Incumbent Ecuadorian president reelected for another term

Ecuador’s newly reelected president, Daniel Noboa, addresses the media to say he won the presidential election. David Diaz Arcos/Reuters

In a rematch between Ecuador’s two 2023 presidential candidates, Ecuadorian president Daniel Noboa won the country’s runoff elections held on April 13th, defeating Luisa González with a 10-point lead. The elections came after neither candidate won a majority in a snap election held on February 9th. While the conservative, banana-billionaire incumbent was quick to announce that he had secured another four-year term, his opponent, left-leaning lawyer González, demanded a recount of the votes that she claimed were the result of “grotesque electoral fraud.”

Previously, Noboa, at age thirty-five, became Ecuador’s youngest elected head of state in November 2023 after winning another snap election held following President Guillermo Lasso’s decision to dissolve the National Assembly to avoid an impeachment vote. After only serving a year and a half, elections were set to be held again on February 9th for the next presidency, which resulted in a “technical tie.” Noboa won 44.17% of the votes and González 44% (the third candidate Leonidas Iza had 5.25%).  Voter turnout for round 1 of the elections was 82%, increasing to 84% in round 2 of the elections following a heated presidential debate.

While President Noboa expressed skepticism following the first round of votes, he has failed to provide any definitive evidence of election fraud or malfeasance, instead asserting that the “irregularities” were being reviewed in areas where the counts “did not add up.” However, in observations independent from the elections, both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the EU Election Observation Mission denied Noboa’s allegations of fraud.

Historically, an incumbent being successfully reelected in Ecuador is rare, yet, ultimately, issues with rampant crime and gang violence tipped the voters over the edge. With rampant crime stemming from cocaine production and narco-trafficking from neighboring countries Colombia and Peru, Ecuadorian citizens have fallen victim to violence across the country. While Noboa put this topic at the forefront of his campaign, González stressed different goals of increasing social spending to boost the economy and cut fuel prices—a message that ultimately didn’t resonate enough with voters. 

Despite making modest progress in reducing crime rates and drug gang presence, Noboa’s past actions in implementing emergency military measures to curb crime and successfully reducing homicide rates, from 46.18 per 100,000 people to 38.76, swayed citizens into giving him another chance to produce more tangible results. González, on the other hand, garnered little attention in her various government positions over the years, until being selected by the RC (Citizens Revolution) as its presidential candidate in the snap election in 2023.

As a whole, the candidates shared some similar goals and policies, including endorsing continued oil drilling in the Amazon and weakening Indigenous governance rights. Third-party candidate and self-identified Marxist-Leninist Leonidas Iza, however, directly opposed these policies in his campaign, advocating for Ecuador’s Indigenous communities and powerful grassroots communities, the End Amazon Crude Movement, and the introduction of a new era of climate justice. While the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) strongly aligned with Iza, with around 5% of overall national votes, much of the community was divided over which candidate would best advocate for their interests. The organization’s failure to fully assemble around one candidate called into question the organization’s ability to unify its members.

In recent years, President Noboa has aligned himself with other conservative presidents, including Argentina’s President Javier Milei, El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, and the U.S.’s President Donald Trump, even going further to align with Trump’s anti-immigration policies and declare a willingness to accept deportees. Ecuadorian citizens have shown disappointment in this alignment, believing that a relationship with President Trump should have already excluded the country from the 10% tariffs outlined for Trump’s “Liberation Day.” González even mocked Noboa when these tariffs were implemented following his informal visit to Mar-a-lago. Now, Ecuadorian citizens hope the new president takes the same strong stance against drug and crime rates, following through on his vows to fix the detrimental effects it has had on the country.

Ukrainian and Russian War Negotiations: The Role of US Intervention

President Trump and President Putin meeting in Helsinki, Finland 2018. Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the conflict has claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians and displaced millions more. Despite previously attempting several rounds of peaceful negotiations between Russia and Ukraine alone, all have failed. Now, three years into the war, negotiations to facilitate the end of the conflict seem to be bearing fruit. Much of the recent swift negotiations are being attributed to the re-election of  U.S. President Donald Trump, who has been pushing for an end to the war since he first began campaigning. Yet, the format of these negotiations has drawn international criticism for their exclusion of Ukraine, one of the two parties embroiled in the conflict. Talks between the United States and Russia began in Saudi Arabia, yet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukrainian diplomats had not received an invitation to war negotiations.

As a whole, Trump’s coziness with Russian President Vladimir Putin has worried many U.S. allies. Not only has Trump failed to denounce Russia for their invasion of Ukraine, but he has also refused to sign a formal statement attributing Russia as the cause of the war, instead stating that the focus should be on ending the war rather than its causes. This set the stage for the meeting of President Trump and President Zelensky on February 28th to discuss mineral rights in Ukraine, which quickly turned into a highly contentious, tense discussion. Among the key moments of the meeting were Trump calling President Zelensky a “dictator,” blaming him for starting the war, and criticizing him for not thanking the United States for the foreign aid that Ukraine has been given, all of which led to President Zelensky walking out of the meeting without signing any agreement.

Following this meeting, President Zelensky sent a letter to the Oval Office stating that Kyiv was ready for negotiations and peace. Since then, President Trump spoke with President Putin on March 18th, and a 30-day partial ceasefire against attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure has been reached. Yet, President Putin still has not agreed to a complete ceasefire, stating that there were still issues that needed to be “ironed out.” The direction of further negotiations remains uncertain.

In the midst of this crisis, many European nations have been expressing concerns about the Trump administration’s new foreign relations policies, especially with the knowledge that Ukrainian aid is conditional pending. French President Emmanuel Macron is one of these leaders, and in response has hosted several European-specific meetings over the past couple of weeks that excluded the United States from discussions on potential aid solutions for Ukraine. As a result, tensions have continued to increase between Europe and the U.S., with many allies continuing to look for alternative routes of aid without involvement from the U.S. This shift toward isolationist policy marks a stark shift in U.S. foreign policy and international diplomacy, with European allies learning they will need to rely less and less on the U.S. for support.

Women and the Struggle for Power in Post-Assad Syria

In Syria, women rallied with YPJ flags to demand that Damascus respect women’s rights. REUTERS/Orhan Qereman

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December marked a turning point in the governance of Syria. In its place, a new interim government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, is leading efforts to rebuild state institutions and restore basic services. Al-Sharaa was the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Sunni rebel group who maintained extensive military and political power and coordinated the offensive that pushed Assad to flee the state. Al-Sharaa announced the new cabinet Saturday, March 29, promising greater diversity and inclusion in decision-making positions in this “strong” post-Assad era. 

On paper, Syria’s authorities have made commitments to gender equality. A newly ratified constitutional declaration was created to facilitate a five-year transitional period that included language guaranteeing women the right to education, work, and political participation. Al-Sharaa called this declaration the beginning of “a new history.” But for many Syrian women who are hesitant to both Assad and HTS, these changes raise more questions than answers. Can Syria’s next political chapter be stable without prioritizing the full inclusion of women in its political and social reconstruction?

A critical examination of the transition reveals troubling early signs. While the constitutional declaration outlines "social, political and economic rights" for women, the sincerity of the commitment to these rights has been perceived by some as dismissive of the demands of Syrian women. For example, the initial appointment of Aisha al-Dibs to lead the Women’s Affairs Office was hailed as progress–until she framed the role of women in society strictly within Islam and the family unit. This narrow vision for female empowerment contradicts the broader equal rights promised in the transitional constitution by institutionalizing and reinforcing this restrictive narrative. This disconnect raises concerns that these reforms are largely symbolic, signaling a shift toward an ideologically-driven government that may limit genuine progress for women’s rights.

Critics from the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava, have outright rejected the new constitutional declaration, calling it unrepresentative of women’s rights and their political participation. In Rojava, women have been at the forefront of both military resistance and civil governance for years, chanting “Jin, Jiyan, Azadi” (Women, Life, Freedom) as part of their women-centered society. The Kurdish feminist philosophy “jineology” emphasizes women’s liberation as central to democracy. While the national transitional government has taken steps to include women in leadership positions and legal codes within the constitution, its approach is still rooted in conservative interpretations of gender roles. In contrast to this, Rojava’s institutions prioritize co-leadership in politics and hold women’s councils as integral parts of community decision-making. It places women’s liberation at the heart of social transformation, arguing that no society can be truly free without the freedom of women. Sharia courts have been disbanded in Rojava following their revolution, demonstrating a practical commitment to women’s empowerment.

This localized model presents a challenge to the transitional government in Damascus. If the central state fails to incorporate women into political processes–or worse, reverts to conservative rhetoric and ideology–it risks alienating a generation of women who have already experienced autonomy but have also borne witness to gender-based violence. Suppressing these hard-fought gains could incite widespread civil unrest, especially in regions like Rojava where women played key roles in military operations, post-conflict recovery, and everyday governance. As al-Sharaa’s government seeks to prove itself to Syrian minorities and the international community, a wave of civil unrest led by women as a result of these restrictions could threaten its already fragile standing. This could especially endanger their support amongst ethnic minority groups like the Druze and Yezidis, as newly-appointed cabinet members from these communities are trusted as representatives to the state. A perceived failure to address their concerns could weaken their trust, in addition to the weakened trust among women. 

In fact, Syria may already be primed for its own version of the 2022 Mahsa Amini movement. Mahsa Amini– a young Kurdish woman– died in police custody for allegedly violating Islamic hijab laws. What began as a Kurdish expression of grievance, “Women, Life, Freedom” soon became a chant for a global women’s movement. Much like Iran, Syria is witnessing the consolidation of a government that claims social and political progress while actively reproducing conservative narratives on women’s societal roles.  If the new Syrian government continues to marginalize women, especially those who played major roles in the revolution and in rebuilding their communities, it risks igniting a similar response—a feminist-led call for dignity and justice that shakes Syria’s efforts for stability. Reversing the political gains of women in regions like Rojava could evolve into a regional, minority-led uprising demanding women’s freedom and structural reform.

Unlike Iran, Syria has not yet institutionalized Sharia law, but if the new government takes this step, it would shake Rojava’s “Women, Life, Freedom” philosophy to its core, threatening to erase an existing system where women’s autonomy has been realized. The lessons of the Mahsa Amini movement remain clear: when states fail to include their most vulnerable and politically active populations, both regime and constituent stability is at stake.

International actors involved in Syria’s reconstruction should also take note. Foreign aid and diplomatic recognition must be tied to concrete commitments to human rights– this includes gender equity. Support for grassroots women’s organizations will be essential in sustaining momentum toward genuine reform. For Syrians and the government alike, the stakes are existential. As Syria now faces the challenge of rebuilding, the future of its legitimacy and peace hinges on whether it chooses to uphold the rights of women in every governing institution, street, and home. In this way, jineology is now a warning. A Syria that sidelines women is not a Syria at peace.

The AfD and New German Parliament

Kay Nietfeld/Pool Image via Getty Images

In February, Germany held a snap national election to determine a new Bundestag, their national parliament. While its winners, the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU), were unsurprising to many observers, the real story lies in the breakthrough of the far-right political party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Coming up with 20.8% of the vote, this doubles their share of votes and seats from the last election in 2021.

Who are the AfD? Now led by Alice Weidel, the political party was formed as a Eurosceptic party in 2013 and has since grown in popularity for its anti-establishment attitude. Frequently, they endorse policies that are less mainstream across the continent, including opposing military aid to Ukraine. Moreover, the party has capitalized on the promotion of harsh anti-immigration policies, a stance that has grown increasingly popular in Germany and Europe writ large. 

While the AfD supports populist far-right beliefs that are rising in popularity around the world (including anti-“woke,” pro-fossil-fuel, and secure border protections), it had been kept on the fringe in post-World War II Germany. As Germany carries the weight of its Nazi past, international and domestic leaders have discouraged the extreme right from holding power in Europe’s largest economy. Marine Le Pen, France’s far-right opposition leader before being disqualified from running for office on embezzlement charges, has publicly distanced herself from the AfD, describing them as the “radical fringe.”  

Moreover, they are closely associated with their antisemitic and Islamophobic statements. They have a pattern of trivializing the Holocaust through the adoption of Nazi slogans (including Alles für Deutschland or “Everything for Germany”) and the promotion of the belief that anyone with migrant heritage is not “properly German.” Beyond that, they’ve focused their anti-immigration efforts on restricting the entry of Muslims into the country. Making matters worse, they are currently under investigation for purported extremism and anti-democratic practices. A German court in Münster ruled that there was reason to believe that they intended to promote a system of illegal discrimination towards those who have immigrated to the state. It is for these reasons that the political party’s rise to power is so monumental. Although they did not win a majority of seats, (an unlikely feat that has only happened once, in the parliamentary term 1957–1961, by the CDU) the systemic features of the German government still give them substantial power, the most that any far-right party has had since the Nazis.

German Bundestag

Understanding the Bundestag

The Bundestag is made up of 630 seats, with the number of seats a party has depending on its share of the national vote. This means that because the AfD won 20.8% of the vote, they are allotted 152 seats. Following a federal election, the Bundestag votes to decide who will serve as Chancellor. To win, the candidate must form a coalition to achieve a parliamentary majority. This process is currently underway with CDU/CSU leader Friedrich Merz, and he hopes to have this secured by mid-April.  

With the AfD winning over 20% of the election, Merz must meet their demands if he wishes to secure their support. In the process of negotiations, he has promised to take steps to limit immigration and agreed to refuse all undocumented migrants (regardless of if they are asylum seekers) at the borders. As he works to form a coalition, he must balance the policy priorities of both the Social Democrats (SDP) and his partners, the Christian Social Union (CSU), to secure a majority without working with the AfD. 

Additionally, the new government plans to increase defense spending at a level of ambition not seen since the Second World War. The spending boost reflects the broader sentiment held by European leaders and their plan for increasing EU strategic autonomy. Instead of relying on other countries in important policy areas like defense and the economy, leaders in the EU are looking to increase state capacity to act independently. As the Trump administration continues to insult European leaders and has shown that an American defense is undependable, many leaders are turning to secure their own defense funds.

Making sense of this election

To understand how the AfD rose to a position of power, we can analyze both international and domestic points. Internationally, the party received support from SpaceX and Tesla CEO Elon Musk, who used his platform to amplify their message. In endorsing them on X, he has said that the AfD is the only party that can “save Germany.” With his support, they have been able to move their messaging from more obscure social media platforms, such as Gettr, Telegram, and VKontakte, to mainstream platforms like X. This mobility helped normalize and legitimize the AfD and its hard-right stances, no matter how extreme they may be. 

Writ large, the rise of the AfD and the outcome of the elections reflect the growing sense of domestic political, economic, and societal turmoil. First, the state’s deep political fractures have only worsened in the past few years. In November 2024, the three-party governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SDP), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens led by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz collapsed due to disagreements over economic policy, plunging the already struggling German economy into further political chaos. 

Adding to this, Germany is in a period of serious economic recession and is facing the longest spell of economic stagnation since the end of the Second World War. While the coronavirus pandemic significantly diminished foreign trade and tourism, their industrial and manufacturing sectors were hit the hardest. This was especially significant because roughly a quarter of Germany’s GDP lies in industry. What was created was a vicious cycle in industrial production where decreases in production would decrease consumption, which, in turn, would further decrease production. The direct consequence is record-breaking unemployment, reaching its highest level in 10 years. This further exacerbates individuals’ economic anxieties and their fears towards immigration. 

Finally, deep societal divisions persist even a generation after Germany’s reunification. The East-West divide continues to define local and national politics and shape policy preferences to this day. Despite the attempts of the German government to integrate East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, more and more it seems to create its own parallel political reality. Political leaders from East-Germany who were previously defined by intense far-left stances, like Sahra Wagenknecht, have forged new anti-establishment policy preferences that veer so far left they have become far-right. This ideology was coined by Wagenknecht as “left conservative,” deeming those on the left as the threat to democracy. She views the move towards clean energy as responsible for deindustrialization, advocates hard-right migration policies, and seeks close relations with Vladimir Putin to secure Russian natural gas. The former East Germany is a fertile ground for this ideology with historically high unemployment and slow economic growth in comparison to West Germany. Overcoming this polarization will require the government to address lingering systemic inequalities. 
Ultimately, the recent elections and the rise of the AfD mark a turning point in Germany’s postwar political development. The shift from traditional parties to support for anti-establishment far-right parties reflects the deep-seated frustrations toward domestic concerns and trends in the international order. Despite not being included within Merz’s coalition, Weidel and the AfD will continue to hold power and maintain influence over the Bundestag as the largest leading opposition force.

Rodrigo Duterte Arrested Under ICC Warrant

Omar Havana / AP Photo

On March 11, former President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte was arrested on an International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant for crimes against humanity. Duterte was taken into custody by Philippine authorities at the Manila Airport upon returning from a trip to Hong Kong. Following his arrest, the former President was flown to the ICC’s headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands and appeared for his first hearing on March 14. 

The case against Duterte was filed to the ICC in 2018 for the killings that occurred from November 1, 2011 to March 16, 2019, under his anti-drug and crime campaigns as Mayor of Davao City and as President of the Philippines. The Philippine National Police recorded the deaths of over 6,000 Filipinos while human rights groups estimate up to 30,000 were killed. Investigations conducted by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I found evidence suggesting Duterte “jointly with and through other persons, agreed to kill individuals they identified as suspected criminals or persons having criminal propensities.” The extrajudicial killings, Duterte maintained, were part of a larger scheme to rid the nation of illegal drugs, dubbed the “War on Drugs.” In a video posted to Facebook after his arrest, Duterte declared “I am the one who led our law enforcement and military. I said that I will protect you and I will be responsible for all of this.” 

While in office, Duterte issued the withdrawal of the Philippines from the ICC’s Rome Statute on March 17, 2018, arguing that the ICC case infringed upon principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. One year later, the withdrawal became official, making the Philippines the second to rescind membership after Burundi. 

The ICC began its formal investigation in 2021. In an attempt to suspend it, the Duterte administration claimed the Philippine government was actively investigating the accusations, rendering the ICC’s jurisdiction as a “court of last resort” – invoked in the case that a country is unable or unwilling to investigate international crimes – null and void. The international court temporarily suspended their investigation based on the administration’s claim, but later resumed in 2023. A warrant of arrest was then issued on March 7, 2025. 

Without a police force, the ICC relies on states to carry out warrants of arrest, conduct transportation operations, and enforce sentences. INTERPOL Manila was given a copy of the ICC warrant, encouraging Philippine authorities to carry out the arrest. Despite previously refusing to aid the ICC case, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. complied. Avoiding mention of cooperation with the ICC, Marcos framed the arrest as a matter between the state and INTERPOL:  “Mr. Duterte was arrested in compliance with our commitments to INTERPOL.” 

Marcos’s reconsideration comes amid bubbling tensions between the President and Vice President Sara Duterte, daughter of the former President. Following their win as the “UniTeam” in the 2022 elections, divisions began to stem from disagreements over drug enforcement policy and relations with the U.S. and China. Disputes escalated as accusations of alleged corruption and a comment from VP Duterte threatening the assassination of the President sparked a case for her impeachment in the House of Representatives. Inflaming tensions heightened weeks prior by the House vote favoring impeachment, the arrest placed further strain on the relationship between Marcos and Duterte. Vehemently opposing her father’s arrest, the Vice President has questioned the court’s jurisdiction and condemned the administration’s response.

Duterte’s legal defense and supporters insist that the ICC lacks the jurisdiction to issue an arrest, given that the Philippines is no longer a member. Others, including the judges responsible for issuing the warrant, maintain that the ICC’s jurisdiction is valid, given that the crimes he is accused of transpired prior to the 2019 withdrawal. Awaiting hearings and possible trial, Duterte could apply for a provisional release from the detention center. If the accusations are confirmed, the trial may proceed several months or years later. 

For the Philippines, the arrest has deepened the rift between dominant dynasties and rekindled debates over Philippine sovereignty, contributing to the growing political turbulence of the period leading up to the May midterm elections. With 12 of the 24 seats up for re-election, the Senate recently announced its decision to investigate Duterte’s arrest. Leader of the probe and sister of the President, Senator Imee Marcos explains, “It is imperative to establish whether due process was followed and to ensure that his legal rights were not just upheld but protected.” The investigation, given the politicization of the arrest, holds the potential to sway support for Senators, such as Imee Marcos, who face re-election in the upcoming midterms. 

The case, situated amid a divisive political feud and the last leg of campaigning before midterms, demonstrates the way in which international justice can hinge on political context. While this context is not to be underestimated, it is worthwhile to recognize the stride this case makes towards accountability. The arrest, as UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Volker Türk maintains, “is a very important step towards seeking accountability for the thousands of victims of killings and other abuses, as well as their families who have courageously pursued justice.” 

Macron’s Meeting With Trump

Brian Snyder/Reuters

Despite myriad disagreements between U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron over the years, the two politicians put their differences aside at a recent White House meeting in February–an encounter which France24 called a “bromance.”

While Trump is a far-right populist and Macron is more center-left, the two might not have much to agree on. Yet over their respective two presidential terms, Trump and Macron have mastered this form of friendly diplomacy, getting along well while also remaining firm in their beliefs and agendas. 

For instance, rather than getting upset at Macron for speaking in French at the White House– as happened previously at the Eiffel Tower– Trump cut him off with a compliment and a firm pat on the thigh, stating: “That is the most beautiful language.”

Piers Morgan, a British broadcaster and longtime friend of Trump, insists Macron is skilled at dealing with Trump. “No world leader handles Trump as well as Macron. Friendly but firm, respectful but not afraid to stand up to him when he thinks he’s wrong. And Trump respects him for it.”

During their meeting Trump and Macron agreed on a few important points, with Trump even stating that Putin would support European peacekeeping forces entering Ukraine once the war is over–a claim that the Kremlin has since denied. Anticipating pushback, Macron prefaced that these forces “would not be along the frontlines. They would not be part of any conflict. They would be there to ensure that the peace is respected.”

Although Trump’s talk with Macron went well, there was no such “bromance” between Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy when the two met on February 28. Trump said one thing with Macron and another with Zelenskyy, demonstrating his lack of commitment to diplomacy and how easily he can be swayed by politicians he gets along with. After being berated by Trump and vice president JD Vance, Zelenskyy walked out of the meeting leaving the US-Ukraine minerals deal unsigned.

Was the groundwork Macron laid regarding Ukraine all in vain? Trump may have ruined his chances with Ukraine by disrespecting Zelenskyy and not taking the suffering and demands of his people seriously.

Given Trump’s unreliable diplomacy, even his relationship with Macron is not always smooth. This is clearly illustrated in Macron’s exclusion from Trump’s inauguration. Instead, fringe far-right French politician Éric Zemmour attended, and not even Marine Le Pen–  the more established right-wing politician who finished in second place in the 2022 French presidential election– was invited. 

While Trump has recognized that the conflict must end before it escalates into a Third World War, he felt that a possible solution could include Ukraine surrendering territory to Russia. However, Macron stressed the need for a strong peace agreement and underlined that a good solution would not include the capitulation of Ukraine. 

With the United States announcing on March 3 that it will suspend military aid to Ukraine, only time will tell whether Macron’s strategy with Trump worked. Those on the left are horrified at the consequences this change of policy may have. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee insisted that in “freezing military aid to Ukraine, President Trump has kicked the door wide open for Putin to escalate his violent aggression against innocent Ukraine.”

Much of Europe shares this anxiety, including Macron’s close ally François Bayrou, France’s prime minister since December who stated “If Russia stops fighting, the war stops. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine disappears.” 

While Bayrou has been clear of his disdain for Trump and his politics with Ukraine, Macron took a more restrained response to American military aid suspension: “The United States, our ally, has changed its position on this war, is less supportive of Ukraine and is casting doubt on what will happen next… I want to believe that the United States will remain by our side, but we need to be ready if that were not the case.” 

While the relationship might not be strong enough to be labeled a “bromance,” Macron has affirmed his commitment to supporting  the American president and his dedication to Franco-American relations.

However, as the situation in Ukraine unfolds–especially after the halting of American military aid–the world will watch for the fate of the Ukrainian people and the response of Europe’s leaders in light of the president’s withdrawal.

Failure After Failure: Let’s Ditch Small Modular Reactors.

REUTERS/Stephane Mahe

Imagine a revolutionary new coffee machine – one that can get twice as much coffee from the same amount of beans. This machine would make coffee cheaper to make at home and buy at shops like Dunkin’ and Starbucks. This coffee machine starts to get buy-in from major companies in the coffee business, like Keurig and Nespresso, and is projected to be launched in Summer 2025. Halfway through the spring, it’s announced that, due to delays, it will now be launched in Winter 2027. After another delay, it’s announced that the project is now expected by 2030. Keurig and Nespresso, in response, withdraw from the project, further delaying it until 2035. After 10 years of delays, would you still invest in this machine? Probably not, so why are we investing in an energy technology that’s built on the same promises?

Small modular reactors (SMRs), unlike the coffee machine, are a real technology that promise to make nuclear energy cheaper and more accessible. In theory, their smaller size allows them to be deployed more quickly and in a variety of settings, an advantage over solar panels, wind turbines, and tidal energy, which have location restrictions. Some of these reactor designs can reprocess spent fuel (known as a “closed fuel cycle”) to extract more energy than traditional reactors can from the same amount of fuel. As such, many have hailed these nuclear reactors as the key to addressing the climate crisis, as they seem to resolve a lot of the current problems that have plagued nuclear power thus far.

On an international level, France and India have announced plans to begin constructing SMRs together, praising the energy source for its potential to enable the transition to a low-carbon future. India is also expected to work with U.S. firms to enhance investment in the technology. Similarly, Trump’s pick for energy secretary, Chris Wright, served on the board of Oklo Inc., a company that focuses on advanced nuclear technology, and is pushing for investments in nuclear energy (alongside fossil fuels). As the Trump administration ditches renewables for fossil fuels and nuclear energy, some, including Wright, have said that now is the time for the nuclear renaissance.

Unfortunately, however, it seems increasingly likely that these reactors will fail to live up to their promise. Talks of deploying small modular reactors have been ongoing for over a decade, and while around a hundred designs exist, only two reactors have been deployed–one in China and one in Russia. In the U.S., while private companies and the federal government have invested billions into their development, projects have faced delays and cancellations. Long construction times, issues with quality control, and disproportionately high energy costs (for producers and consumers alike) have led many to conclude that the energy source is a false promise. Recognizing this failure, many of the largest energy companies, such as Babcock & Wilcox and Westinghouse have withdrawn their investments, leaving many other investors hesitant to put any of their assets in the nuclear cause. While the potential of these models is exciting in theory, investors would much rather hedge their bets on just about anything else.

To make matters worse, small modular reactors come with an additional catch: they risk enabling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. SMRs are a dual-use technology; after reactors have extracted energy from the fuel rods (the real-life equivalent of the coffee beans from earlier), they’re left with weapons-grade plutonium in the nuclear waste that could be used to create a potent nuclear weapon. This risk is particularly acute for reactors that reprocess for more energy, as the leftover waste is more potent and more viable for a nuclear weapon. This presents a particular challenge, as in order for the touted benefits of SMRs to materialize, they need to distinguish themselves from the nuclear reactors we have now. As such, these new designs have to be more efficient and take advantage of their versatility, which means a lot of smaller reactors capable of reprocessing. More fissile material (in quantity and quality) coming out of more reactors makes it difficult to effectively monitor where all the waste goes. To complicate things, monitoring is already a problem, as it’s difficult to accurately measure nuclear material as it’s being transported from the facility to a waste disposal unit. The ease of diverting material could provide a pathway for states that have long had nuclear ambitions, such as Iran (who is also in a proxy war against a nuclear-armed adversary), or opportunistic non-state actors (such as domestic extremists or terrorist groups like ISIS) to finally get their hands on a nuclear weapon. 

Unfortunately for proponents, it’s unlikely that the U.S. will be able to control or monitor the spread of this technology. The U.S. cannot set the standards for SMRs when it continues to lag behind Russia and China in production. Even then, why would countries already in China’s global infrastructure program, known as the Belt and Road Initiative, choose to get nuclear reactor designs from the U.S. further down the line when they can get nuclear reactors from China now? Chinese energy technology is likely more interoperable—able to work with pre-existing infrastructure—than U.S. designs, further restricting the U.S.’ potential market share. Even our closest allies wouldn’t want U.S. models, as some of them, including Germany and Japan, have given up on nuclear energy altogether. Given this hesitation and the long delays, SMRs would either fail to be deployed at a sufficient scale to resolve climate change, or would be completed hastily, which increases the risk of state or non-state actors acquiring a nuclear weapon.

While some may argue that any investment in renewable energy is a net positive in the fight against climate change, investing in nuclear energy hamstrings the response of future administrations. Investing in nuclear power creates a dangerous moral licensing, wherein future leaders may feel less incentivized to invest in other, effective renewable energy sources because they feel that they already have it covered with nuclear power. Historically, because of the way subsidies are distributed under the Clean Power Plan, nuclear energy actively stifles the development of other energies. In an effort to make nuclear power prices competitive, the U.S. government subsidizes it, which actively siphons those subsidies away from solar, wind, and tidal energy. As solar energy becomes the cheapest option available, subsidies to expand its gap or aid its clean partners could enhance renewable energy’s grip on the market. Absent these subsidies, however, fossil fuels may retain their foothold in the market for the foreseeable future. Given the existential threat at stake, the risk that this poses for the climate response cannot be overstated.

While advocates of SMRs are right that renewable energy needs to be adopted swiftly, trying to haphazardly rush out these reactors to deploy around the world risks trading one crisis for another, enabling a new era of nuclear proliferation. Similarly, if the Trump administration wants to keep its promise of low energy prices, their best bet is to stop investing in the nuclear power industry and let solar and wind energy take the reins. Like the hypothetical coffee machine, the benefits of SMRs will remain a nice thought, but nothing more than that. As climate change beckons at our doorstep, we can’t afford to invest in a false promise—it’s time to ditch SMRs.

NATO Confirms Assassination Plot on CEO of German Defence Firm Rheinmetall

Ina Fassbender/AFP via Getty Images

On January 28, 2025, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General James Appathurai confirmed that Russian operatives plotted to assassinate Armin Papperger, CEO of German defence firm Rheinmetall. This revelation was made during a European Parliament committee meeting on hybrid warfare, where Apparthurai detailed Moscow’s ongoing covert operations targeting Western defence infrastructure. The plot against Papperger was part of a broader campaign of sabotage and political destabilisation across NATO member states. Rheinmetall and Russia have declined to comment on the confirmation.

NATO officials have linked the assassination attempt to a series of recent Russian hybrid attacks, including arson, train derailments, and acts of political intimidation across Europe. Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest arms manufacturer, is a likely focus of Russian espionage and sabotage efforts against European defence, especially as the company announced plans to ramp up production by building a tank factory in Ukraine.

NATO’s confirmation of the assassination plot emphasises the escalating hybrid warfare tactics used by Russia, reflecting Moscow’s belief that they are at war with the entire West. Western intelligence agencies have expressed alarm over the increased danger of Russian activities. These “grey zone” attacks aim to spread chaos among Ukraine’s partners, disrupt military supplies to Kyiv, and widen societal divisions.

Ultimately, this development highlights the need for NATO and its allies to strengthen their defences against hybrid threats and other similar covert operations. Through its use of hybrid tactics, Russia is able to harm the alliance without triggering Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one state is an attack on all NATO states. In this case, Russia’s attack on important public figures illustrates that their efforts to destabilize NATO states aren’t limited to political attacks. As the United States and Russia discuss an end to the war in Ukraine, it remains to be seen how Russia interacts with their Western neighbors. Looking to the days ahead, the alliance is expected to agree on a strategy for tackling the hybrid threats by the summer, with the hopes of deterring further acts of sabotage and protecting key industry leaders essential to Europe’s security infrastructure. Given Trump’s shift away from the alliance, however, we could expect a sooner response, especially if Russia continues to escalate their attacks.

Filipina Vice President Sara Duterte Awaits Senate Trial Following House Impeachment

Vice President Sara Duterte speaking at a Manila press conference on February 7, 2025 Basilio Sepe, AP Photo

On February 5, the Philippine House of Representatives voted to impeach Vice President Sara Duterte. The vote was raised over complaints of alleged corruption involving the misuse of public funds and failure to declare wealth as required by law, alongside plotting the assassination of President Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos. At a news conference on November 23, the Vice President claimed she contracted an assassin to kill Marcos, his wife, and the Speaker of the House Martin Romualdez. Later, she contended the comment was not a threat, instead an expression of worry for her own safety. Concerns regarding the VP’s lack of assertiveness towards China, citing her failure to denounce Xi Jinping’s behavior challenging Philippine presence in the South China Seas, added to those raised in the vote. Duterte has denied all accusations. 

Exceeding the one-third minimum for an impeachment, with 215 of the 306 members in favor, the vote will proceed to the Senate. The impeachment claim is set to be addressed in June, when Congress resumes following the May midterm elections. Given that 12 of the 24 Senate seats are up for re-election, and 16 votes are needed to convict, the midterms are imperative in deciding the outcome of the impeachment trial. 

If convicted, Duterte would be ousted from her current position and barred from future entry into public office, squandering tentative plans for presidential candidacy in the 2028 election. The impeachment, if passed, would mark the first of a Vice President in the Philippines. In this instance, Marcos would nominate a member of Congress as a successor. The newly-appointed senators are among the potential candidates. 

The impeachment case is the latest manifestation of the feud between Marcos and Duterte. Since landslide victories in 2022, the “UniTeam” has experienced rifts over diverging anti-drug agendas and foreign policy. Duterte’s absence of defiance against China’s aggression in the SCS has created tension with Marcos’s continued efforts to strengthen U.S.-Philippine relations. With speculation swirling around the VP’s intentions to run for President following Marcos’s term, the impeachment trial holds the potential to not only shape the outcome of the 2028 presidential elections but the direction of the country’s relationships with the U.S. and China. 

The House decision comes amid an ongoing International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into the mass extrajudicial killings that occurred under the “War on Drugs” launched in 2016 by the VP’s father and former President, Rodrigo Duterte. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that over 8,000 people have been killed under the banner of the campaign. On the claim that the case violates principles of non-intervention and sovereignty, Rodrigo Duterte issued the withdrawal of Philippine membership from the ICC’s Rome Statute. The Philippines officially withdrew in March 2019, making it the second to rescind membership following Burundi in 2017. Retaining the assertion that the case threatens sovereignty, Marcos stated that “the Philippine government will not lift a finger to help any investigation that the ICC conducts.” Given the lack of cooperation exhibited by the government and the court’s means of enforcement, the violence is likely to persist as the campaign, though toned down, carries on. Human rights groups are concerned that the VP may intensify the campaign, if given the opportunity. The impeachment trial, granting or denying Duterte’s ability to maintain and run for office, may be critical in determining how the crisis unfolds.

A New Lebanese Cabinet Has Filled a Years-Long Political Vacuum

A handout picture released by the Lebanese presidency shows Lebanon's newly formed cabinet, led by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam (center-right), posing for a group photo,along with President Joseph Aoun (center), Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (center-left) and cabinet members at the presidential palace, on February 11, 2025. (Lebanese Presidency / AFP)

Since the start of 2025, the government of Lebanon has undergone a significant political shift away from Hezbollah. Within the first two months of the year, Lebanon has appointed a president, ousted the Hezbollah-backed prime minister, and established the first full cabinet in over two years. The president’s appointment marks the end of a parliamentary deadlock that started in October 2022, while the new cabinet is the first one since 2008 that Hezbollah’s party does not have a majority in. 

This new government is the latest in a series of political developments in Lebanon that indicate a shift in power away from Hezbollah. On January 9, after two rounds of parliamentary voting and robust U.S. and Saudi support, Joseph Aoun was elected to the Lebanese presidency, ending a years-long presidential vacuum. In addition to being close to Washington and Riyadh, Aoun has been vocal about his displeasure with the way the Hezbollah-backed caretaker cabinet handled the Lebanese economic crisis. 

Aoun’s election is not the only political blow Hezbollah has taken recently. On the 13th of January, two-thirds of the Lebanese Parliament voted to elect former ICJ president Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister. This further weakened Hezbollah’s influence in the state, as Salam’s appointment replaced Hezbollah-backed Prime Minister Najib Mikati. 

The new Lebanese cabinet follows this trend. On February 8, after three weeks of political negotiations between Lebanon’s rival political parties, Aoun announced he had accepted the resignation of the caretaker cabinet and signed a decree with Salam forming a new cabinet. When addressing the press, Salam said that the twenty-four member cabinet would focus on reconstruction, ending Lebanon’s six-year-long economic crisis, and implementing UN Resolution 1701. The resolution, commonly called the “linchpin of peace” in the region, calls for a Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the creation of the Blue Line–a “line of withdrawal” operated by ten thousand UN peacekeepers. Salam also said that the new cabinet would prioritize the enforcement of a 2024 ceasefire deal that aims to end the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel on Lebanon’s southern border by the 18th of February.

These political developments do not mean that Hezbollah has been completely expelled from Lebanon’s government. In fact, during the three-week negotiation process, Hezbollah engaged in negotiations with Salam over who would hold the Shi’ite Muslim seats in the cabinet. At the end of negotiations, Hezbollah’s political ally, the Amal movement—led by Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Berri—was able to choose four of the cabinet members, including the new minister of finance, and give its approval for a fifth. 

While this influence was enough for the U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East to speak out against Hezbollah's role in the cabinet, the group’s influence has still significantly diminished. Most decisions in the Lebanese cabinet need a two-thirds majority to pass, and Hezbollah does not occupy the necessary number of seats to have a “blocking third”—meaning a third plus one—in the cabinet. The lack of a blocking third means that Aoun, Salam, and Lebanon’s cabinet will be able to pass legislation without Hezbollah’s support. 

The past sixteen months have greatly weakened Hezbollah's strength. From Israeli warfare killing their top officials, to the overthrow of Assad’s regime in Syria, and now with the recent political losses, the group’s regional presence is on the retreat. Hezbollah’s influence in the region is still present,but with a new Lebanese cabinet focused on reform and building stability, the group may face increasing difficulty as they try to re-establish their control.

Trump’s Decision to Invite Zemmour

French far-right pundit Éric Zemmour - Stefano Rellandini, AFP

When creating the guest list for his inauguration, American president Donald Trump carefully chose which international attendees he wanted there. So when far-right politician Éric Zemmour arrived from France, instead of President Emmanuel Macron, or his counterpart Marine Le Pen—who has lost to Macron in the past two presidential elections—it may indicate a change of pace in US-Franco relations for the next few years. 

Tensions between Trump and Le Pen are not a new phenomenon. In January 2017, Le Pen waited hours to see Trump at his New York City hotel, but the meeting never took place. This caused a rift between the two politicians, decreasing Le Pen’s admiration for Trump and leading her to ban lower-ranking members of her party from commenting on the 2024 election, stating that his style is “incompatible” with her party. 

On the other hand, Éric Zemmour has gained media attention since he boasted of a “warm” 40-minute phone call with Trump back in February 2022, where the American president told him: “Don’t give in to anything, stand your ground, remain courageous, it’s tenacity and endurance that pay off.” 

Despite receiving Trump’s backing, Zemmour’s party – Reconquête, meaning “win back” – did not win a seat in either the 2022 or 2024 parliamentary elections. Being invited to Trump’s inauguration indicates that Zemmour is likely to remain on the fringes of French society, despite Trump’s politics becoming more mainstream in the United States. While there are certainly far-right sentiments in France, even those citizens are concerned with their safety and prosperity. As such, while they may agree with Trump’s politics, his disregard for European interests is worrying for those on the continent. 

This is where Marine Le Pen comes in. Le Pen might be taken more seriously by the French in the next election precisely because of her absence from Trump’s inauguration. Le Pen represents far-right tendencies while also protecting the nation rather than disregarding French concerns about Trump. 

“If she wants to claim to govern and defend the interests of France, she cannot appear as someone who’s in the immediate proximity of Donald Trump, especially since Trump has a very aggressive discourse towards Europe,” states Olivier Costa, director at the Sciences Po Center for Political Research. 

Le Pen’s distance from Trump may help her win the presidency next, and it will be interesting to see the direction that French far-right politics takes in the coming years. With Macron unable to run for a third term in 2027, Le Pen is the front runner in polling, with projections giving her about 37% of the vote, placing her far ahead in the first electoral round. If given the choice between Zemmour and Le Pen, will supporters side with a fringe American-backed politician, or a more established candidate doing more to protect French and European interests? 

Although Trump’s first presidential term was difficult for Europe, many fear his second could be worse. France and the European Union are already steeped in political and economic struggles of their own. These could be exacerbated by tensions between the United States and China, and Trump threatening to pull out of NATO would mark a decisive turn for the war in Ukraine. 

Trump’s decision to invite a fringe far-right French politician—instead of the republic’s president—demonstrates that he is not interested in maintaining traditional relations with France. Instead, he favors non-mainstream alternative elements of the country, such as parties and individuals not actually representing the French people. Trump wants to pick and choose how he handles transatlantic relations, doing it on his own terms rather than following traditional diplomatic customs. 

However, it is curious that Macron was not invited to Trump’s inauguration, as Trump was invited to the reopening ceremony of Notre-Dame de Paris in December. Unfortunately, Trump’s inauguration guest list seems to be evidence that Macron’s attempt to get in the U.S. president’s good graces was ineffective. 

Macron echoed the fears of many Europeans when he stated: “The United States of America has two priorities. The USA first, and that is legitimate, and the China issue, second. And the European issue is not a geopolitical priority for the coming years and decades.” While it remains to be seen how Trump will navigate the future of transatlantic relations, it is clear that the nation’s link with France will change during the first two years of Trump’s presidency, as well as after the upcoming French elections in 2027.

Hungarian Spy Scandal with the EU

Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán speaks at the European Parliament - EP/Flickr

Last month, the European Parliament reviewed concerns about illegal espionage conducted by Információs Hivatal (IH), Hungary’s civilian foreign intelligence service, on European Union (EU) officials between 2015 and 2017. This information was first revealed in an investigation by the Belgian daily newspaper De Tijd and the Hungarian NGO Direkt36 published last December. In their article, journalists Szabolcs Panyi and András Pethő detail how the Hungarian government initiated multiple espionage attempts against the EU’s Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). This came at a time when the office was investigating the Hungarian Prime Minister's son-in-law’s company, Elios, on the suspension of corrupt tenders. The espionage included phone tapping and IH officers stalking the officers, with the latter activity eventually leading to their discovery, as they were unable to maintain their cover.

More recently, the Hungarian government has continued to spy on its own citizens. In a 2021 interview with the Committee to Protect Journalists, Panyi discussed how the IH used Pegasus spyware to surveil journalists, inhibiting their ability to conduct investigative journalism. Panyi, an outspoken critic of Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán and a member of one of the few remaining Hungarian news outlets insulated from government influence, was a top target for the attacks. In both instances (2015-17 and 2021), the Hungarian government has not denied their involvement in the espionage, instead maintaining that it was used legally to investigate “national security threats.”

This intrusion is yet another instance of Orbán’s broader crackdown on independent media in Hungary, and a symptom of the broader democratic backsliding that’s happening in the state.  This blatant violation of democratic norms fractures their trust with the EU and the other democratic members in the alliance. Despite these tendencies, as of February 11th, the EU has not taken any concrete action against Hungary in regards to their espionage or established any additional laws protecting against espionage. The EU’s hesitation likely stems from fears of further increasing tension with Hungary, , though the national security risk that this poses would seem to merit a swift and decisive action.

More broadly, as the war in Ukraine continues, and pressure from Russia and China intensifies, the EU needs to project unity to protect themselves from foreign interference. Without a firm condemnation of Hungary, they risk setting a dangerous precedent for other global powers or EU members to gather intelligence on the EU. This precedent could also lead to the erosion of the integrity of democratic norms, both in Hungary and other EU countries, as Hungary continues to spy on their citizens. Ultimately, this dispute exacerbates the already existing rift between the EU and Hungary, as Budapest has increasingly pushed back against the alliance (including recently threatening to withhold support for the EU’s prolongation of sanctions on Russia).

What To Expect From al-Sharaa in Syria

Ahmed al-Sharaa; Credit: Aref Tammawi—AFP/Getty Images

On January 29, 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa declared himself interim president of Syria for the duration of the government's transitional phase. His formal declaration as president comes as no surprise, as he has been the de facto leader of the country since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a military coup and ousted Bashar al-Assad, bringing an end to the Assad dynasty’s 50-year long rule. 

HTS, formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was founded under the leadership of Sharaa, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, in 2011 as an affiliate of al-Qaeda. However, in 2016, al-Jolani broke ties with al-Qaeda and a year later, merged with other groups to establish HTS to defeat the Assad regime. 

Understanding the fall of the Assad state, despite their historic grip on power, we can look at two factors. First, the power of the Syrian state has been eroded by years of war, sanctions, and corruption. Second, the military strength of the regime’s most influential allies, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, has been significantly weakened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the ongoing regional-Israeli war has depleted key resources from these states. Thus, when the HTS military launched their offensive attack on the Assad regime, the state was too weak to fight back and their allies were too diminished to intervene. 

As the new Syrian president Sharaa took office, he announced his plans for the transitional government. His first priority is to fill Syria’s power vacuum in government “in a legitimate and legal way” by rebuilding state institutions. Specifically, the reconstruction of the military and the development of economic infrastructure. This is crucial because studies have shown peace to be extremely fragile in states where power vacuums leave the government incapable of providing citizens necessary goods or services. Sharaa’s first step to fill the gap in leadership was the empowerment of a legislative council to draft a new legal code, replacing the suspended 2012 constitution and establishing a framework for transitional justice. 

One of the first things Sharaa announced in office was the pursuit of transitional justice against “the criminals who shed Syrian blood and committed massacres and crimes.” Although his exact perpetrators are unspecified, he is likely referring to the political and military elite who targeted civilians during the ongoing Syrian civil war. In 2010, pro-democracy protests swept across the country as part of a larger regional movement called the Arab Spring. However, Assad responded with force, firing unarmed protesters and carrying out mass arrests. The peaceful movement transformed into a still-ongoing civil war, with casualties now reaching over half a million. The international community has responded by condemning the atrocities and human rights violations the regime has committed throughout the conflict.

Despite Sharaa’s vow to preserve “civil peace,” the safety of international refugees remains uncertain. As a result of the civil war, Syria has become the world’s largest refugee crisis, with an estimated 14 million civilians forced to flee. This is broken down into 7.4 million internally displaced persons; 5.5 million in the neighboring countries of Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt; and 850,000 in Germany. Immediately after Assad’s regime was toppled, many European countries pressed to return Syrian refugees to their home country. Additionally, others have stopped processing Syrian asylum applications. 

However, with the state’s political fragility, analysts have argued against this move. First, the influx of returning Syrians would add pressure to the transitional government and could undermine the prospect of a successful transition. This is further exacerbated by the collapse of the Syrian pound due to political instability and a loss of investor confidence. Finally, the destruction from the war has destroyed the housing market, with entire neighborhoods in ruin. As such, the country would be ill-prepared  to house an influx of returning Syrian refugees. 

What does this all mean for Bashar al-Assad? Immediately after HTS assumed power, the leader fled the country to Russia. Yet recent negotiations between Syria’s interim government and Russian President Vladimir Putin signal that his asylum may not be secure. Since 2015, Russia has had a military presence in the state, and although there has been a transition in the political apparatus, it is too valuable for them to surrender. The Syrian state is particularly valuable because of its strategic geography and intrinsic wealth. That said, Russia has declined to comment on whether they would return Assad in order to secure their position.

Ultimately, the fate of the nation is extremely fragile and in an unpredictable position. Sharaa currently enjoys popular support, but should positive change not come soon, his grasp on power could be quickly undermined. Such a herculean national project requires the support of the international community, particularly lifting Assad-era sanctions to foster their economy and empower economic growth. With international support, Syria has the opportunity to embark on a path to recovery, but without external support, the window of opportunity could be lost. 

Fighting in DR Congo–Set to Boil Over

As of last Sunday, the UN reported 700 dead from the conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Rwandan-backed M23. While fighting in the DR Congo is not new—and can be traced back to the Rwandan Genocide in 1994—the recent events have brought this conflict to its boiling point. M23, the Rwandan-backed militant group, has now captured Goma, a mineral-rich city and capital of the North Kivu province in the eastern DRC. Beginning February 4, a unilateral ceasefire is in place due to the humanitarian crisis; however, M23 still remains in control of Goma. The group recently began to move towards Bukavu, the capital of the South Kivu province, but have publicly stated that they do not intend to capture it.

M23, the militant group backed by Rwanda, are led by ethnic Tutsis and have stated the reason for their violence is to fight for minority rights that are under threat from the Congolese government. The DR Congo’s government has pushed back on this, arguing that the M23 are instead motivated by a desire to capitalize on the wealth of the mineral-rich eastern region, which contains copper, gold, and cobalt, coveted components of parts found in mobile phones, solar panels, and other widely-used electronics.

Despite M23’s adamant claims, evidence shows that the group has been weaponizing the plight of Tutsis to justify their actions. This is indicated by the inconsistencies with the group’s public statements and corresponding actions. Additionally Rwanda, who largely supports the insurgency, continues to benefit from M23’s growing encroachment into the eastern DRC. Rwanda’s support of M23 lends them increased access to minerals in eastern DRC, as evidenced by the 50% increase of coltan exports in 2022-2023. Regardless of M23’s or the Rwandan government’s apparent dishonesty, the fighting has resulted in a major humanitarian crisis; more than 7 million displaced people, over 300 thousand suspected cholera cases (as of January 2023), and 15.4 million children in need of humanitarian aid (as of 2023). Prior to the recent escalation, the humanitarian situation was already at a crisis level, but now it has only intensified. The UN has sounded the alarm on three major issues to focus on in the conflict: scarcity of food and water, mass displacement, and mass increase of sexual-based violence. As M23 gets closer to the Bukavu, which holds a population of two million people, these issues will only worsen. 

Several attempts at peace deals have failed in the past. Last year, a ceasefire deal was struck, but peace only held temporarily before fighting resumed again. This has been a recurring pattern, happening earlier on March 23, 2009 when M23 claimed that the terms of the most recent peace deal had been violated. This move signaled the resumption of conflict and served as the origin of the rebel group's name. Additionally, the UN has kept a peacekeeping mission, Monusco, in the DR Congo since 1999; however, their presence, no matter how well intentioned, may be escalating tensions, as many Congolese see Monusco as unsuccessful and have voiced a desire for them to leave. On January 31, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) gathered for an emergency summit in Harare, Zimbabwe which will hopefully bear some fruit.

M23 and the government of the DR Congo seem unwilling to cooperate or to engage in dialogue, and the permeating sense of distrust that has stalled attempts for peace in the past threatens possibilities for reconciliation. Beginning February 4, there has been a humanitarian ceasefire, allowing people to have a safe passage to escape the conflict and increased humanitarian aid; however, this action does not necessitate an end to this conflict. Leaders across Africa and the UN will need to put pressure on Rwanda, potentially in the form of sanctions, to withdraw their support from M23 in addition to the ongoing diplomatic discussions.  The international community has their work cut out from them as they search for ways to incentivise both parties to move towards peace. At the very least, the summit on Saturday in Tanzania, an unparalleled event, shows that much of the international community is at least willing to work towards peace.

Sudan Conflict: Attack on Last Functioning Hospital in North Darfur Kills 70

Getty Images

On January 24, 2025, a drone attack targeting the Saudi Teaching Maternal Hospital in El Fasher, the capital of Sudan’s North Darfur region, resulted in over 70 fatalities and wounded dozens more. The hospital was the only operational healthcare facility in the area, providing essential services like gy-obstetrics, internal medicine, surgery, and pediatrics.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) condemned the attack, emphasizing the critical role the hospital plays in the region. WHO’s Director-General, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, called for an immediate cessation of all attacks on healthcare facilities in Sudan and urged for unrestricted access to restore the damage to medical centres.

The attack on the Saudi Teaching Maternal Hospital marks the latest strike in Sudan’s 20-month civil war between the Sudanese government and the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The attack was blamed on the paramilitary group by local authorities, which was said to be caused by the apparent battlefield losses to the Sudanese military and allies. The RSF, however, denied those claims, alleging that the Sudanese military was behind the attack, though they provided no evidence to support the accusation.

This incident is only a small part of the continued escalating conflict in Sudan, which has led to tens of thousands of deaths, the displacement of 12 million Sudanese civilians, and widespread famine in the region. The attack magnifies the ongoing healthcare crisis in Sudan, with two out of three people lacking access to healthcare and one in three people facing severe hunger. As the civil war continues to grow, ethnically driven violence has been on the rise, with some international watchdogs arguing that some acts committed by the RSF are escalating into acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide. If the crisis continues to draw on, it risks spiralling Sudan into state failure, stifling prospects for a successful post-conflict recovery. Furthermore, if the country continues to be vastly divided into two– with the Sudanese army having control of the East and the RSF in the West–the probability of Sudan once again splitting into two countries will become higher. As the conflict escalates, it remains unknown whether the international community will interfere or let it worsen–only time will tell.

The Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire

Photo credit: Rex/Shutterstock (left) and Bloomberg (right)

On January 15, a ceasefire was reached between Israel and Hamas after 15 months of war. This deal aims to end the war in Gaza and facilitate the return of Israeli hostages captured by Hamas in the October 7 invasion of southern Israel. 

There are three stages to the ceasefire deal, but as of now, the second and third stages have only been agreed upon in principle. The first stage began on January 19 and is set to last 42 days. During this initial stage, a ceasefire will commence and Israeli forces will leave populated areas of Gaza, allowing humanitarian aid to enter and displaced Palestinians to return. Hamas will then release 33 hostages–children, women, elderly, and wounded–and in exchange, Israel will release 1,900 Palestinian prisoners. In the second stage, the permanent ceasefire will become official and younger Israeli male hostages will be exchanged for more Palestinian prisoners. In the third and final stage, the bodies of dead hostages will be returned, Israeli troops will commit to a complete withdrawal of Gaza, and the reconstruction process will begin. 

As of this article’s publication, 18 Israeli hostages have been released as per the terms of the ceasefire agreement. Of the 18 released, 5 were Thai nationals and 10 Israeli citizens–5 female soldiers, 4 women, and 3 men. In return for the released hostages, Israel has released around 600 Palestinian prisoners. Among those individuals was the high-profile terrorist, Zakaria Zubeidi, a former leader of the Fatah militant wing al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, who was involved in deadly attacks targeting civilians during the Second Intifada. 

Both sides have different factors that coalesced to help explain the timing of this agreement. Hamas suffered a major blow with the death of their leader Yahya Al-Sinwar in October. Additionally, some argue that their attack on October 7th was intended to trigger a regional war, an idea that looks increasingly unlikely. The support they once garnered from Iran’s so-called “axis of resistance” has been significantly weakened with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the severe setbacks suffered by Hezbollah. Finally, as argued by some scholars, such as Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, they may have already achieved their goal: provocation. Knowing that the Netanyahu government is hawkish, they may have seen this as a chance to provoke the Israelis into responding with indiscriminate repression that could garner support for their side. As we have seen, global support for Israel has dropped significantly since the war in Gaza began.

Looking at Israel, two events are crucial to understanding the motivation behind Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s acceptance of the deal despite past resistance. First, the ceasefire brokered between Israel and Lebanon in November heightened demands by Qatari, Egyptian, and U.S. mediators to negotiate the war in Gaza. Second, there was a significant increase in pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to office, as he warned of “hell to pay” if the deal was not reached before his inauguration. 

Despite the pressure on Netanyahu to accept the deal, the security of the second and third phases of the ceasefire is incredibly fragile. Many have assessed that neither side is ready to stop fighting. With Gaza destroyed and left with no viable political alternative to Hamas, the opportunity cost to resume fighting is low. In Israel, Netanyahu has already addressed the ceasefire as “temporary,” arguing that his goal of eradicating Hamas is not done. Moreover, the end of the war could mark the end of his time in office. He and his party, Likud, have done poorly in polls since the start of the war. This decline in approval rating, paired with a poll claiming 69% of Israelis want parliamentary elections “the day after the war ends,” could signal the termination of his time in office.

Because of the fragility in the region and the instability of the ceasefire, it is up to foreign pressure to enforce the end of the war. Despite the Trump administration’s commitment to the deal, it remains uncertain the degree of leverage they have over Netanyahu to ensure its implementation, especially after Hamas released the hostages (their most crucial bargaining chips). Ultimately, without substantial external intervention, both sides must honor their commitments to the ceasefire, prioritize effective humanitarian aid, and concentrate on reconstruction for any hope of lasting peace.

A Fractured EU Navigates a 2nd Trump Term

French President Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen EPA-EFE/REX/Shutterstock

While President Donald Trump returned to office in the United States, leaders throughout the European Union (EU) were busy mapping out their own course at the World Economic Forum. At the latest conference, held in Davos, Switzerland, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen outlined a plan for Europe’s future on the world stage. While von der Leyen avoided direct criticism of the U.S. president, her speech marked a crucial pivot in EU foreign policy: independence from the U.S. Seeking to avoid a repeat of the tariff headaches from Trump’s first term, it seems the EU president has opted for Europe to separate its political fortunes from the volatile superpower. Amongst the alliance, however, the response has lacked cohesion; factions have emerged as leaders reconcile and navigate the converging crises of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Some European leaders, such as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have stuck close to the American business mogul. Meloni, who attended Trump’s inauguration, has been a stalwart ally of the GOP strongman, leading some to call her Europe’s “Trump whisperer.” The Italian PM’s close ties with Trump, and the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) head Elon Musk, suggest her administration may maintain warm relations with the U.S., and move in lockstep with its transatlantic partner for the next 4 years. Similarly, several members of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party also made an appearance at Trump’s inauguration. While the conservative Christian Democrats party, led by Friedrich Merz, are best positioned to win Germany’s upcoming elections, the AfD may still influence a strengthening of German-American relations and an increased closeness to the Trump administration.

Conversely, French President Emmanuel Macron, who has long been the EU’s top proponent of strategic autonomy, has responded to Trump’s inauguration by calling for an increase in defense expenditures among EU countries. While Macron’s pleas for European strategic autonomy fell on deaf ears during the Biden administration, Trump’s return–and the continued Russia-Ukraine war–have reignited talks of the EU forging its own path, independent of the U.S. Indeed, Macron’s ambition has been reinvigorated, as he’s urged his fellow European leaders to face the realities of the Trump administration and end the EU’s reliance on the U.S. for defense. The alliance may be positioned to achieve this feat, as EU defense spending hit record highs in 2023 and 2024, and is expected to balloon this year, with 22 of the 27 EU states increasing their defense spending.

Support for stronger European defense has been echoed by Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who has condemned the U.S.’ inability to pass legislation that would provide more aid to Ukraine. Poland, whose estimated defense expenditures as a share of GDP (%) in 2024 were the highest among the NATO alliance (at 4.12%), has given dozens of packages in military aid to Ukraine and served as one of Kyiv’s most steadfast allies in their fight for sovereignty.

Tusk’s concerns are undoubtedly geographically motivated, as Poland’s proximity to Russia makes conflict a perennial concern. This geopolitical anxiety has also motivated the Nordic-Baltic states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden) to increase their military spending in recent years. Beyond that, in November, Tusk and other leaders of Nordic-Baltic countries held a security summit in Sweden, issuing a joint statement on the need to take greater responsibility for their own defense. This recognition of the necessity of European strategic autonomy was music to the ears of Macron, who attended the conference virtually. While the U.S. has historically been the champion of the liberal international order and Western security, these moves from Europe suggest a willingness to take the mantle in the event that Trump abdicates the throne.

Meanwhile, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico has charted a different course: a pro-Russia one. Since his return to office in 2023, Fico has met with Putin, ended Slovakian military aid to Ukraine, and pushed back against EU sanctions on Russia. While the Slovakian PM has defended his move, citing the necessity of developing strong relations with both sides, the Slovakian people haven’t bought it. Tens of thousands of protestors throughout the country have called for Fico’s resignation in recent months in opposition to his foreign policy pivot.

Similarly, in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán threatened to condition his support for Ukraine on the maintenance of a pipeline to provide Budapest with energy. Orbán has defended this stipulation by arguing that Hungary, who imports 80% of their oil from Russia, has lost €19 billion from EU sanctions on Russia. While the Hungarian PM backed down and voted to continue sanctions, his threats should not be dismissed, as they’re emblematic of a broader cohesion problem that the alliance is facing. While the unanimity requirement for EU decisions didn’t prevent action this time, if Orbán’s hesitation grows, or Fico drags his feet too, it could damage the ability of the bloc to show resolve against Russia–and illiberal values–and support for Ukraine–and democratic values.

As the EU navigates a period rife with uncertainty, it remains to be seen which factions will shape the alliance’s foreign policy going forward. Only time will tell whether Macron’s plans for the alliance manifest in the coming years or are destined to remain a pipe dream forever.

Russia and Iran 20-Year Treaty Strengthens Strategic Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with Iranian counterpart Masoud Pezeshkian. Evgenia Novozhenina/AFP via Getty Images

On January 17th, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian negotiated a 20-year defense treaty titled “The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement,” outlining new alliance policies between the two states. The deal covers a variety of topics, including science, trade, transportation, agriculture, military, intelligence, education, and culture, all of which are geared toward boosting trade and economic relations between Russia and Iran.

Among the agreed-upon policies, was a prohibition on either state giving aid to an aggressor attacking the other, as well as a policy barring the use of each other’s territory in a way that threatens the stability of the other. However, unlike the treaty between Russia and North Korea, a mutual defense clause requiring one country to come to the other’s defense in the event of an attack was not included. The exclusion of such a policy is particularly notable, as it could have potentially required Iran to get involved in Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine.  

Made just days before President Donald Trump’s inauguration, the negotiation announcement has led to worldwide speculation on the motivations behind its timing, with many pointing to the increasing pressure posed by strict Western sanctions and Trump’s “America First” foreign policy interests. With the American president promising to end the war in Ukraine and threatening a tougher stance on Iran, many believe this deal is meant to coordinate a joint-retaliation response and stir worry across the West.

Yet this deal is not a sudden decision, but rather the cumulation of months of negotiating that began when Pezeshkian took office last July, ultimately being signed on the first visit between these two presidents at the Kremlin. Building off a relationship that began after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and Iran have made a number of strategic moves together over the years, including the construction of Iran’s first nuclear power plant in 2013 and Iran’s entry into the BRICS bloc in 2023. The Syrian Civil War was also a crucial catalyst in the strengthening of bilateral relations, as the two states pooled efforts in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government. An effort which, much to Putin and Pezeshkian’s chagrin, failed to prevent his downfall late last year. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to further strengthening of relations, as Moscow paid $1.7 billion for 11,000 Iranian Shahed drones to use in the conflict. Given the rich history between Russia and Iran, this treaty has become merely a formality between two well-acquainted allies.

Pezeshkian has even made direct comments on the Russia-Ukraine war, saying he hopes the war can be ended soon with peace talks and negotiations. He further stated that “war is not a good solution to resolve problems and we would welcome talks and achieving peace between... Russia and Ukraine,” emphasizing the need for a mediator to help the states resolve their disputes before tensions worsen and efforts to stabilize become even more difficult.

Looking toward the future of Russia, we can anticipate the construction of more nuclear projects in the region and the creation of a gas pipeline of 55 billion cubic meters per year to Iran via Azerbaijan, a goal which, despite setbacks, is still underway. "This [treaty] creates better conditions for bilateral cooperation in all areas," Putin stated, emphasizing that this “important new chapter” would expand ties and bolster trust and collaboration between the two countries for many years to come.

Retribution Returns to Washington

Enrique Tarrio and other Proud Boys gather in Washington D.C. in December 2020. Tarrio, whose sentence was commuted by Trump, had been sentenced to 22 years in prison on seditious conspiracy charges related to the January 6th Capitol attack. Victor J. Blue for the New York Times

During the 2023 Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), Donald Trump made a promise to his supporters: “I am your justice…I am your retribution.” At that time, Trump and his political movement were in exile, having made a disgraceful exit after an election loss that many of them believed had been caused by a nebulous “deep state” embedded inside the federal government. Now, Trump and his movement have returned to the halls of power, bringing justice for their friends and retribution for their enemies in equal measure. 

Soon after the inauguration, before cheering crowds at the Capital One arena, Trump signed his first wave of executive orders, presidential pardons, and commutations. The initial pardons and commutations went to over 1500 participants in the January 6th Capitol riot, including rioters convicted of violent felonies and militia leaders convicted of seditious conspiracy. Four days later, Trump pardoned 23 anti-abortion activists who had blocked the entrance of an abortion clinic and accosted patients and staff. The message was clear: in Trump’s America, the legal system, once the bane of his most radical supporters, will no longer restrict their activities. Former Proud Boys leader Enrique Tarrio, fresh out of prison, echoed the sentiment: “Now it’s our turn.”

Trump has also sought to render the federal government more pliable to his wishes. During his first term, a group of officials colloquially known as the “adults in the room” often tried to restrain what they saw as Trump’s worst impulses. Trump’s first executive actions seek to exact revenge against these and other former officials, and to prevent the rise of any successor movement by installing loyal functionaries throughout the federal bureaucracy. Trump has reinstated Schedule F, a classification developed at the end of his first term that makes it easier to fire certain kinds of federal employees and replace them with political appointees. Additionally, Trump has begun directly removing officials who he believes may exhibit an ideological bias against him or otherwise hinder his agenda, including Coast Guard commandant Admiral Linda Fagan, 17 inspectors general, and several high-level Justice Department officials. Trump’s efforts thus far have seemingly found success; as of yet, there is no talk of resistance from within the federal ranks. 

Trump’s animus is not limited to individuals currently serving in the government. Trump removed federal security protection from at least four former officials who served in his previous administration: former CDC director Dr. Anthony Fauci, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former National Security Advisor John Bolton, and former Iran envoy Brian Hook. This comes despite evidence that Bolton, Pompeo, and Hook have been targeted for assassination by Iran. Additionally, Trump has stripped security clearances from dozens of former intelligence officials, including three ex-CIA directors, who signed an open letter warning that the Hunter Biden laptop story might be Russian disinformation. 

Less than a week into his presidency, Trump has already made an indelible mark. Enemies beware as a new elite, armed with the full power of the American state, pursues justice and retribution with vindictive urgency.

Putin and Touadéra Hold Discussions on Increasing Bilateral Cooperation

Sergei Chirikov/Reuters

On January 15, 2025, President Fuastin-Archange Touadéra of the Central African Republic (CAR) arrived in Moscow for a three-day official visit aimed at improving bilateral relations with Russia and President Vladimir Putin. Specifically, the states focused on deepening their ties in the realms of military cooperation and political cooperation.

Russia has played a key role in CAR’s security framework since 2018, providing military training and logistical support. During the meeting, both leaders discussed expanding bilateral military cooperation, specifically to focus on enhancing CAR’s defense capabilities amidst ongoing security challenges. Putin emphasized Russia’s commitment to supporting CAR’s sovereignty and stability, offering security support to embattled leaders as they battle with warring rebel factions.

Touadéra and Putin also reviewed economic and political agreements aimed at strengthening CAR’s infrastructure and governance. The Central African leader expressed gratitude for Russia’s assistance in addressing internal conflicts and promoting development. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to deepening ties beyond military collaboration.

Russia’s involvement in CAR includes the mercenaries from the Wagner Group, whose military contractors have played a large role in supporting CAR’s government forces. Despite the scrutiny they have faced from the international community, the group remains influential in maintaining stability in CAR. By training thousands of local forces, the group has put the rebels on the retreat, turning the tide of CAR’s civil war. In doing so, they’ve gained support in the state, as seen by the unveiling of a bronze monument glorifying the late head of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

The bilateral talks between President Touadéra and President Putin signify a growing partnership between the two nations outside of military cooperation. While details of future agreements remain confidential, the discussions highlight Russia’s increasing influence in CAR and the African continent. As Russia’s war with Ukraine rages on, they may expand this agreement to make use of CAR troops in the conflict, further diversifying their army (as they’ve already done with North Korean troops). If Putin continues to strengthen his foothold in the region, he may embolden the continent’s authoritarian leaders, further straying Africa from democracy.