European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered this year’s State of the Union address in Strasbourg, France, like every other year. But events still occurring in another location far to her east dominated her thoughts and remarks. Though she waxed poetic about Europe’s united and swift response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this February, von der Leyen did not mince her words about the dangers remaining for Europe: “this is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future.”
Ukrainians bear the biggest brunt of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against their nation, but its ramifications extend across the European continent. The conflict presents a security dilemma with immediate and lasting dimensions, as well as domestic and external implications. In particular, Europe has recognized the necessity of indigenous military capacity, prompting renewed focus on defense spending. More abrupt, perhaps, is the challenge of securing energy supply as winter approaches and many countries can no longer look to Russia. A significant rethink is accordingly underway in most capitals about how much to trust Moscow as long as it is led by Putin or someone likeminded, rewriting the playbook of currying a cooperative relationship through security pacts and economic exchange.
Although some European Union (EU) member-states face more daunting threats than others, this new security environment imperils the entire bloc. It also presents overwhelming incentive for enhanced cooperation across national borders. Several member-states, however, from those friendly with Moscow to those skeptical of deeper alignment to those whose political landscape skews nationalistic, may not be as keen on “more Europe” in these times. As the Euractiv Green Brief newsletter suggests, von der Leyen likely aimed her comments at “national governments who tend to pursue national interests when confronted with crises on a European scale.”
Unilateralism would squander this opportunity. The impetus to pool resources is not simply for European integration’s sake, but because multilateral action could deliver better results. Not only would joint development, purchasing, and planning of military capabilities yield a more formidable Europe, but current energy insecurity endangers the European market and threatens to leave citizens literally out in the cold. Though von der Leyen’s address was promising, the present challenge is to translate her sentiment into attitude and action.
Toward a Geopolitical Europe
February 24, the day Putin launched his most recent invasion of Ukraine, is seen as a turning point for Europe. With Washington’s support, Brussels quickly marshaled numerous sanctions packages that have eroded Russia’s post-Cold War economic progress and upended its relationship with Moscow. Since then, the European Commission has adopted a more “geopolitical” approach, embracing candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, and becoming more deeply involved in Europe’s foreign policy toward Russia. At the core of these developments is a recognition that efforts to build a constructive relationship with Russia since 1991 have failed.
Germany’s recent history with Russia underscores these challenges. Berlin pursued Russian energy resources, even after Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, through natural gas pipelines like Nord Stream 2, believing sustained commerce might incentivize Russia to temper its foreign policy so as to sustain such lucrative arrangements. Europe hoped Putin was truly “rational,” or, as writes Nathalie Tocci of Italian think-tank Istituto Affari Internazionali, subscribing to “a rationality that puts material interests above ideology.” But despite the threat of losing Germany’s business, Putin launched his attack on Ukraine and cut supply to European countries as retribution for supporting Kyiv. Reflecting on the unfolding war, then-recently elected German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock acknowledged that Europeans should have diversified their energy imports to rely less on Russia years ago, as “energy policy is always power policy… always security policy.” Because Putin has used energy as a political tool since the invasion, and indeed in other moments in the past two decades, this ideal relationship based on sanctity of contract, interdependence, and trade is unlikely.
Putin’s behavior seeks to anchor Ukraine in Moscow’s mir, or world, consistent with the Russian president’s conception of upholding Russian civilization and great power status. That Kyiv could opt to “join the West” through pursuit of EU or NATO membership was thus an unacceptable prospect, especially considering Putin’s view that the Western world is incompatible with Russia’s. This sense of historical right, if taken to its conclusions, is a different mode of thinking than that which underpins the European project, which in theory rejects sphere of influence politics and embraces the sort of peace through common progress that makes the EU’s promise so special. Because this undertaking does not interest Putin, the EU should adapt and fortify itself, not in the pursuit of war but of internal security. This pertains especially to the two most glaring areas: defense capabilities and energy.
Building European Defense Capability
In recent years, an increasingly complex security situation has imperiled Europe’s defense. The continent relies on U.S. capabilities, including military aid, troops, and large-scale sophisticated firepower, to guarantee its security. Though EU member-states’ military budgets have increased since Putin’s incursion in Crimea in 2014, Donald Trump’s presidency sparked unique concern over American commitment to Europe, given his questioning of NATO commitments and transactional approach to foreign policy. Most rank-and-file Republican lawmakers still support NATO, but a growing, vocal wing of the party shares Trump’s antipathy toward Europe.
Perhaps the most durable shift in U.S. politics, however, is a bipartisan prioritization of great-power competition with China, auguring a strategic shift toward the Indo-Pacific. Though war in Ukraine returned considerable focus to Europe, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan reaffirmed the Biden administration’s view of China as “the most consequential geopolitical challenge,” a belief echoed by the most recent U.S. national security strategy. Realizing these trends will persist, Europeans – notably French President Emmanuel Macron – have emphasized a need for “strategic autonomy,” or development of continental defense apart from Washington. So long as these efforts do not replace NATO or entirely reject the United States, but instead enhance existing systems, Europe will better insure itself against U.S. domestic volatility and strategic shifts as well as external threats by adopting this path.
The Ukraine crisis has introduced new urgency by demonstrating that war is still possible on the continent and that lack of preparation will prove costly. Europe’s dilemma thus remains improving capabilities in a productive manner, fearing that a lack of coordination and planning will limit the benefit of any additional spending. In EU High Representative Josep Borrell’s words, “after the Cold War, we shrunk our forces to bonsai armies. If each European state just increases its military capabilities… the result will be a big waste of resources. We’ll just have 27 bigger bonsais.” The EU has little competence over military strategy and, like NATO, does not have its own independent armed forces separate from the member-states. Its initiatives instead rely on the contributions of national forces.
Building the necessary technology will prove daunting. Ian Bond and Luigi Scazzieri of the Centre for European Reform write that, given current spending promises, it will still take years to procure necessary equipment and higher inflation rates will erode the value of new spending. And because the EU does not have a unified defense industrial base from which to draw, capacity development between member-states is limited and procurement processes remain biased toward national companies. This leaves European countries vulnerable to duplication and financial or practical obstacles. For example, two fighter aircraft programs in progress – one between Britain, Italy, and Sweden and another between France, Germany, and Spain – may both take longer and cost far more than might occur with greater cooperation, as both struggle to achieve economies of scale. Further, without common agreement on standardization and interoperability, EU member-states could find collaboration difficult in times of crisis.
For its part, Brussels seeks to facilitate this process through initiatives like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aimed at easing integration of member-states’ armed forces. The European Commission is also preparing proposals to incentivize joint procurement of weapons through VAT waivers and update the European Defense Fund (EDF) accordingly. Such steps toward greater multilateral planning could help maximize the defense of the European project and, in turn, each individual member.
Powering a New Energy Security
The more immediate concern for most EU member-states, however, is energy insecurity and economic havoc, especially with the downgrading of EU-Russia energy trade. As Jason Bordoff and Meghan L. O’Sullivan caution in Foreign Affairs, Moscow is “the dominant supplier of natural gas to Europe and a major exporter of coal and the low-enriched uranium used to power nuclear plants.” Some member-states like Lithuania or France rely less on Russia for energy to varying degrees, but before war broke out, others like Germany and several Central European counterparts counted on supplies from the east. Even before the EU’s ban on Russian oil imports, the European Commission and member-states like Italy resorted to a diplomatic blitz in preparation for a harsh winter without a key source.
Russia progressively sealed the spigots to several countries over the course of the summer, weaponizing energy trade. With commodity prices so high, persistent supply disruptions threaten to worsen inflation and usher in a recession with global ramifications. Europe has turned to alternatives in lieu of Russia, between bilateral agreements and large-scale deals with partners like Norway, Algeria, Qatar, and Azerbaijan, to compensate for vulnerability. The United States has been supplying more liquified natural gas (LNG) than expected, resulting from the European Commission’s energy diplomacy early on in the crisis. These efforts have hardly been for naught; EU gas storages are 90% full and von der Leyen has expressed confidence ahead of winter. Among the most vulnerable are Central and Eastern European countries lacking the infrastructure to diversify quickly. However, bilateral deals like the one Greece and Bulgaria have reached on a long-delayed gas pipeline, providing the latter with an affordable alternative to its usual Russian flow, are promising.
European countries’ collective efforts have evidently already yielded dividends. However, continued consensus may be necessary to deal with two additional challenges: weathering price fluctuations and ensuring future supply, especially ahead of the winter of 2023. Member-states have increasingly been engaging Brussels given the implications of energy policy in the European market. Discussion of price caps has dominated, alongside Germany’s announcement of a relief package worth 200 billion euros for households and businesses, which has attracted widespread criticism for undermining a level playing field in the single market. Whatever the result of these debates, divergent national measures threaten to unsettle markets and fracture an integrated approach to energy, which is why continued bloc-wide solutions to additional challenges like decreasing consumer demand are of paramount importance.
On the supply front, Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann write that the EU stands the best chance if member-states pool their resources with an eye to securing supply for the entire bloc if necessary. Just as with national defense capacities, having 27 different energy strategies makes the pursuit of EU-wide supply more costly and risks leaving some countries out in the cold. If breakthroughs on other fronts arrive, such as on the stalled pipeline between Spain and France, Europe would further be equipped to supply all of its members, especially with future winters in mind.
“Forged in Crisis”
As new obstacles confront the EU, a united front presents the greatest chance of success at handling them. Countries like Hungary – whose prime minister, Viktor Orban, maintains close ties with Putin – within the bloc are cumbersome realities that must be managed. Further, governments must stand firm in their support of Ukraine through sanctions on Russia when the temperature drops. Brussels has been quite active in and recognizing a new geopolitical imperative and seeking a uniform policy since February. However, not all authority needs to be centralized in Brussels for member-states to communicate with each other. This is significant, considering governments skeptical of greater European integration but seemingly likely to support Ukraine and improved European defense, like the one likely to form in Italy following September’s elections, can still engage productively in building European capacity.
It has long been said that the EU is forged in crisis. Russia’s behavior has granted EU member-states even more reason to mold a new security architecture, from heating homes this winter to deterring future aggression for years to come. Though Putin continues to wreak havoc on Ukraine, the EU can emerge a more capable ally by fortifying its own security. The chilling scenes emanating from Europe’s east this year are stark warnings of a new geopolitical relationship to come, but also reason to take action. If member-states maintain their momentum and unify behind this common motivation, they can realize von der Leyen’s goal of “a union that stands strong together,” and turn platitude into prophecy.