Towards the end of January, the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR) announced that the government and national assembly had been dissolved, and they had removed democratically-elected Roch Marc Kaboré from his position as president of Burkina Faso. Kaboré was detained and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, an overnight curfew was implemented, land and air borders were closed, and the constitution was suspended for one week. A coup d’état had struck.
While this is the most recent one, a trend has emerged in the past year and a half as Mali, Guinea, and Chad have faced military takeovers. There is a resurgence of coups in West Africa, and the contributing factors are not adequately being mitigated. With the presence of everything from violent extremism to poverty, democratic institutions are struggling to stay alive in the region, and there has been controversy regarding international response. Moreover, discussion of this subject has been full of generalizations and blanket policy suggestions. Examining the coup in Burkina Faso can provide a deeper understanding of the circumstances in West Africa and why it is important to acknowledge each country’s distinct identity, advancing the global conversation surrounding intervention and aid.
Growing Violence in West Africa
The buildup to the coup in Burkina Faso was multifaceted, but a major reason for the overthrow was the rising threat from violent extremists. As with the 2020 coup in Mali—the one often seen as the trigger for the other military takeovers—many civilians thought that their government had failed to protect them. Since 2016, over 230 terrorist attacks have taken place in Burkina Faso. Last November, 53 people were killed after a gendarmerie post was attacked, which was “the worst strike on Burkinabe security forces in years.” Just one month later, a civilian militia trained by the government to contain insurgents was ambushed, and at least 41 members were killed. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “violent events linked to militant Islamist groups” increased by 70 percent between 2020 and 2021 in the Sahel region, and the United Nations reported that almost 12,000 people were displaced within two weeks in December. There were at least 2,354 fatalities from the violence in 2021.
Many believed that the government response was not enough, and the people of Burkina Faso made that clear. As gunfire erupted at Kaboré's residence and several of the country’s military barracks on the day of the coup, protests raged in the capital. The headquarters of Kaboré’s party was looted and set on fire, and people were tear gassed by police as hundreds marched through Ouagadougou. The events of this day showed what Damiba explicitly said in his first speech since taking power: the takeover was due to their former leader’s failure to stop attacks across the country.
Repercussions Regarding Sanctions and Aid
A major player in how the world has responded to the coups is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). After the coups in Mali and Guinea, ECOWAS responded by closing member states’ borders and imposing economic sanctions. However, these sanctions were highly controversial, in part because the affected economies were already poor. If the goal of these sanctions is to promote stability in the region, the long-term consequences may backfire. As explained by the International Peace Institute, the sanctions may be “necessary” but “counterproductive,” and the people whose lives could be altered the most would be marginalized groups in rural areas, those displaced from the violence, and unemployed youth. A large portion of the protestors on the day of the coup in Burkina Faso were showing up in solidarity with the affected population in Mali.
While the possibility of sanctions remains and ECOWAS has warned of them, Burkina Faso has only been removed from the bloc thus far, and the African Union (AU) also suspended the country pending the reinstatement of the constitution. Additionally, while sanctions have not been imposed, the United States has paused $450 million in aid to Burkina Faso. The United States has been the largest international donor to the country, but U.S. law requires the suspension of non-humanitarian aid to countries where a democratically-elected government has been taken over unconstitutionally, and there is still much uncertainty regarding Burkina Faso’s path forward. Although the constitution has been restored now and MPSR ensured “the continuity of the state pending the establishment of transitional bodies,” those transitional bodies are yet to be established.
In a more recent development, Burkina Faso may see a steep decline in aid due to the invasion of Ukraine. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council spokesperson in West and Central Africa said, “Some donors have already indicated that they would proceed to a 70% cut of our funding to support operations in Ukraine…” Additionally, a regional advocate from Refugees International said that “Russia is one of the leading grain exporters in the world,” and more people in sub-Saharan Africa will be in need of emergency food assistance as the international community cuts ties with Russia. Finally, certain impacts of foreign aid on political stability as a whole are still debated, but time will tell whether the military government is able to successfully carry out their plans.
However, a timeline has been given for the transition of power in Burkina Faso, and it was announced a week after the invasion of Ukraine. Damiba was officially inaugurated as president back in February and a team of 25 ministers stood by his side, but it took until March for other plans to be released. On March 3, an economist and professor named Albert Ouedraogo was announced to be the interim prime minister, and the plan as communicated by the military government is for Damiba and Ouedraogo to work towards political stability for the next three years before hosting elections.
International Response to the Coup
Countries in other parts of the world have also reacted to the coup, including France. Although France has been less involved in Burkina Faso than it has in some neighboring countries, Burkina Faso is a former French colony, and France has about 5,000 soldiers in the region. For years, France has been trying to halt militant attacks from extremists by sending in troops and working with the groups in power, but after the events of January, the country is in a tough place. After the takeover of Burkina Faso, President Emmanuel Macron said, "I would remind you that our priority in the region is to fight against Islamist terrorism,” but it should be noted that Macron has an upcoming election to think about. While he has already been reducing the number of troops in the area, if France takes any drastic measures, those actions would reflect on him.
Russia is also worth discussing, for reasons beyond the invasion of Ukraine. In Mali, the junta has relied on security from the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization backed by the Russian government, and this group has been deployed in Libya and the Central African Republic as well. Reportedly, the leader of the coup in Burkina Faso was regularly in communication with the military leaders of Mali and Guinea, and twice, Damiba tried to convince Kaboré to use Russian paramilitaries. Kaboré refused, but with Damiba in power, the situation has shifted.
Examining France and Russia’s current role in the region, counterterrorism and tension between the West and Russia were at the forefront of the conversation—but there is more at play. Some have said that “core political problems” are being ignored while foreign powers use West Africa to compete among themselves. In terms of Burkina Faso, the International Crisis Group surfaced the importance of addressing the social crisis in the north and the development deficit, as well as the pre-existing spread of corruption in the administration judicial system. Not every coup in the region can be solely blamed on violent extremism (although it is certainly a large factor in this situation) because the acceptance of democracy underlies the pattern.
The Need for Nuance
The chairman of ECOWAS and president of Ghana, Nana Akufo-Addo, called the coup in Mali “contagious” during the summit following Burkina Faso’s takeover. This implies that the coups are having a domino effect, or that they are modeled after each other. Notably, however, not every coup in West Africa stemmed from the violent extremists, but rather the interruption or prevention of democratic trajectories. Some, including Vice President of the US Institute of Peace’s Africa Center Joseph Sany, believe that conveying the idea of a coup contagion is problematic because it “absolves the world community” from assisting West African countries in creating democratic institutions. Fully attributing these coups to violent extremism could greatly affect the viability of international response.
On the other hand, Akufo-Addo did address the observed controversy over democracy, and he called for a collective response to the trend of coups in the region. Perhaps “contagious” is a fitting way to describe the pattern in West Africa, not because extremism is the overarching factor, but rather concerns about democracy. Panic generated from violence inevitably leads to critique of the present format and exploration of government systems, but while root causes are important to address, there does seem to be a connecting factor beyond violent extremism.
Moving forward, those discussing coups in the West African region should be conscious of nuance while noting that there are major similarities. Talking as though each country is struggling for the same reason and attributing all of this to religious extremism interrupts how the international community responds to military takeovers in West Africa, and that way of thinking draws attention away from social issues, government/judicial corruption, poverty, and more. Particularly in terms of strategizing foreign aid, countries need to pay attention to both the situations of individual countries and the region as a whole.