In the immediate aftermath of the fall of Kabul and the Taliban’s takeover of the government, Afghanistan is facing several pressing crises. The delivery of vital humanitarian aid is in a state of logistical limbo, threatening the food security of millions. Furthermore, the human rights of women and members of the old government are under threat. In light of this crisis, several commentators have endorsed the idea of deploying a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (or PKO) to the country. While noble, these efforts are misguided. Any PKO in Afghanistan would lack the ability to complete its objectives if the Taliban opposed them, and the resources required for such an operation would be better allocated elsewhere.
The most prominent proposal for a PKO in Afghanistan comes from Georgetown professor Lise Howard, who laid out the case in an op-ed for the L.A. Times. In it, she proposes a PKO lead by China and Muslim nations with the objective of monitoring the situation and to“help the Taliban consolidate less radical control.” Another consistent source of advocacy has been from UMass Amherst professor Charli Carpenter, who argued in favor of a full-scale UN peace enforcement operation aimed at preventing a total Taliban takeover.
Other proposals have supported the establishment of a PKO with the objective of preventing a possible civil war. Carpenter and Howard argue in Foreign Policy that “the Taliban have only a tenuous hold over the country” which has the potential to become a “multisided conflict that, unless checked, could metastasize and spread across borders, similar to the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Libya.” In their view, a small (5,000 strong) mission from Muslim countries could prevent the outbreak of conflict. US Army Major Ryan van Wie of West Point proposed a new type of peace operation, aimed at boosting Taliban legitimacy and moderating its human rights problems. He has also developed several different options, each with its own capabilities and price tag.
In response to these arguments, GWU professor Paul D. Williams outlined several potential flaws in any such operation. He notes that no UN forces would be able to arrive for at least 60 days, as well as an inability to find willing troop contributors. He also highlights how the Taliban’s consolidation of control over the Afghan government contrasts with the situations in which peacekeepers excel, such as when “there’s a viable peace process to help implement and a host government to support.” Adam Day of the United Nations University highlights how much of this discourse ignores both the reality on the ground and the opinion of the Afghan people
In response to this critique, Carpenter argues that much of the opposition to a PKO in Afghanistan comes from a sense of fatalism, the idea that the inability to deploy to Afghanistan is set in stone, so there is no real sense in debating over it. While I wouldn’t describe this attitude as fatalism, I believe this perspective is valid. The UN will not and should not deploy to Afghanistan, even if there are some potential benefits to doing so. The political will and financial resources allocated to any such operation would be better utilized elsewhere. Before we address if such a deployment would be viable, we must address whether such a deployment is likely. Will the UN go?
At this point in time, it is highly unlikely that the UN Security Council will authorize a deployment to Afghanistan. The UNSC hasn’t debated the proposal and none of its recent resolutions or statements on the crisis in Afghanistan have mentioned the possibility of deployment.
At a time where smaller budgets have already led to cuts in UN Peacekeeping missions (such as the end of UNAMID in Sudan), the idea of paying for another large-scale operation seems unlikely to attract much interest on the Security Council. Neither is the idea of deploying to such a politically charged situation. UN peacekeepers have traditionally stayed out of countries (such as Libya and Syria) where there is discord between the Permanent Members. Afghanistan is one such case. While some Permanent Members, such as China, have displayed a willingness to recognize and work with the Taliban other Permanent Members, namely the USA, have displayed far less willingness.
Even if the Security Council were to authorize a mission to Afghanistan like the ones proposed, a mission would take time to deploy. The UNs rapid reaction force is the Vanguard Brigade units of several member states. It would take 60 days from when the Secretary-General requests deployment to when the first forces would arrive in Afghanistan if the member states consent to deployment. The arrival of additional specialized forces-such as trained observers, helicopter units, and permanent command staff-would take even longer. The Secretary-General can’t begin the 60-day countdown until authorized to do by the Security Council and the long debate and process for such authorization have yet to be considered.
This means that, should a PKO be deployed, it won’t be effective for several months. By that time the full-scale civil war that proponents hope the PKO could prevent may have already begun. UN Peacekeepers have never worked well as a rapid reaction crisis response force, even though efforts have been made to improve that capability. PKOs work best when they deploy to deadlocked conflict areas with a solid framework for peacebuilding. For example, missions in Namibia, Liberia, and East Timor were all able to bring peace but only after there was an outlined peace agreement. In contrast, there is no such peace agreement between the Taliban and any of its potential opponents (such as ISIS-K). Thus, we must examine the several potential obstacles to mission effectiveness.
Is the Mission Viable?
Even if the UNSC were to authorize deployment, and even if such a force could deploy in time to make a difference, the entire operation hinges on Taliban consent. While UN PKOs are military units, they are not capable of sustained counterinsurgent or offensive military operations. This is because they are drawn from dozens of different countries, each with its own language, equipment, procedures, and wartime doctrines. It also lacks unity of command or the idea that military units should be subordinate to a single commander because UN Peacekeepers take orders from both their national capitals and the UN Force Commander. Peacekeepers have traditionally overcome this military deficiency by operating with the consent of the (major) parties to the conflict. While Peacekeepers can undertake offensive operations against spoilers (smaller combatants who hope to disrupt the peace process), such as in the DRC, they lack the ability to fight major parties like the Taliban.
Even ignoring the Taliban, other armed groups in the region would present a significant problem for any UN PKO. ISIS-K, for example, is highly unlikely to cooperate with any form of foreign intervention force. As the Kabul airport bombing tragically showed, ISIS-K has the ability to inflict significant casualties on any such force. Any large number of casualties would imperil the viability of the operation, as troop-contributing countries have been unwilling to contribute troops after taking casualties. The only way the threat of ISIS-K and other spoilers could be minimized is through potential military and intelligence cooperation with the Taliban.
That means the Taliban must consent to the mission, which they have shown no indication of doing. The Taliban have spent twenty years fighting against a foreign military presence in Afghanistan, it’s unlikely they would consent to another. It also means that the prospective mission would have relatively few ways to reform the Taliban’s human rights abuses
if the Taliban refuse to cooperate. Many of the levers that the UNSC can use to effect Taliban behavior on human rights (such as humanitarian aid, sanctions, and diplomatic recognition) can be effected without the presence of a PKO. Which raises the question: what specific problems in Afghanistan would a PKO address?
Is the Mission Needed?
Besides improving the Taliban’s respect for human rights, proponents have identified two other major purposes for a PKO. They are first to Prevent the outbreak of civil war and second to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. At this point in time, it appears that both of these objectives are being met without the presence of a PKO. The last remaining resistance to the Taliban was in the northwestern Panjshir Province, which fell to the Taliban in early September. While the threat of civil war is still looming over Afghanistan, no armed groups have taken advantage of the uncertainty and chaos to directly challenge the Taliban.
Furthermore, the Taliban have pledged to uphold the safety of humanitarian aid providers on the ground and have requested even more humanitarian aid from the UN. The Taliban realize that they need humanitarian aid to prevent starvation (and thus opposition to their rule) among the Afghan people. Furthermore, they realize that they need Western recognition for their long-term survival, and harming aid workers would complicate that effort.
Finally, we must consider not just the feasibility of success when considering an action, we must also consider the opportunity cost of undertaking such an action. Under Van Wie’s proposed options, the annual cost of a PKO in Afghanistan would be between $500 million and $2 billion, which would be between 8 to 31% of Peacekeeping’s current $6.47 billion budget. That is a substantial amount of resources either being raised by member states or taken from
other operations. Despite the large amount of money being allocated to peacekeeping, there are still several unmet budgetary requests in current peacekeeping operations. Many large-scale operations, such as the ones in South Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, and the DRC, lack the needed personnel to fully fulfill their mandate and lack a sufficient number of high-cost assets. As an April 2020 UN report notes, peacekeeping missions in Mali and the Central African Republic face “critical gaps” in their inventory of helicopters, UAVS, and medical units. These missions have already been established and have already proven capable of effecting meaningful change in their countries of operation. A 2019 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs report, for example, highlights how without the PKO in Mali “the security situation in Mali … would likely deteriorate significantly,” and could accomplish much more if additional capabilities are funded. It would be more prudent to allocate funds and assets to these existing missions instead of an unproven and possibly unnecessary mission in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
While the arguments in favor of deploying a UN PKO to Afghanistan have some validity, it would be unwise to deploy to such a mission. UN PKOs are largely effective at certain tasks, such as protecting civilians in active combat zones and implementing peace agreements. The current environment in Afghanistan, however, is not one where UN PKOs thrive. There is no large-scale active conflict to protect civilians in, or a peace agreement to help implement. Furthermore, The UN lacks the rapid reaction ability to prevent the outbreak of a new war, and it lacks either the Taliban consent or military power needed to improve the Taliban’s human rights situation.
It’s unclear if a PKO is even needed to prevent the outbreak of civil war or ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. As it stands, without a PKO, a civil war has failed to materialize and humanitarian aid deliveries have continued undisrupted. Thus, any mission to Afghanistan would be costly, risky, and with limited upside. In the age of COVID and great power rivalry, the budget for peacekeeping is currently shrinking. Thus, the substantial resources needed for a potential Afghan mission would be better served by further funding other existing PKOs.