverage to help improve a rapidly deteriorating situation following recent violence and coups. India’s growing economy and population also make it a logical ally for the U.S. Yet even as many issues offer opportunity for agreement, room for separation still exists.
Of Media and Missiles: Areas of Divergence
Biden, against the backdrop of eroding norms at home, has made democracy a pillar of his foreign policy. Especially after the events of January 6, a desire to restore confidence in democracy at home and abroad is welcome. Though little has manifested yet, his administration floated a Democracy Summit of sorts, aiming to bring fellow democracies to the table in the face of autocratic trajectories abroad. India would ordinarily be guaranteed an invite. However, Modi’s governance has alarmed observers concerned about a retreat of democratic norms. Freedom House has downgraded India from “free” to “partly free,” and Varieties of Democracy, an index tracking the integrity of democracy worldwide, recently made the momentous decision to classify India as an “electoral autocracy.” These rankings were promptly lambasted by Modi’s government.
Worrying developments include immigration policy. Critics point to BJP-crafted laws and rules changes, like that in Assam, which discriminate against Muslims and erode India’s religious tolerance tradition, including by offering a path to citizenship for migrants of many faiths except Islam. Indeed, mobs and violence have threatened Indian Muslims before. When demonstrations arise in response to these changes and others, Modi has relied on a favorite tool to quell unrest: restricting Internet access and the press. He blacked out phone and Internet services recently after massive farmer protests formed to protest his economic policies. These same tactics were deployed in Jammu and Kashmir after he repealed the disputed state’s special status in Indian law. Most recently, India’s government has threatened to arrest Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter employees if the sites do not agree to regulate content related to the farmers. The world has watched uneasily as the leader of the most populous democracy has leaned on increasingly authoritarian tactics. Even if this summit idea ultimately does not materialize, a U.S.-stressing democracy abroad might find cozier ties with India awkward. As Tanvi Madan assesses for Brookings, the Biden administration will still see in India a strategic partner, but the relationship will not deepen as fast or as much as it otherwise could due to these concerns.
Geopolitical thorns exist as well. Though Modi may feel comfortable aligning India closer to the U.S., he does not see India working solely with America. Just as New Delhi’s nonalignment and subsequent relations with Moscow bothered Washington in the Cold War, Modi’s relations with Russia today leave the U.S. unsettled. Though Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin have not been particularly close, except for an invitation to host Putin after COVID-19 subsides, India’s purchase of the S-400 Russian missile system ruffles American feathers. (Turkey’s purchase of the same system has similarly sparked controversy on Capitol Hill.) Indian officials defend buying the system as necessary for defense against neighbors like China and Pakistan. But as the U.S. State Department warns, India could be subject to U.S. sanctions as a result. Though these measures against India may still be unlikely, the transaction remains a sticking point between the countries. The U.S. may still struggle to trust an ally which hopes to retain a more nonaligned stance between Moscow and Washington.
Conclusion: An Alliance of Asterisks
Evidently, the U.S.-India partnership will elevate in importance as years pass. However, existing concerns lead the two countries to remain more estranged than they otherwise might be. Though these bilateral ties are unique, the dynamics at play reflect larger pressing questions in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. today finds itself in odd positions with many of its allies. Some, like the Philippines and Brazil, have far-right leaders whose disregard for the rule of law and liberal international order complicate ties with America. Turkey, despite its NATO membership, worries the U.S. due to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s closer relations with Putin, authoritarian populist worldview, and general revanchism. Other high profile examples include Saudi Arabia, whose Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has attracted notoriety over the bloody war in Yemen and the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Biden has had to — and will continue to — balance a foreign policy advocating simultaneously for specific values and also American alliances with some partners who violate these standards, while also withdrawing support from such transgressions.
In the case of India, the U.S. should not reject an expanding alliance. It should realize India’s foreign policy goals and aspirations are not as dichotomous as America’s and will not always align, yet a mutually beneficial partnership can flourish in some areas. Geopolitical disagreements like the S-400 missile purchase alone should not fragment U.S.-India ties. Where possible, the two countries should cooperate. Biden’s ability to aid India in its current battle against the raging coronavirus is one such area. Even so, the U.S. should not stay silent with India on troubling topics, particularly human rights. Badly-needed moves to strengthen America’s own democracy and immigration system would also be a boon to Biden’s foreign policy, to make it one of mutual appreciation for reinforcing democratic norms in the face of malaise. If done right, both countries could enjoy a mutually beneficial partnership, even if the days of “bromance” have passed.