In the midst of the twenty-first century, it is arguable that the greatest threat to the international community is that of transnational terrorism. Defined as “such action when carried out by basically autonomous non-state actors, whether or not they enjoy some degree of support from sympathetic states,” transnational terrorism spans national boundaries and presents itself as a formidable challenge to nation-states. While the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is still a prominent threat, they have slightly faded from international media attention in the past few years and their recent loss of territory has pushed them out of the bigger picture, making way for a new focus group: Al-Shabaab. Known in Arabic as “the Youth” or “the Guys,” al-Shabaab is a jihadist insurgency group based in Somalia that largely operates in many states throughout East Africa, including Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Yemen, with occasional violent activity in Ethiopia and Uganda. Active since 2006, al-Shabaab’s main objectives are to replace the current Somali federal republic that is supported by the United Nations (UN) with an Islamic government. As part of their efforts to achieve that, the group’s distinctive mobilization schemes, including their use of guerrilla warfare and sophisticated public relations arm, allows them to target disadvantaged populations, recruit fighters on both the domestic and global scale, and ultimately elevate their status to one of the most dangerous insurgent groups capable of largely impacting East Africa.
Public Relations Arm
While al-Shabaab is based in Somalia, its online presence makes it just as much of a threat as its physical presence does to nearby states in East Africa. After the devastating events that transpired in September 2001, the term “terrorism” has become synonymous with social media, particularly interactive platforms such as Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook. However, while al-Qaeda was the first extremist group to truly capitalize on the use of social media, al-Shabaab is no stranger to online recruitment and cyberterrorism.
Al-Shabaab’s use of “electronic jihad” is extensive as their public relations arm is extremely sophisticated, utilizing a particular pro-Muslim framework in order to appeal to a certain religious group and identity that people hold. In actuality, this framework helps explain why al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts are so effective. Starting in 2007, Al-Kataib, the group’s media branch, has produced propaganda aimed at recruiting new fighters, as well as enhanced its audio-visual production in order to produce “polished films” alongside written, radio, and photographic content. But the internet’s inadvertent allyship also extends to Twitter. In 2011, al-Shabaab created its Twitter account under the username “@HSMPress,” which it uses to coordinate information and mobilize its members as a form of collective action. For example, the account attempted to appeal to the interests of all Muslims as seen by a tweet stating that “To propound, propagate and promote the forgotten obligation of Jihad among the Muslims around the globe is the essence of #JihadPhilosophy,” adding that “Sheikh; Jihad is an individual obligation; so all Muslims, and Somalis in particular, must march forth for Jihad.” This call to action specifically used an “obligatory” anti-Western jihadist framework in order to try and appeal to the greater Islamic community and their inherent responsibilities as Muslims to fight back against those who try to oppress them and all that they stand for.
The group’s Twitter account also serves as a platform where they can regularly confront foreigners and opposing forces and denounce intervention efforts by primarily Western states. In one instance, @HSMPress tweeted a link to an article and captioned it “Decades of interference-and not a single success… Foreign interventions have never succeeded in Somalia.” In a later response to a follower, the account wrote that “Western Media has spent years inculcating derogatory anti-Islami views into ur minds.” The group’s overall decision to focus on decades of failed Western interventionism allows them to highlight the strength and resiliency of the Somali people. It also serves as some sort of justification for al-Shabaab’s violent behavior. They are not simply acting out against enemies of Allah, but also in response to numerous attempts to, as they view it, infiltrate Somalia.
However, despite their online presence, al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts generally focus on nobody and everybody all at once. Their multifaceted social media campaigns and their “construction of specific media operations narratives” allow them to have multiple target audiences, demonstrating their ability to interact with others on both a domestic and international scale. However, certain populations are targeted to a higher degree than others. As part of the diaspora, approximately 145,000 Somalis have settled in the United States as of 2017, particularly in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area of Minnesota. While the group has not outright mentioned them, the mass assembly of Somalis in the state makes it far easier to implement recruitment methods there. In fact, Somali-American’s feelings of marginalization and homesickness make them the most susceptible targets to al-Shabaab’s framing efforts.
Furthermore, al-Shabaab’s media apparatus has also continued to try and attract foreign fighters from the East Africa region, particularly those who speak a local language such as Swahili. And, because they are primarily a group with a large number of youth, al-Shabaab has been known to target orphans and abandoned children in Mogadishu, the state’s capital city. Not only does social media increase an organization’s ability to reach people online, but its usability and reachability make it easier to employ selective recruitment efforts where al-Shabaab is able to openly recruit foreign fighters from specific communities. While al-Shabaab is relinquishing a lot of its territorial hold in Somalia, its online presence is as strong as ever.
Warfare Tactics
Composed of several thousand members, al-Shabaab relies on guerrilla warfare fighting techniques rather than a traditional combat approach because the group is unable to match the power of pro-government forces in Somalia and elsewhere. A form of irregular warfare, guerrilla warfare is when a small group of rebel combatants is dispatched to confront government forces, often utilizing ambushes, raids, and hit-and-run tactics. Al-Shabaab’s structure is also more decentralized in nature, meaning that responsibilities and tasks are delineated to lower-level members by upper management, making it easier to instruct members. Furthermore, despite its transnational rhetoric and affiliation with the larger, more prestigious al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab’s domestic focus on the Somali government and local clan issues enables them to carry out successful high-profile attacks.
With guerrilla warfare as one of their staple battlefield strategies, al-Shabaab has been extremely successful in making a name and reputation for themselves through a few well-executed attacks. In September 2013, armed militants killed 67 people and injured more than 200 during a four-day siege at the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Then in 2015, Garissa University College in northeastern Kenya was the site of another major attack orchestrated by the group. A number of gunmen entered the campus and murdered 147 people after separating students by religion, immediately killing Christians while releasing Muslims in the deadliest terror attack on Kenyan soil since the U.S. embassy was bombed in Nairobi in 1998. Kenya was, yet again, the target of another shooting in early 2019 as five al-Shabaab members struck the DusitD2 hotel in Nairobi. Three vehicles were bombed in a bank parking lot inside the hotel complex while a suicide bomber detonated inside the hotel lobby, resulting in a 20-hour siege and the deaths of 14 people. These are but a few of al-Shabaab’s deadlier attacks, and while none come close to the impact that al-Qaeda’s September 2001 attack had, they still illustrate the group’s attempts to show both African and American military forces that they are a formidable threat and should be taken seriously.
By bypassing conventional fighting techniques in favor of low risk, small-group attacks, al-Shabaab is relying more on the use of tactics such as improvised explosive devices, patrol ambushes, and assassinations to demonstrate to both the region and the world that they are still able to inflict significant damage. In fact, al-Shabaab was reportedly responsible for over 1,457 deaths in 2017 alone, and their success can be attributed to their rigorous training process. Currently, recruits go through a six-month training program that includes “reading and interpreting the Koran, physical exercise, and weapons handling.” This process is aided by the group’s impressive adaptability as they employ a hybridization of violent attacks, which helps ensure their sustainability as an organization. Utilization of such methods means the group is unpredictable, making it more difficult for their adversaries to defeat them.
And while al-Shabaab did not form until 2006, their homeland of Somalia is well-known in the American psyche. Somali guerrilla fighters were instrumental actors in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1993 which killed 18 American troops in Mogadishu. Somalia, in general, has been a target of American presidents for years, and only recently with the increased risk posed by al-Shabaab has the United States reiterated their commitment to the eradication of terrorism in the state. However, al-Shabaab’s attack history is unlike anything the area has experienced before. While al-Qaeda is known for its use of explosives, usually in the form of car bombs and suicide bombers in front of government buildings, al-Shabaab’s fighting methods center around close-quarter attacks, such as mass shootings at highly populated locations. Whether this makes them more or less deadly than their al-Qaeda affiliate is subjective, but it does indicate the diversity with which these types of groups carry out attacks, as well as the diversity of their targets.
However, despite the group’s sophisticated use of social media and employment of guerrilla warfare tactics, those are but two puzzle pieces in the greater picture that explains why al-Shabaab is a dangerous insurgency movement. While this piece touched upon the fighting tactics and the recruitment strategies utilized by al-Shabaab, there are a number of counterarguments that could be made regarding the limitations of this evidence. First, because al-Shabaab is based out of Somalia, there is very little information available concerning the group’s current numbers and mobilization plans. Insurgency groups tend to be so successful because they remain private, secretive, and often act without warning or notice. While some may argue that this piece fails to provide more concrete evidence and case study examples, it does so to the best of its ability due to a lack of available data and information online.
Going forth, more research should be conducted on the new era of al-Shabaab because insurgency groups tend to morph over time and through generations. Around the time of their 2013 attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall, the group had endured a reformation and resurgence of sorts under the new Amir, Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamud Godane. This “reformation” essentially made the group more asymmetrical in design in regards to their fighting strategy, as well as more extremist in nature, as they are now considered “an al-Qaeda franchise in Somalia, imbued with the ‘takfiri’ ethos that legitimizes the killing of other Muslims, and a recommitment to the cause of international jihad.” Further researching this fundamental shift in the way in which the group operates and thinks, as well as their values and goals, may better help scholars understand their behavior and be able to counter it. The international community as a whole must also change the way in which they examine al-Shabaab as an organization. Currently, the international community views al-Shabaab through an “international terrorism” frame, but they fail to acknowledge their “transition toward a greater governing role” in the region. In addition, studying the various elements of transnational terrorist organizations in a general sense allows for an analysis and foundational understanding that can apply to other fields of work that pertain to al-Shabaab, such as rebel governance and state collapse.
Finally, even though they have only existed for the last 13 years, al-Shabaab has managed to climb the ranks and situate themselves towards the top of the terrorist threat ladder. While ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram continue to reign supreme in the world of transnational terrorism, al-Shabaab’s unique fighting tactics and multifaceted recruitment strategies elevate them far above the rest, increasing their threat potential in East Africa. Their sophisticated use of guerrilla warfare and social media, as well as their employment of certain frameworks and rhetoric, demonstrate that al-Shabaab is a transnational terrorist organization that should not be taken lightly. They ultimately pose a serious threat to not only East Africa and the African Union, but also the international community as a whole due to the success of their online outreach efforts.