Since the 1990s, the United States (U.S.) has employed various sanction regimes at an increasing rate in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. After Turkey’s October incursion into Northern Syria, U.S. policymakers immediately started pushing for the introduction of new sanctions against Turkey. Included in the Turkey sanction bill that passed the House of Representatives on October 29, 2019 was a provision to impose a previously defined set of sanctions called Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). However, the specific CAATSA sanctions provisions that Turkey would be subject to are extremely ineffective in accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals and could actually increase the influence of Russia. The root of the ineffectiveness of CAATSA sanctions is “mirrored thinking,” as U.S. policymakers automatically assume that other states “think” like the U.S. The case of CAATSA sanctions serves as a warning to policymakers to avoid the analytical trap of mirrored thinking in future policy decisions.
CAATSA Overview
In 2017, Congress passed CAATSA with sanctions targeting North Korea, Iran, and Russia. For each country, CAATSA lays out a separate justification for sanctions and the specifics of the sanctions differ for each country. Thus, CAATSA is effectively three sanction regimes folded into one. However, despite the fact that the targets of CAATSA sanctions differ for Iran, North Korea, and Russia, CAATSA universally implements secondary sanctions on targeted entities.
Per country, CAATSA created a list of persons and entities that are directly targeted by sanctions. Secondary sanctions direct the U.S. Treasury Department to also sanction any persons or entities that partake in “significant” transactions with listed persons or entities. Secondary sanctions on Iran and North Korea are not revolutionary, however, whereas Iran and North Korea are relatively isolated from the international business community, Russia is not. European businesses have significantly more ties to Russia than they do to North Korea or Iran and thus, are more likely, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to do business with a CAATSA targeted entity. Sanctioning a European entity could lead to complications between Washington and Brussels. Thus, the imposition of secondary sanctions on Russia has the potential to weaken U.S. partnerships.
The Russia-specific sections of the CAATSA legislation state that Congress implemented the sanctions to respond to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, cyber intrusions, and human rights violations, and codifies many existing Russia sanctions programs. In addition, CAATSA Section 231E added provisions that target the Russian Defense and Intelligence sectors. Russian arms exports account for a predominant portion of the country’s technology-intensive exports and are one of the main avenues by which Russia integrates with the global economy. Therefore, CAATSA sanctions targeting the Russian military-industrial complex are supposed to have a chilling effect on the sales of Russian arms and defense technology. This would theoretically degrade the economic health of the Russian military-industrial base and decrease Russia’s ability to expand its sphere of influence through arms deals. However, the effectiveness of the policy is predicated on the assumption that Russia leverages arms sales to create close ties with states and that Russia is attempting to generate a profit from arms sales. This assumption stems from the U.S. usage of arms sales but does not acknowledge the fact that Russia employs arms sales differently.
U.S. Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy
It is no secret that the United States is the largest arms exporter in the world. In 2018 alone the U.S. made 136 billion dollars in arms deals. According to the U.S. Department of State, “Arms sales and defense trade are key tools of [U.S.] foreign policy.” The vast majority of analysts agree that the purchase of an advanced U.S. defense system creates an extraordinarily strong incentive for the recipient country to preserve a close relationship with the U.S. For instance, a single U.S. cooperative defense program, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), involves 46 percent of the global economy and ensures that the states purchasing the JSF will be largely dependent on maintaining stable relationships with the U.S. to competently sustain the jet over its projected 50 year lifespan. The U.S. sells arms to make other states dependent on the U.S. in order to preserve their national security.
In addition, promoting interoperability between the U.S. military and militaries of ally states has been a long-standing goal of U.S. arms sales from administration to administration. In 2014, the Obama administration released a directive stating that one of the primary goals of U.S. arms sales was increasing interoperability capabilities. The Trump administration’s public rhetoric focuses on the benefits of arms sales to the U.S. economy. However, in the Trump administration’s April 2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, the importance of promoting interoperability is still highlighted. Administrations understand that increasing interoperability results in an increase in ease by which the U.S. can project its military power.
U.S. planners understand that the outcome of any great power confrontation will hinge on the ability to gather, analyze, and disseminate information quickly. Allies that use U.S. compatible technology enable the U.S. military to easily incorporate the allies’ military assets into the broader U.S. information network. Jonathan Caverley of the U.S. naval war college highlights that “Interoperability among networked drones from multiple countries will likely play an enormous role in future “informationalized conflicts.” Interoperability results in increased lethality, therefore cultivating interoperability through arms sales remains a priority of U.S. foreign policy.
CAATSA-style sanctions decrease the effectiveness of arms sales to build strong bilateral relationships and to cultivate interoperability. One can imagine that significant disincentives to buy U.S. arms would arise if China were to impose CAATSA- style secondary sanctions on U.S. arms sales. If that were to occur, the primary partners of the U.S., such as the UK, France, Australia, and Germany, would surely continue to purchase U.S. arms. However, states which the U.S. is trying to court might be dissuaded from purchasing arms in the quantity required to produce a dependent relationship and create interoperability capabilities with the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions would be effective against the U.S.—but Russia’s use of arms sales in its foreign policy is fundamentally different.
Russia’s Use of Arms Deals in Foreign Policy
Russia’s primary objective of arms sales is to support its image as a first-rate, global power, promote the creation of a multi-polar world, and keep the Russian military-industrial base employed.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia is the second most prolific seller of arms in the world (the most prolific is the U.S.). This is a point of pride for Russia. In a public meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin stated: “The arms market is complicated. Competition in this sector is very fierce. That Russia is the world’s second biggest arms and military hardware exporter is thus all the greater an achievement. I think it is an important indicator of our country’s industrial, technological, scientific, and political capabilities…. Russia has a time-tested reputation as a top-class producer of the most sophisticated military hardware.” Furthermore, Russian equipment is less expensive than U.S. arms and that is also a point of pride for Russia. For instance, in February of 2019, the Defense Minister of Russia, Sergey Shogiu, bragged that “Our foreign colleagues realize that our weapons are hundreds of times cheaper than the systems deployed to be used against us. And that does not apply only to the US missile defense system.” Russia’s arms sales enhance Russia’s prestige abroad and, arguably, more importantly, helps cements the perception of Russian power in the collective consciousness of the Russian citizenry.
Furthermore, Russia does not necessarily make money from its arms exports. It has been widely documented that Russia will provide loans to states who are cash strapped but looking to buy Russian weapons. A high-profile example of this policy is Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s advanced anti-air missile system—the S-400. This acquisition has an estimated value of 2.5 billion dollars, and 55 percent of this purchase is being financed via a Russian loan. Additionally, in 2018, Russia issued a 200 million dollar loan to Armenia to finance the purchase of anti-aircraft and radar systems and, in 2013, Bangladesh was issued an 800 million dollar Russian loan in order to purchase Russian training jets. The chance of Russia actually seeing profits from these sales are relatively low. However, this is the trend for the entire military-industrial complex in Russia—Russian production of weapons is not profitable and thus requires state-funded subsidies. The export of arms that are financed by Russian loans is just another way to subsidize Russia’s military-industrial complex. These foreign arms sales keep the Russian military-industrial complex, which employs over two million Russians, operating. Keeping production lines running guarantees that Russia will have a domestic source of arms. Moreover, the two million Russians that are employed in the military-industrial complex and the oligarch owners of these firms provide stable political support to Putin’s government.
Moreover, Russia’s sales of arms are opportunistic and do not represent any concerted effort to form tight alliances with the states who purchase Russian arms. In 2018, there was significant media coverage of China’s participation in Russia’s Vostok-18 military exercises. Combined with China’s purchase of S-400’s, many analysts suggested that there was a deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia. Despite appearances, in Vostok-18 Chinese forces only represented one percent of the troops involved. Despite the fact that Chinese and Russian officials might state that arms sales and joint exercises symbolize a growing strategic relationship, actions speak larger than words and so far, Russian-Chinese cooperation has been quite superficial. But, the appearance of Russia creating interoperable capability with any state gives the appearance that Russia is forming an alternative to the western-dominated international system. This promotion of a multi-polar world is referenced many times in Russian foreign policy. Arms sales contribute to the appearance that Russia is creating this alternative system regardless of the actual imperial effects.
How Russia Can Leverage CAATSA Sanctions
As demonstrated, Russia’s geopolitical use of arms sales differs significantly from how the U.S. employs arms sales. Due to these differences, Russia is actually able to leverage CAATSA sanctions to advance its foreign policy objectives—chiefly, the promotion of a more multipolar world.
Although, as discussed, Russia does not always seek to build close partnerships with other states, it is always looking to undermine other countries’ partnerships. A world where the overall cooperation between states is lower than it is today is inherently more multipolar—an objective of Russian foreign policy. When the U.S. sanctions, or even threatens to sanction another state, the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the state being targeted is strained—and thus, a step is taken closer towards the realization of Russia’s objectives.
The case of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms highlights this “partnership degrading” characteristic of sanctions. Turkey's purchase of Russian made S-400s has resulted in a significant straining of the U.S.- Turkish relationship since Turkey announced the acquisition in December of 2017. Turkey is a NATO ally and the prospect of the United States unilaterally sanctioning Turkey was met with profound dismay by many foreign policy experts. As a result of Turkey’s acquisition of Russian arms, the U.S. kicked Turkey out of the F-35 consortium (a major U.S. effort in developing closer strategic partnerships with other states) and there has been the talk of even reevaluating Turkey’s membership in NATO. It is important to note that this tension arose before Turkey’s incursion into Northern Syria- which has even further degraded the U.S.- Turkey relationship.
Russia was counting on its sale of weapons to undermine the Turkish-U.S. relationship. Russia was therefore willing to make concessions during this arms deal to help achieve this goal. Included in Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400’s were significant technology transfer provisions. These provisions will enable Turkey to maintain the S-400’s independently from Russia. Moreover, this technology transfer, in the future, will enable Turkey to domestically produce an analogous missile system. Thus, the technology transfer provisions negate the “dependency” building characteristics of arms sales which is critical to the way that the U.S. uses arms sales. Furthermore, as noted previously, Russia provided a loan to Turkey to finance 55 percent of the S-400 purchase (decreasing the likelihood that Russia will see a profit from the deal), and Russia also promised to expedite the delivery date of the missile system. The sale of S-400’s does not create a basis for a long-lasting partnership between Russia and Turkey and is not profitable for Russia. However, the sale of S-400’s raised the profile of the Russian arms industry which contributes to the image of Russia as a great power (this effect of arms sales happens regardless of CAATSA sanctions), and in large part because of the threat of CAATSA sanction, there was a significant chilling in the U.S.- Turkish relationship.
The Perils of Mirrored Thinking
The case of CAATSA sanctions demonstrates how foreign policy can stumble when policymakers transpose their own policy-making paradigms onto the leaderships of other states. Sanctions can be a valuable tool for policymakers; however, not all sanctions regimes are created equal. To craft an effective sanctions policy or any policy in general, policymakers must have a clear understanding of the policy’s goals and how the state that is being sanctioned will react. U.S. policymakers wanted to push back on what they perceived to be Russia’s expanding influence. Because the U.S. gains such a great deal of influence in its own export of military equipment, U.S. policymakers projected that limiting Russia’s ability to sell arms would be an effective way to counter Russia. However, as demonstrated, Russia applies arms sales in its foreign policy very differently than the U.S.. Thus, CAATSA sanctions on Russia’s military-industrial base do not degrade Russia’s ability to project power, but if anything, enhances it.