Notice: This paper includes discussions of sexual and gender-based violence.
Founded in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, better known as North Korea, is considered to be the last true Stalinist regime. Similar to other communist nations, such as the Soviet Union and China, North Korea prides itself on gender equality and freeing women from the responsibilities and social roles that held them back from fully supporting their country. In 1946, North Korea passed the Sex Equality Law, followed by a stipulation in Article 22 of the 1948 Constitution that “women in the D.P.R.K. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of government, political, economic, social and cultural activity. The state protects especially mothers and children.” Articles in the 1972 and 1990 Constitutions continued the trend with the statements that “women hold equal social status and rights with men” and of the country’s contribution to the creation of “various conditions for the advancement of women”, respectfully. For most of its existence, the North Korean government, and the Kim regime - Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il, and Kim Jong-Un - maintained a relatively stable society, with work requirements, food rations, and set salaries for all citizens. However, in the 1990s, North Korea fell into an economic crash and famine following the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent loss of aid support. The hardships, better known as the Arduous March, went on to drastically change the role of women in North Korean society. During the famine, the government required citizens to continue working despite a lack of salary. Women were in a unique position in the labor force, as, unlike other communist nations, North Korea emphasized the role of mothers and recognized the role of the housewife as a valid alternative to state employment. The country began this acknowledgment of housewives and mothers near its founding, with the 1946 Labour Law prohibiting women and children from “toilsome or harmful labour”. As the nation continued to grow, the North Korean government never officially denounced the traditional Confucian hierarchies, particularly in reference to gender roles, providing many women the leeway to leave their state jobs to be housewives after marriage. The amount of women leaving the workforce after marriage had grown to over 60 percent by the mid-1980s. This supplied them with the freedom and time flexibility to pursue other opportunities to provide for their families as they were no longer expected to perform jobs in the traditional labor force. As more women pursued informal methods of income generation, a market economy known as the “jangmadang” was created and women quickly gained a unique social status as the primary breadwinners and caregivers of their households. Yet, this was not the case for all women in North Korea. Women in the military were denied the same status and opportunities, and while their responsibilities and roles have changed over the past thirty years, the change has not occurred parallel to the overall status change of women in the general population. While the economic and social positions of women in North Korea have changed over the past three decades through greater financial and social independence, those changes have not been mirrored within the military as enlisted women remain subjected to grueling and unequal tasks, poor sanitary conditions, and a mass culture of abuse and discrimination.
Understanding the background of the issue is essential when approaching the roles of women in North Korea’s military. The relationship between women and the military can be broken into two major time periods; 1) prior to a reported mandatory service requirement in 2015 and 2) post the requirement. South Korea and internationally based news agencies first began reporting on the mandatory service requirement in January of 2015, however, the details of the exact policy remain ambiguous. One article, published by Daily North Korea, stated that the directive establishes military service as “mandatory for eligible women between the ages of 17 and 20,” with enlistment length lasting up to five or six years. It must be noted, however, that reports surrounding the mandatory service requirement may not be entirely accurate due to the lack of clear sources or data, and it is possible that it is instead a highly encouraged enlisted policy, similar to what men in North Korea experienced throughout most of the country’s history. For the purposes of this analysis, attention will be paid to the policy in 2015 as a marker in shifting attitudes and expectations surrounding the military service of women. Prior to 2015, primary accounts - mostly from defectors - present that joining the military was viewed by women not as a duty to the country but as a way to rise up in social rank, as many of those in higher military positions were in a higher class or members of the Korean Workers’ Party. One defector, Lee So-Yeon, served in the military for about a decade and served as a signals specialist along the Demilitarized Zone. During an interview with The World, she stated her reason for joining was to “become a low-ranking member of the ruling party.” Even as women gained social and economic status due to the market economy, the country’s strict hierarchical order made it difficult to move between class levels. Additionally, during the famine in the 1990s, many who enlisted did so due to the appeal of a daily meal. For many, especially women, who had less pressure to enlist, joining the military could create a path to a better future.
Following the reported mandatory service requirement in 2015, the number of women in the military unsurprisingly grew from an estimated 2.38% of the country’s total population in 2015 to an estimated 2.62% in 2018. According to South Korean news sources, women were now expected to serve from the age of eighteen or nineteen until they were twenty-three. This five-year service expectation is half of what is set for men, who are typically in the service for ten years. The change can be explained in part by the reported population decline in North Korea, which has contributed to a similar decline in military size. Enlisting in the military was now no longer a tool for increasing social status. Rather, it is now a responsibility. While women who care for family members or children face less pressure to join, many do not marry or have children until their late-20’s, due to the preexisting service expectations for men. As a result, there is less ability for women to pursue market opportunities or keep themselves out of the pressure of contributing to North Korea’s workforce and military.
Central to the experience of any soldier is the expected tasks and duties. For the women in North Korea’s military, these expectations varied heavily from that of male soldiers. After joining, women undergo training similar to that of their male counterparts. They reportedly have slightly shorter physical training regimens during the day. However, the overall daily schedule is relatively the same. In addition to the physical training demands, many women soldiers are also expected to perform the cooking and cleaning for their units. They are viewed as “ttukong unjeongsu” according to author Juliette Morillot, a term that directly translates to “cooking pot lid drivers” and references the traditional attitudes around the gender roles and responsibilities of women. The requirements end up being overwhelming to the soldiers, who have to juggle their training, position tasks, and domestic duties simultaneously.
North Korea’s government has presented itself as a beacon of gender equality, the military being no exception. However, under that phrase is a culture of Confucian values creating social hierarchies. Women in the country are subject to inadequate sanitation and hygiene, an issue that is worse for those serving in the military. Primary to this is the issue of menstruation. North Korea’s society shuns the idea of periods, considering them impure and taboo to discuss, making it difficult for women to receive the care they need. Women outside of the military have access to jangmadang where they can purchase makeshift sanitary products. For example, some defectors described how women would oftentimes buy medical gauze to use as pads, cloths that could be washed and reused, old used clothing, or socks to use as pads. Those in the military, however, are cut off from the jangmadang and are forced instead to use military gauze or reused sanitary pads that could only be cleaned and reused during the night, when male soldiers were sleeping. As discussed, female soldiers are subject to the same intense physical regimens as their male counterparts, a requirement that limits their ability to swap out dirty hygiene products and stresses their body’s limits. Some recounts by defectors claim the complete loss of periods due to the physical training, stress, and inadequate nutrition - most troops, male and female, are reportedly provided bowls of rice and corn for meals, with meat and candies reserved for special occasions. Following the 2015 policy change, the Kim Regime announced it would start providing sanitary products to its female soldiers, however, little is known about the follow-through or the amount that was distributed.
The tasks of women in the military went beyond physical training, cooking, and cleaning. For a majority of North Korea’s history, one of the most prominent images of women in the military was of the Kippumjo, a “pleasure squad” of approximately 2,000 women and girls that provided entertainment for the Kim regime, high-ranking officials of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and distinguished guests. The squad was formed under Kim Il-Sung sometime in the 1970s and was reported to be disbanded in 2011 by Kim Jong-Un. It is also important to note that in 2015, news agencies began publishing articles that Kim Jong-Un was reestablishing the Kippumjo. During its active period, teenage girls, typically between the ages of 15 and 19 would be recruited by officers based on their height and appearance. One defector by the name of Mi Hyang claimed to have been a member of the Kippumjo. She recounted being conscripted while in high school when officers visited her school and was then trained for six months before beginning her service. Members of the special force received greater benefits than other women in military service. They were reportedly provided with new appliances and a stipend. Reported duties for the members of the Kippumjo varied from dancing and singing to massages to sexual favors. While the Kippumjo has reportedly been disbanded, the culture of gender discrimination within North Korea’s military has not.
Despite the lack of attention to female bodily autonomy and needs, North Korea maintains a hyper-feminized image of how women should appear and behave. This is highlighted by the intense beauty standards faced by women both within and outside of the military. For the general female population, the rise of the market economy and greater economic freedom has allowed for more expression in fashion. Since the 1990s, women’s fashion has evolved to embrace clothing reflective of the nation’s first lady, Ri Sol-Ju, with brighter colors, lace and sequins, and feminine cuts. It could be expected that this hyper feminization would not occur within the military, as women there would be expected to be equals to their male counterparts and focus on their tasks and position. Yet, women in the military are still expected to maintain appearances. While the pleasure squadron, the Kippumjo, has been disbanded, female soldiers are expected to maintain basic aspects of their feminine image. In fact, when the Kim Regime released the state-sponsored cosmetics brand “Pyongyang Cosmetics Industry,” it distributed products to many female aviation units. In short, the country expected women to be capable of maintaining their feminine qualities despite their intense training, lack of sanitation, and domestic duties.
Arguably the harshest part of the experiences of women in North Korea’s military is the expansive sexual assault and rape culture. Despite a lack of exact numbers, reports from defectors have shown that rape and sexual assault are part of the norm for many female soldiers. Defectors would report that even if they themselves were not assaulted during their time in the army, they knew of many others who were. While Pyongyang claims that it does not tolerate any form of sexual assault towards its soldiers, cases are seldom pursued. Cases that are pursued are rarely found in favor of the victim, and many more are shunned into silence by a culture of shame. Some women are frightened into silence through threats to “block their chances of joining the party if they refuse or attempt to report the abuse.” Rhetoric is presented to blame victims and put the focus on women’s actions rather than on the violations by men. This creates a system of victim-blaming, one which takes the blame away from perpetrators and puts it on the female victims. Female soldiers are unable to receive care, on top of the already lacking menstrual hygiene and the pressure to keep quiet. Instead, they are forced to suffer in silence.
Despite sexual assault and harassment being common knowledge for women in the military, they are still forced to struggle on their own. In the case of sexual assault, victims are oftentimes on their own, as a culture of shame and victim-blaming is prevalent even among other female soldiers. Sexual assault is viewed as something to be expected and is normalized to the point that the country has established the idea that women must act in a certain way to avoid violence. The issue is so expansive that in order to avoid social blame, women are willing to undergo dangerous abortions. Especially in the military, where a pregnancy could ruin one’s social status and career, some soldiers use anthelmintic medicine, tighten their belts, or roll down hills to force miscarriages. If able to, some pursue illegal surgical abortions, with potentially life-threatening consequences. Sexual assault and rape also put them at risk for injury, sexual-transmitted illnesses, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Enlisted women are especially vulnerable to sexual violence due to the male-centric hierarchal nature of the military, with social values and limitations cutting them off from seeking comfort, medical care, or legal recourse, leaving them on their own to cope.
Not only is the mental and physical health of the women in the military impacted by the tasks and discrimination that they face during their service, but their social roles and the country’s economy as a whole are also affected. Women outside of the traditional workforce were able to participate in the market economy during the 1990s, including women who were not tied up in the military operations that came as a response to natural disasters and flooding. As North Korea continues to work towards increasing its military capabilities despite a dwindling population, its focus on pressuring enlistment among women limits their ability to provide food for themselves and their families as well as to participate in the country’s now semi-legal and quasi-capitalist markets. Taking women out of the markets will eliminate the primary organizers and parties involved, potentially decreasing the strength of the country’s overall economy. Additionally, as women are pushed into the military, they will potentially lose the social statuses that they gained as a result of the jangmadang. Following the Arduous March, women had become the primary “breadwinners” for their households and also gained greater freedoms as divorce rates rose and extramarital affairs became less taboo. This status is inherently linked to the market economy, and if women are taken out of the equation, it is likely that both will reverse.
As North Korea gains increased attention on the international stage, many look to its growing military capability and unique economic structure. North Korea’s military growth has involved technological developments in cyber, missile, and nuclear capabilities. Simultaneously, the country developed its market economy through the jangmadang. However, both of these involve one specific group, the women of North Korea. As the country attempts to balance its ambitions, declining population growth - from 1.54 percent in the 1980s to 0.49 percent in the 2010s - and diminishing military size - from an estimated 6.6 percent of the population in the 1980s to 5.2 percent -, it turned to women as the solution. Women had been part of the solution to famine and economic decline thirty years ago, as their unique social status allowed them to become the primary breadwinners and base of a new market economy during the Arduous March in the 1990s. Women currently make up an estimated 51.5 percent of the country’s population, yet, as previously stated, only 2.62 percent of women currently serve in the country’s military. As a result, the female population remains a largely untapped resource for military growth. From the 1990s onward, women managed to gain a higher social status and earn greater freedoms, even if those freedoms are not comparable to those of other nations. Despite these changes, the status of women within the North Korean military saw little movement. While the country’s campaign to increase female military enlisted, domestic responsibilities, lack of sanitary products, beauty standards, and sexual assault have continued to dominate their experiences. As North Korea pushes forward on its current path, it puts its economy at risk, as well as the status of its female population. The removal from the market economy and the cultural shame around traumatic gender-based experiences in favor of the stagnant military status threatens to dominate the experiences of women and force their social advances to regress.