“While organized crime is not a new phenomenon today, some governments find their authority besieged at home and their foreign policy interests imperiled abroad. Drug trafficking, links between drug traffickers and terrorists, smuggling of illegal aliens, massive financial and bank fraud, arms smuggling, potential involvement in the theft and sale of nuclear material, political intimidation, and corruption all constitute a poisonous brew.”
James Woolsey, Former Director of the CIA
In the early twenty-first century, the international community adopted a policy of indifference towards the Balkan peninsula after the United States (U.S.) successfully commandeered NATO-led military interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo to prevent the escalation of a conflict that threatened to “taint the post-Cold War world.” However, as democratic backsliding and rising nationalist-populist parties threaten to reverse European integration efforts, stability in the Balkans is no longer guaranteed. While a large number of European countries are currently experiencing calls for secession, the Balkans face a greater, more established threat: transnational organized crime. These organized crime groups (OCGs) have been operating in the Balkans since the Yugoslav Wars, and they continue to threaten states’ efforts to democratize and stabilize. As the “hub” for organized crime in the region, the impact of these groups is especially visible in Albania, whose accession to the European Union (EU) has been halted due to the proliferation of organized crime and group ties to the country’s economic and political systems. However, the question remains as to what conditions have enabled Albania in particular, and not another Balkan state, to become the regional hub for organized crime groups and the illicit drug trade in the post-Cold War era?
It is critical to understand why the situation in Albania differs from the other Balkan countries that also host a number of OCGs. The factors of analysis that will be used to examine the reasons for this difference include Albania’s poor social and economic conditions, the magnitude of political corruption, and the country’s porous border as a result of their geographic location. In addition to analyzing these factors, this piece will also examine the implications of the proliferation of organized crime in Albania, particularly as they pertain to the country’s potential for acquiring EU membership, and as well as the overall impact on both the Balkans and contemporary Europe.
Historical Context
The Balkans and Organized Crime
Comprised of twelve countries, including the states that made up the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Greece, the Balkans lie at the crossroads between Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, essentially serving as a bridge between Europe and Asia. While economically beneficial, this geopolitical location also makes the Balkans extremely susceptible to transnational criminal activity. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the Balkan states were left politically weak, with no real governmental structure left in place. These conditions, paired with a fractured economic system, made the Balkan peninsula vulnerable to transnational organized crime groups.
Historically, organized crime in the Balkans was facilitated by means of “Balkan routes” which ran primarily through Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria. Through the use of these routes, transnational criminals were able to smuggle illegal drugs like heroin and marijuana, and now also cocaine and human beings, to other European countries such as Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Germany, among others. The outbreak of war in the Balkans in the 1990s increased smugglers’ use of these routes, as smuggling became a “survival strategy” for citizens who required basic supplies, as well as for groups like the Kosovo Liberation Army, who needed weapons and ammunition in order to fight. As a result of war-time smuggling, criminal profits made during the conflicts translated to political power in the post-war period. This led to corruption and the establishment of criminal structures in the Balkan countries’ political systems, such as the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and various state law enforcement agencies.
Albania as the “Hub” for OCGs
However, while transnational OCGs threaten the entirety of the Balkan countries, Albania is especially vulnerable to this type of clandestine criminal activity. Regarding the centralization of organized crime, Albania serves as the main hub, acting as both a “producer country” and as a “distribution node” for groups such as Hellbanianz. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2018 Strategy for International Control of Narcotics, “Albania produces and exports a significant amount of marijuana [and] is a transit country for Afghan heroin and cocaine,” making it one of the fastest-growing threats in contemporary Europe. As the primary exporter of cannabis in the region, Albanian OCGs take advantage of the historical “Balkan routes” that were used by smugglers and ensure the safe transportation of their products by placing “Soldiers” and “Capos” along the route to ward off public inquiries. The U.S. State Department also describes Albania as home to “rampant corruption, weak legal and government institutions and weak border controls” where drug trafficking and smuggling are among the top sources of revenue.
Factors of Analysis
Poor Social and Economic Conditions
Albania’s economy has experienced significant growth since the end of the Cold War. However, underlying social issues still prevent the country from achieving further economic success, the greatest being a lack of job opportunities. This can be attributed to the period between 1996-97 when the Albanian economy was besieged by a series of financial pyramid schemes. Despite enjoying success after transitioning to a market economy in the post-war period, Albania’s new economy was rudimentary and unstructured. This weak financial system enabled pyramid schemes to be carried out. A form of fraud, pyramid schemes are a way to make money based on the recruitment of investors, who are drawn in with the promise of high returns. The more investors involved, the more levels reached in the “pyramid” until eventually there are no more investors, profits are lost, and the system is rendered unsustainable.
In Albania, the proliferation of these schemes was detrimental to social and economic growth. Once schemes began to collapse, riots ensued as an estimated 800,000 individuals lost their money, leading to the acquisition of approximately $13.3 million in illegal proceeds. While knowledge about the true nature of pyramid schemes later reached the masses and people became more careful about where they invested their money, the impact of these schemes in the late 1990s set the stage for financial failure in an economic system that had a weak foundation.
The legacy of these pyramid schemes enables the success of OCGs in modern-day Albania because they are often cited as the reason for the lack of employment opportunities, which OCGs then use as an argument to draw people in to commit criminal acts as an alternative means to make money. Compared to the greater Euro Area, where unemployment rests at 7.5 percent as of October 2019, Albania has an extremely high national unemployment rate, recorded at 12 percent in December 2019, and an even higher youth unemployment rate, which averaged out at 20.9 percent in the second quarter of 2019. The country’s unemployment rates, paired with an aging population and high levels of emigration to Greece and Italy, help contribute to the phenomenon known as “brain drain,” which occurs when highly-trained or intelligent people leave their home country in search of better opportunities and a life outside of widespread poverty. This is where the impact produced by OCGs is the greatest, as these groups flourish in fragile states where post-conflict conditions ensure weak governance, poverty, and inequality. Albanian nationals who are living in poverty and are unable to find jobs are drawn to the idea of making fast cash through the illicit drug trade, which only serves to further the success of OCGs and perpetuate their existence in society.
Political Corruption
Coined “Europe’s first narco-state,” which the International Monetary Fund defines as a state “where all legitimate institutions become penetrated by the power and wealth of the illegal drug trade,” political corruption is key to the success of organized crime groups and the growth of the illicit drug trade in Albania. Corruption was rampant in the highest levels of government in the capital of Tirana under former Prime Minister Enver Hoxha until his death in 1985, and that trend persists today under Prime Minister Edi Rama, who, along with other government officials, is said to be in collusion with drug traffickers. According to the Independent Balkan News Agency, cocaine gangs such as the “Avdyli group” successfully rigged Albanian elections in 2016 by engaging in vote-buying for the mayor of Durres, a major port city in the country. Additionally, allegations that ties between OCGs and government officials influenced 2017 parliamentary elections in Albania were verified in a three-year-long study, which found that 20.7 percent of Albanians were offered favors in exchange for their vote. In Albania, which is said to be the most corrupt Balkan state by the Corruption Perceptions Index, the best way to secure people’s votes is by paying them in the cash that is generated by the drug trade. This enhances the level of top-down corruption that occurs in the public sector, of which drugs and OCGs play a participatory role, and allows Albanian government officials to perpetuate unorthodox practices. Rudina Hajdari, a member of the Assembly of the Republic of Albania, summarizes the issue in Albania:
“Young Albanians feel angry and cheated by the government. We have seismic, mind-blowing problems with corruption. When drugs came into the picture, so much cash was flowing that it actually shook the national currency. Money dictates our country’s decisions, and as that money is provided by drug cartels-to individual politicians, and to all political parties-anyone fighting corruption hits big hurdles.”
This exchange of dirty money for votes helps to ensure job stability of politicians who wish to remain in office and perpetuate the cycle of corruption from which they are benefitting. Saimir Tahiri, former interior minister under Prime Minister Rama, resigned in May 2018 amid investigations into his culpability regarding drug trafficking charges and accusations of corruption, of which he was later found guilty of abuse of office. As interior minister, Tahiri was responsible for the conduct of elections. A corrupt official in this position is detrimental to Albanian politics, as elections are more susceptible to the demands and desires of the politician in charge rather than to the votes of the people. The implications for Albania’s democratic government are therefore greater if this corruption and criminal association between politicians and OCGs have infected the rest of the political system.
The effects of this systemic interaction between corruption and OCGs are seen by Albania’s slow progress towards attaining EU membership. Serbia, another Balkan state that yearns to join the EU, is also facing halted progress due to corruption and poor human rights practices. If Serbia, who is ranked as being less corrupt than Albania, cannot be accepted into the EU without intense negotiations, then Albania’s chances of becoming a member in the near future are slim. While Tirana has made impressive progress towards eradicating organized crime and was granted candidate status in June 2014, the influence of OCGs and the illicit drug trade are still prevalent in many areas of the country.
The overall rampant corruption and lack of government stability highlight the degree to which the illicit drug trade, through which OCGs operate, is intertwined with Albania’s democratic system. The high level of government corruption not only hinders Albania’s ability to adequately address the ingrained nature of OCGs, but it also impedes the country’s efforts to join the EU, membership that could improve their international standing as well as boost their economy. With an upcoming presidential election in 2022, continued reports of criminal groups infiltrating the government to gain political power do not bode well for Albania, the country’s EU ambitions, nor the rest of the Balkans.
Ideal Geographic Location
Externally, Albania’s unique geographical position at the crossroads between eastern and western Europe enables OCGs to take advantage of both the country’s land and maritime borders to facilitate the transportation of drugs to the rest of the Balkans and greater Europe. Located in the Western Balkans, Albania shares a land border with Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Greece, and Italy, and a maritime border with the Adriatic Sea. While other Balkan states such as Croatia and Bosnia also have access to the Adriatic Sea, the sea is heavy utilized by criminal groups in Italy who allegedly have ties to OCGs in Albania in particular and are either bringing drugs to them or picking drugs up. As a narcotics hub, Albanian OCGs have also formed connections with other organizations in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe as a result of easy access routes. These connections allow Albanian OCGs to operate successfully and continue to challenge both Italian and Turkish traffickers even when maritime operations run by local law enforcement attempt to stop them.
Internally, Albanian OCGs have a strong presence in the port cities of Durres and Vlore where a majority of business occurs and there is established financial infrastructure. The locations of these cities, along the western coastline of the Adriatic Sea, help contribute greatly to smuggling efforts. In February 2018, Albanian law enforcement seized 613 kilograms of cocaine that was concealed in a shipment of bananas headed to Durres from Colombia, a market value of $219.96 million. The use of these port cities as stops in a longer distribution line that connects countries and continents highlights the global reach of these OCGs and the interconnectedness of their relationships with one another. Albania’s particular location makes it an ideal location distribution-wise and source-wise for many OCGs given the wide range of options that can be taken to disseminate the product, whether that be drugs or human beings, to other areas of the world.
Conclusion: Lessons for the Balkans and the EU
Albania’s role as the epicenter of organized crime, and subsequently the illicit drug trade in the region, is a problem pertinent to both the Balkans and the entirety of Europe. Currently, the EU is in the midst of another wave of enlargement, of which it hopes to integrate the remaining Balkan countries in a controversial move according to current member states. Infamously known as the “Colombia of Europe” due to the prevalence of drugs and organized crime in society, Albania’s weak economic system and high level of political corruption, which are aided by their strategic geopolitical location, make it extremely susceptible to the influence of OCGs and makes it even more difficult for them to acquire EU membership. While Albania has made significant progress towards internal reformation, including partnering with the EU to strengthen judicial cooperation and destroying cannabis farms, Albanian OCGs have simply evolved and adapted their methods in response to government actions. This is visible in a report disseminated by the U.S. Department of State, of which the agency concluded that “The Government of Albania made no significant progress toward thwarting money laundering and financial crimes in 2018” despite substantial efforts, and the country still remains extremely vulnerable to money laundering due to corruption and OCGs.
However, the biggest takeaway regarding the proliferation of OCGs in Albania regards what their behavior means for the rest of Europe. While organized crime is not exclusive to Albania and the Balkans, Albania’s existence as the regional “hub” for organized crime and their role as a facilitator for the transnational drug trade should be of great concern to the Albanian government, the Balkans, greater Europe, and even the West. The willingness and ability of Albanian OCGs to successfully cooperate with rival criminal groups in Latin America, Central Asia, and Western Europe demonstrate the scope of the problem, as the desire for profit-making now exceeds the groups’ feelings of rivalry and competition. The global reach of these groups is shared by other OCGs in Europe, which can impede institutional efforts to better the community, a problem that the EU is facing amidst the Brexit debacle and upcoming Parliamentary elections.
Going forward, Albania should keep working on internal structural reform despite the amount of time it will take to fully eradicate the problem. In this case, organized crime groups will continue to pervade every element of society within Albania unless the government amps up its efforts to fight corruption, prevent the perpetuation of unorthodox practice, and boost the economy by investing more in other countries and exporting more products to create more employment opportunities. By engaging more with other regional economies, Albania’s own economy could experience growth and prosper, which would help improve the lives of the country’s impoverished citizens and deter them from joining these OCGs in the first place.