In September 2022, Ukraine’s farmers began sowing winter wheat, rye, barley, and rapeseed with the echoes of Russian artillery and the smell of burning cities fresh in their minds. Many agricultural fields such as those in Ozera, Ukraine were cratered by rockets, flattened by tanks, and littered with the vestiges of war. Tractors started with no guarantee that Russia would respect Ukraine’s right to export grain from its Black Sea ports. Many of those who would be working in these fields were off fighting against the Russian military. Ukraine’s rich black soil and its seaports which give it access to international markets make the country a critical global agricultural exporter and is the reason why it is commonly referred to as “the breadbasket of Europe.” Unfortunately, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food anticipated the land dedicated to winter grain crops would decrease by up to 35 percent. The time and resources lost to Putin’s war not only threaten Europe’s food security but could cause a devastating disruption in global food distribution. The international community recognized this threat and has acted. In November 2022, Türkiye and the United Nations negotiated a deal to extend the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), which assures Ukraine’s grain exports safe passage past Russian naval blockades, by 120 days. Although the BSGI took a critical step in staving off the worst consequences of a global food shortage, there is more to be done.
As the March expiration-date soon approaches, Russia has telegraphed that reupping the crucial deal will come with some foot-dragging. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin said during a February 13 interview that without the “real removal of sanctions restrictions on Russian agricultural exports,” the extension of the deal is “inappropriate.” However, this statement bends reality, because Western sanctions have not explicitly targeted Russian agricultural exports. Moscow has argued that blocks on its payments, logistics, and insurance industries are a “barrier” to the export of grains and fertilizers. The Kremlin seems to be using the threat of a global food crisis to further its own interests and weaken Ukraine’s economy.
Moscow is not too proud to hide its intentions. As a condition of the BSGI, joint teams from Ukraine, Russia, the United Nations, and Türkiye must inspect each ship to prevent the arrival or departure of unauthorized cargo and passengers. Ukrainian ship inspector Ruslan Sakhautdinov claims that his Russian counterparts systematically delay inspections by double and triple-checking fuel gages and scrutinizing crewmembers’ personal belongings. The practice has become routine and created serious backlogs. In October 2022, Istanbul’s typically beautiful sunrise on the Marmara Sea was littered with 165 cargo ships waiting for inspection. In January 2023, Ukraine exported 3.1 million tonnes of grain which fell far short of its 5 million tonne goal. In fact, the BSGI has not once met its goal since the deal was signed in August. October was the month that came closest to the target— when 194 ships were cleared for passage exporting 4.3 million tonnes of grain (compared to the 85 ships in January). October’s brief success was thanks to Moscow stepping away from the deal which in consequence allowed for the Ukrainian, U.N., and Turkish inspectors to work without the obstruction of their Russian colleagues.
One consequence is that, as the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service observed in January, “Ukraine farm prices remain low due to the increased stockpiles and decrease in export demand as some countries shifted to other suppliers.” Facing market volatility and lower expected returns, many of Ukraine’s wheat producers have made the calculation that it is in their best interest to plant fewer acres so that they aren’t stuck with silos of grain which can’t be sold. Russian farmers on the other hand have increased their grain production and exports since the war started. However, they don’t have the capacity to supplant Ukraine’s agricultural losses. Moscow has critically damaged Ukraine’s production capabilities and continues to undermine global food networks with threats to the BSGI.
Russia’s actions come as World Food Programme (WFP) boss David Beasley stressed at the Munich Security Conference that nonrenewal of the grain deal would be catastrophic for millions in Africa who are on the cusp of starvation. Beasley noted too that the initiative’s current grain flows have still not been sufficient for the needs of poorer countries that are reliant on regional exports.
Together, Ukraine and Russia constitute 12 percent of the global market share in calories. The most vulnerable countries to food shortages share some common characteristics. They typically (although not all applicable) are reliant on Ukrainian and Russian imports, are low-income, have active conflicts, and lack robust internal food distribution systems. Countries in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Central Asia, and Eastern Africa are most at-risk due to the Ukraine conflict. In the MENA region, Jordan, Yemen, Israel, and Lebanon are most vulnerable. Armenia (92 percent of its grain imports come from Ukraine and Russia), Azerbaijan, and Georgia are the most vulnerable Central Asian countries. In Eastern Africa, the countries with the highest reliance on Ukraine and Russian grain imports are Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi, and Ethiopia.
The Brussels-based thinktank Bruegel in March 2022 following Russia’s invasion anticipated the global food implications of the conflict and forecasted three possible scenarios. In their worst-case scenario, Ukraine would need all of its grain for domestic consumption and exports fell 100 percent year-over-year. Thankfully this has not materialized and unless there is a dramatic turn in the war (possibly from Russian use of strategic nuclear warheads), this will scenario will remain a hypothetical. The second worst-case scenario would see Ukraine export half of its normal production. In the best-case scenario, Ukraine would export roughly 70 percent of its normal production. The current situation hovers in between the second-worst case and best-case scenarios. Although Ukraine exported 23.6 million tonnes of grain in the 2022/23 season (70.4% of its exports from the same stage the year prior), decreases in production will allow Ukraine to harvest only 51 million tonnes which is 59 percent of 2021 pre-war harvests.
High food prices also pose a danger to global food security. In the first stages of Russia’s War in Ukraine, food prices lept and the greatest costs were felt in low-income countries. For instance in August 2022, it cost Ayan Hassan Abdirahman— a mother of 11 children who lives in the capital of Somalia— twice as much as it did just months before to buy the wheat flour that she needs to prepare breakfasts. Increases in crude oil prices and disruption to Russian fertilizer exports have increased food production costs globally. These consequences are most visible in the ports of Brazil. The South American country is the 4th largest agricultural producer in the world and imports 85 percent of the fertilizer it requires— mostly from Russia. Sea ports across the country reached their maximum capacity due to growing stockpiles of imported fertilizer. Farmers were unable to purchase the products, delaying the sowing process, because the price of fertilizer became too expensive. In recent months, prices have decreased but are still roughly 150 percent more expensive than the 5-year average. The higher cost of production will result in higher food prices which would be unreachable from millions globally without international assistance.
WFP estimates that today 349 million people across 79 countries are facing acute food insecurity (which the Global Network Against Food Crises defines as when a person’s inability to consume food puts their life into immediate danger). This number rose nearly 200 million from pre-pandemic levels. 60 percent of the world’s malnourished populations live in areas affected by armed conflict which makes the successful delivery of food assistance more difficult. Food insecurity can be both begotten and beget violence with the notable examples of the 1789 French Revolution and the 2011 Arab Spring which were precipitated by historically-high food prices. Global food instability caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine would not only be a dramatic humanitarian catastrophe but could bring a massive destabilizing event to the world order.
Although the situation seems overwhelming, many policymakers and groups such as the Consortium of International Agricultural Research Centers (CGIAR) propose solutions to systematically reduce the risks and consequences of a global food crisis. CGIAR emphasizes the importance of reliable, real-time data analyses of food and input price volatility which can inform appropriate international and national policy responses. Governments must provide their farmers with targeted subsidies for productivity-enhancing inputs, machinery, fertilizer, and energy costs to increase yields in low and medium productivity environments. International assistance must be provided to low-income countries so that the higher costs of inputs is not passed onto consumers. Governments should invest in sustainable crops which require less water than wheat and barley and can better survive climate shocks such as quinoa and seaweed. However, not all policy responses are made equal and many government interventions could worsen the situation. Experts recommend that countries should avoid sanctions and export restrictions on food and fertilizer products and refrain from hoarding or panic buying input-products. This is not a crisis of anyone but Vladimir Putin’s making, yet it is incumbent upon the international community to make comprehensive policy solutions so that the world’s breadbasket can hold enough for everyone.