The conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatists, which started in 2014 in Eastern Ukraine, has killed approximately 12,000 people, maimed a least 27,000, and displaced about 1.3 million people. However, over the last five years, with the exception of the occasional news cycle, Ukraine stayed out of the collective consciousness of the public of the United States (U.S.) until September 2019. A whistleblower report informed the public that the President of the United States may have used his office to pressure the Ukrainian government to investigate a leading political Rival.
Suddenly Ukraine was on the lips of almost every talking head in the country. Judging by how many U.S. lawmakers still use the literal Russian translation of “The Ukraine” in public remarks, it is likely that many policymakers also haven’t thought too much about Ukraine over the last five years. Nonetheless, the lack of public attention doesn’t negate the fact that Ukraine has been on the frontlines of a Great Power Competition—Russia and China are both pursuing strategic objectives in Ukraine. Understanding precisely what these great powers’ objectives are in Ukraine and how these regional objectives fit into the global outlooks of these states is critical. This understanding enables the prediction of future actions of these states on both a regional and global level.
Frozen Conflicts and Russian Grand Strategy
Russia, in both its 2009 and 2016 national defense strategy, has stated that it views the eastern expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the positioning of NATO troops ever closer to the Russian border as a direct threat to the country’s national security. After the rapid eastern expansion of the NATO alliance in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia developed a strategy to block certain countries from integrating into the Trans-Atlantic alliance. In both Moldova and Georgia, Russia was able to successfully leverage the separatist tendencies of ethnic minorities in the respective states to create frozen conflicts. Until these frozen conflicts are resolved, the prospect for European Union (EU) or NATO integration remains dim.
These autonomous entities, which are generally unrecognized at the international level, would not survive without Russian patronage. In 2015, The Guardian reported that 70 percent of the separatist’s entity in Moldova, Transnistria, the national budget came in the form of Russian aid. In the case of Georgia, in September 2019, Putin publicly expressed his continued support for the separatist regions which included the allocation of funds to provide for the modernization of the entities’ armed forces of the separatist republics of Georgia. However, this relatively modest level of support has significantly complicated the EU and NATO aspirations of two former Soviet republics–in the case of Moldova, it’s been 27 years and for Georgia, it’s been ten years.
The Utility of a Frozen Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
In the case of Ukraine, the line of contact that represents the de-facto border between the separatists and the Ukrainian government has been relatively stable since 2016.
The conflict is now characterized by low-intensity trench warfare, sniper attacks, artillery barrages, and the occasional skirmish. It is in Russia’s interest to keep this conflict unresolved. Although Russia denies that it has military assets deployed on Ukrainian soil (which many investigative reports have conclusively debunked), Russia makes no secret of the economic and political support that it provides to the breakaway regions. No official numbers exist regarding the exact amount of aid that Russia sends to the separatist regions, but Western analysts estimate that Russian aid to these regions amounts to 2 billion USD annually. This figure is less than .01 percent of Russia’s GDP—which, for Russia, is a relatively small price to pay to achieve a major geopolitical objective.
As long as this conflict remains unresolved, significant complications will persist regarding Ukrainian aspirations to join the transatlantic security apparatus. The implicit threat of the conflict in the east of Ukraine going from frozen to very hot will hang over any move by Ukraine to become a more integrated member of NATO. Russia desires to maintain this tripwire to Ukrainian integration into the West, and thus will continue economically supporting the separatist regions and will work to sandbag any efforts to fully resolve the conflict.
For instance, Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian-turned-president of Ukraine, during both his presidential campaign and his time as president, has been a strong proponent of undertaking public diplomacy campaigns in an attempt to convince the residents of the separatists’ regions that they would be welcomed back into Ukraine. Furthermore, in his inaugural speech in May of 2019, he stated that “for years the government [of Ukraine] has done nothing to in order for them [the Russian separatists] to feel Ukrainian. They are not strangers, they are ours, they are Ukrainian.” However, Russia seeks to discourage the residents of the separatists’ republics to think of themselves in any way Ukrainian because that could eventually lead to a resolution of the conflict. Thus, in an attempt to solidify a non-Ukrainian identity in the separatist republic, in April of 2019, Russia distributed Russian passports to the residents of the breakaway regions. While these types of small provocations rarely make it into the Western news cycle and garner very little attention, they further solidify the frozen conflict in Ukraine. In the near term, expect Russia to sponsor similar actions, particularly if any progress is made in negotiations that could lead to a resolution of the conflict.
When states that border Russia start to strategically align themselves with centers of power independent of Moscow, Russia feels threatened. Although Russia will most likely attempt to avoid open conflict in dissuading its neighbors from aligning with other powers, they will not shy away from using their less-then-war playbook to achieve their strategic objectives. For instance, if Central Asian states start to reorient themselves towards China (as a result of China’s far-reaching Belt and Road Initiative), and if this reorientation reaches a tipping point, one could expect Russia to undertake a similar strategy as it has in the Caucuses and in Eastern Europe.
China: Belt and Road Initiative, Trade, and Access
Unsurprisingly, China has made inroads into Ukraine via its Belt and Road Initiative, as China envisions Ukraine as a major transit hub that can deliver Chinese produced goods to the EU market. In fact, government officials and businesses of both countries have proposed ambitious infrastructure projects to make this vision a reality. In August 2018, during a roundtable of officials and experts from Ukraine and China, the group unveiled the concept for an 1100 kilometer high-speed rail line in Ukraine. It is important to note, despite the unveiling of this plan and many like it, very few projects have actually been started. Thus far, the Belt and Road Initiative in Ukraine remains largely an abstract concept instead of a concrete project.
However, the growing trade relationship between Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, and Beijing is very real. In 2018, Ukraine’s single largest import partner was China. Ukraine imported 7 billion dollars worth of goods from China in 2018—only the EU exported more goods to Ukraine that year. Furthermore, in the first half of 2019, China became the 3rd largest destination for Ukrainian exports. Although the EU is still undoubtedly Ukraine’s most important economic partner, China has cultivated its economic relationship with Ukraine quite quickly.
This budding trade relationship with Kyiv allows Beijing access to the Ukrainian goods that it most desires: weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China was the largest customer for Ukrainian arms in 2018. To note, China is not acquiring mere old soviet weapons stocks that have been rusting away in warehouses since the 90’s – they are acquiring high-tech aerospace technology.
Ukraine was a critical part of the Soviet defense industry and much of the infrastructure and human capital are still present to this day. According to Michael Carpenter, an arms control expert at the Atlantic Council, Ukraine “is blessed with extraordinary human capital: world-class engineers, designers, and top-notch universities that feed qualified science and engineering graduates into the job market.” The Ukrainian military-industrial complex has the exceedingly rare capability to produce high-tech helicopters and jet engines from start to finish. Although China has made incredible advances in aerospace technology, it still struggles with the production of high-precision equipment like jet engines. For instance, China’s fifth-generation fighter, the J-20, is currently outfitted with a Russian engine because China’s engine development program for the fighter has been plagued with problems. Fundamentally, China has a high demand for this Ukrainian technology and know-how and, since 2014 when they dramatically cut their arms sales to Russia, the Ukrainian military-industrial base needs the customer.
Traditionally, China has acquired this type of quality military technology from Russia. However, after Russia meddled in the 2016 U.S. election, the U.S. Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). This law allows the United States to enact sanctions against any entity that does business with the Russian defense sector. In September 2018, Washington used this authority to sanction China in response to China’s acquisition of Russian fighter jets and missile systems. Arms acquisitions from Ukraine are also not subject to CAATSA, making Ukraine an even more attractive supplier for China. Furthermore, there is the possibility that Moscow ceases supplying Beijing with military technology if the Sino-Russian relationship becomes more competitive. China has a strategic interest in retaining and expanding its access to the Ukrainian military-industrial complex.
In order to protect this interest in the short term, China will most likely continue various public diplomacy and investment efforts with the goal of developing good-will among the Ukrainian citizenry. In the past, China has gifted 50 ambulances, 50 search-and-rescue vehicles, and provided 137 million dollars for medical equipment to regional hospitals. These types of “hearts and minds” campaigns make it easier for China to grow its influence in Ukraine without provoking a negative reaction from everyday Ukrainians.
In addition to public diplomacy efforts, China may use more direct means to protect its image and popularity in Ukraine. For instance, in early October Ukrainian media reported that a number of high-profile members of president Zelensky’s political party had been pressured by Chinese agents to act against Ukrainian civil society groups supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. This type of interference in domestic Ukrainian politics could become more common as China increases its influence in Ukraine.
Moreover, China will most likely seek to invest in and develop the Ukrainian arms industry. In June 2019, a Chinese firm with connections to the Chinese government bid to buy a 50 percent stake in Motor Sich for 100 million dollars above market price. Motor Sich is one of the largest defense contractors in Ukraine that produces engines and employs over 30,000 Ukrainians. China can be expected to continue attempting to gain control over these types of Ukrainian companies in order to ensure its access to these firms’ products and to potentially acquire the technological know-how of these companies.
On a strategic level, China, like Russia, has an interest in keeping Kyiv from fully integrating into the EU and the transatlantic community. The EU has enforced a moratorium on arms sale to China since 1989 in response to Tiananmen Square. If Ukraine were to join the EU or even make moves towards EU ascension that would require Kyiv to align its foreign policy to Brussels—to include the restrictions of arms sales—China would push back. Most likely, Beijing would attempt to leverage its economic influence that it is developing in Ukraine to lobby Ukrainian leaders to keep a degree of distance from Brussels. Therefore, much like Russia, China has a strategic interest in keeping Ukraine neutral. However, it is very unlikely that China would ever support or recognize the Russian-separatists in Ukraine in order to achieve this goal. China has a strict policy of not recognizing the breakaway regions of other countries for fear of emboldening any number of separatist movements in China itself.
Overall, China is concerned with access—access to goods, access to markets, and access to resources. The case of Ukraine illustrates how China goes about quietly acquiring and then protecting this access.
Implications for Ukraine
Traditionally, when discussing the geopolitical situation in Ukraine, commenters have underscored the supposed divide between the Russian-speaking east and the Ukrainian-speaking west, the implication being that Ukraine is a divided country. However, in the 2019 elections, Zelensky ran a campaign that attempted to rise above the east/west divide. Although Zelensky spoke mostly Russian (as he is primarily a Russian speaker) during the election, he still emphasized the importance of the Ukrainian language—identity politics was not the focus of his platform. Instead, he focused on formulating a series of ambitious reforms that would seek to clean up Ukrainian politics, make the country more business-friendly, and simplify the bureaucracy. Zelensky’s campaign was successful and he won support that transcended the traditional east/west divide. Ukraine is not nearly as divided as many pundits portray.
Zelensky has expressed support for Ukrainian ascension to the EU and has stated that he believes that the Ukrainian people should vote in a referendum to decide the future course of the country. Concerningly, as demonstrated, outside powers have distinct interests in keeping Ukraine from undertaking the EU ascension process. Moreover, these outside powers also have levers they could push that could seriously complicate any referendum. If this referendum takes place, it is pertinent to remember that Moscow wants to halt western encroachment and it will capitalize on its influence over the separatist republics to accomplish this strategic goal. China, on the other hand, will seek to preserve its access to Ukrainian goods, know-how, and markets, and will leverage its growing soft-power tools to protect these interests.