It is generally understood that uniformed personnel serving in peace operations, from a variety of different militaries and in a variety of different settings, will understand and conceptualize their experiences and operations in different ways. This is true when we examine how personnel from different Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) view the Protection of Civilians (POC). As Fiifi Edu-Afful notes in his IPI report on peacekeeping in non-permissive environments, “the mindset of peacekeeping contingents is often predicated on the concepts and attitudes imparted through the training and doctrinal perspective of the TCC that deployed them.” However, what happens when the views of peacekeepers differ from their training? I explore a possible case of this occurring through the example of Kenyan peacekeepers deployed in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).
Through conducting interviews, reviewing archival documents, and analyzing open-source information, I found that there is a disconnect between what Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) personnel were taught regarding protection and what they actually believe. This article examines that difference, how it came to be, and the implications of the existence of that disconnect for future research and policy. However, it is important to caveat that this research is currently exploratory as it is based on relatively limited data and observations.
This article begins by examining how KDF personnel are taught about POC and what concepts they are taught, which are based around conventional existing UN doctrine. It then looks at how KDF personnel who served in AMISOM actually view POC, which is more outcomes-based, community-focused, and holistic. It then examines possible reasons why this disconnect occurred, building off the KDF’s organizational history and the operating experience they found themselves in in Somalia. It then concludes by presenting some concluding thoughts and implications for policymakers and academics.
KDF pre-deployment training, mostly based at the International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC), had limited specialized protection training, and what specialized POC training was offered was based on pre-existing UN doctrine, such as the published “Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United nations Peacekeeping” and the “Protection of Civilians Handbook,” that emphasizes certain methods and objectives One reviewed training schedule, for infantry units deploying to a UN mission, included only a single 45 minute training block fully dedicated to the “Protection of Civilians.” It’s likely that personnel deploying to AMISOM received similar levels of total pre-deployment training but with even less of a theoretical emphasis on POC. A civilian working at the center noted that both UN and AU pre deployment training used a similar structure and two-week training schedule. However, multiple trainers who worked with the KDF noted that units deploying to Somalia received a stronger focus on “basic soldiering skills,” given the harsh environment and by extension a lesser focus on academic topics, such as the module on POC compared to pre-deployment for UN missions. These modules were usually a combination of lectures, discussions, and scenario-based learning.
While we don’t currently know what material is specifically taught in AMISOM pre-deployment training, a review of training material gives us a strong idea of how the IPSTC conceptualized POC as a general concept before it was made mission specific. This can be determined by their facilitators’ guide for their specialized “Protection of Civilians” course that, while not in and of itself widely attended within the KDF, shows how the IPSTC views POC and might teach at a smaller scale to those deploying to Somalia.
The conceptualization of POC offered by the specialized POC course is almost entirely in line with existing UN doctrine. In the course, POC activities are divided into three tiers of operation (Protection through Political Process, Protection from Physical Violence, and Establishing a Protective Environment) across four phases (Prevention, Pre-emption, Response, and Consolidation). In UN doctrine, POC activities are also divided into three tiers of operation (Protection through dialogue and engagement, Provision of physical protection, and Establishment of a protective environment) also across four phases (Prevention, Pre-emption, Response, and Consolidation).
Despite the differences in mandate and operating environment, the use of UN doctrine makes sense. It is already well established, developed, and tested. Thus, it makes sense to teach it to those deploying to AMISOM. Even if the difference in mandate (AMISOM, for example, does not have an active protection mandate unlike many UN missions) makes some parts of it irrelevant. However, the ways in which personnel trained in UN doctrine interact with their operational environment combine to form a new conceptual framework for POC.
KDF personnel who had served in AMISOM, however, displayed a very different conceptualization of POC. This manifested itself in two ways. First, they conceptualized POC as community based and outcome based rather than process based and based around particular incidents as in standard doctrine. Second, they focused on how POC could “work” for the KDF.
Firstly, KDF personnel viewed POC on a community level. When asked what a “successful POC” looks like, one KDF officer who had served in AMISOM answered that it involved a scenario with reduced violence, where people could go back to businesses and students could go back to school. Importantly, this is outcome-based. It describes what happens when POC activities are implemented well rather than describing what activities would help create that environment. It was also community-based. It describes improving conditions for the community as a whole rather than protecting specific targeted individuals or groups from imminent physical harm, which is what UN POC doctrine prioritizes.
There was also a desire to view POC through the lens of AMISOM’s stabilization and peace enforcement mandate. Another KDF officer, who served in AMISOM as part of a EOD unit, described teaching civilians how to recognize IEDs as a POC success. While this obviously mitigates civilian harm and is a clear-cut case of POC, he also highlighted how that was useful for the KDF because it allowed for local civilians to better report possible threats to KDF patrols. Similarly, many AMISOM public statements on POC and increased POC awareness focus on civilian harm mitigation or reducing the threat to civilians from one’s own action, instead of from other actors. This is in order to prevent backlash and loss of support amongst the mission. Several sources spoke of established loss of local support, partially as the result of civilian casualties caused by AMISOM, as a key challenge to mission effectiveness. This suggests that, especially in non-permissive environments where POC is not a core mandated activity, POC activities (such as training civilians to recognize IEDs) is viewed as a means to an end (stabilization) rather than an end in and of itself.
While there is a clear difference between what KDF personnel are taught regarding POC and what they actually believe, it is less clear why that gap occurs. One reason may relate to the operational environment. AMISOM and the Somali context is very different from the average environment where UN peacekeeping operations operate (such as the DRC and South Sudan) in two major ways: the mission mandate and the operating environment.
Compared to many other African conflicts, the conflict in Somalia features fewer cases of large scale and deliberate targeting of civilian population. Using data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), we can track violence dynamics. During AMISOM’s 8+ years of operation, ACLED only recorded 37 attacks against civilians with 10 or more fatalities. In contrast, during the first six months of 2022 alone, the DRC saw 29 such attacks, the Central African Republic 12, Mali 34, and South Sudan 19. In contrast to other conflicts, where the large-scale massacre of civilians is a common tactic by armed groups, most Somali civilians who died in conflict die in smaller scale incidents such as assassinations, IEDs, and crossfire during battles between different armed groups.
There are also key differences between UN peacekeeping mandates and AMISOM’s mandate. While all large-scale UN peacekeeping operations are mandated to protect civilians from imminent physical harm, AMISOM lacks such an explicit mandate. However, interviews with KDF personnel showed an internal buy-in to do POC amongst KDF personnel, and conducting POC activities was still encouraged to some extent by AMISOM leadership.
These two factors partially explain the difference in POC conceptualization. In UN missions, where the explicit mandate is to protect civilians from “Imminent Physical Harm,” POC becomes focused on ways to prevent incidents, where “Imminent Physical Harm” occur on a large scale such as massacres. There are a variety of ways to accomplish this, such as mediating local conflict, conducting military patrols, and developing early warning networks, but the objective is the same. The conceptualization of POC develops along that line. In contrast, civilian casualties in Somalia don’t largely occur as a result of large-scale attacks that result in “Imminent Physical Harm.” Instead, they largely occur as a byproduct of the conflict between the government and Al-Shabaab. Thus, the KDF vision of POC, where the successful implementation of POC programs is framed around communities returning to normalcy as a result of stabilizing the community in general, rather than preventing specific negative events. This is speculative, but the view could be that, by reducing and ending the conflict between armed groups, the threat to civilians brought by the conflict is coincidentally ended, thus protecting civilians. The lack of mandate also means that AMISOM personnel aren’t mandated to intervene in cases of “Imminent Physical Harm.” They are, however, mandated to defeat Al-Shabaab and (theoretically) end the conflict and, thus, the threat to civilians as a result of that conflict.
While environmental effects of the Somali context were the primary driver in the division between what KDF personnel were taught regarding POC and what they believed, there are probably also other secondary contributing factors. While these factors would require further research to be fully understood, there are some factors within the KDFs organizational culture that might influence the development of their views on POC. The KDF was formed immediately after independence with the assistance of their former colonial masters and have had a close working relationship with the British ever since. The KDF fits the mold of a colonial military, where the military is consistently trained, equipped, and supported by the former colonial power. Compared to many of its neighbors, the KDF has a strong history of political non-interference in domestic affairs. The KDF also hasn’t fought in any major conflicts beyond some small domestic counterinsurgency efforts until their commitment to AMISOM. Several foreign trainers I’ve spoken with highlighted how this level of intensity marked a new challenge for the KDF, forcing the organization to further professionalize, receive additional training, and adopt modern COIN doctrine when they previously never had to. This collective experience means that the Kenyan experience in Somalia is possibly formative for the KDF’s conceptualization of itself and how it operates. The reason why the KDF’s view on POC lines up with the Somali context so well, versus being incorporated into a wider schema, is because AMISOM has represented the first and most dominant experience of the KDF with regards to POC.
Peacekeeping is becoming an increasingly multilateral institution, as more and more countries from different regions and backgrounds deploy troops to peacekeeping missions. As this article has established, the environment peacekeepers are deployed in has a significant impact on their views towards their activities and peacekeeping concepts. There is room for more research on this topic. While it has been laid out here that KDF personnel have a unique view on protection, there is room to explore how personnel from different TCCs view POC through their own separate lenses. Within that, there is also room to explore how the different combinations of military culture, training/doctrine, and operational experience can impact the perceptions of peacekeepers. This, in turn, will help policymakers, planners, and practitioners better understand the diversity of views within peacekeeping and help them better conduct successful implementations of POC mandates.