In the early morning hours of February 3rd, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the second leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, was killed in an American operation in northwest Syria. His death followed that of the organization's founder and self proclaimed caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019. Al-Qurashi’s death is an important milestone in continuing the struggle against the forces of ISIS - yet it appears to have overshadowed the more significant events of the previous month.
On January 20th, a truck in the northeastern Syrian city of Al-Hasakah suddenly veered towards the walls of the Al-Sina’a prison. It detonated, marking the beginning of a prison break at the largest detention camp of ISIS fighters in the world, and the largest and most complex operation of the organization since their territorial defeat three years earlier.
The military defeat of ISIS and the loss of its territory did not mean the end of the organization's existence, despite the rhetoric and lack of attention paid by many Western governments. For the tens of thousands of the organization's fighters, there were few options. Many fought to the death, others attempted to slink away into unpopulated or barren areas to try and avoid detection - but thousands of fighters, along with their wives and children, were either captured or surrendered. These fighters have been held in a kind of purgatory - crammed into massive detention centers for years with no end in sight.
The Al-Sina’a prison in Al-Hasakah was one of these detention centers and held an estimated 3,500 and 4,000 prisoners, all either ISIS militants or their children - some of whom were child soldiers. Al-Hasakah is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a multi-ethnic - but primarily Kurdish - armed group seeking to carve out an autonomous zone in northwest Syria.
Al-Sina’a has long been infamous for holding both the former militants and their children (the so called ‘cubs of the caliphate’) in atrocious and inhumane conditions. The prison is overcrowded, with food, water, and medicine being in short supply. 700 of the prison's occupants are children, and their continued incarceration without charge or chance of rehabilitation is particularly problematic.
Yet it's important to note that these conditions are not on account of the SDF’s cruelty but instead of a lack of resources. Of the 3,500-4,000 prisoners, only a quarter are from Syria. The diverse makeup of the prison population is representative of the global nature of ISIS' membership. Indeed, the continued presence of these multinational prisoners is due to the refusal of the rest of the world to repatriate their citizens who left to join ISIS. It is an underreported absurdity that the international community has abandoned the people of Syria and Iraq to deal foreign citizens. So these fighters are stuck, with their countries unwilling to bring them home and prosecute them. They have no chance at rehabilitation by rotting away in sweltering inhumane conditions surrounded by hardened terrorists. Without any program of rehabilitation, the militants remain ready and committed to their ideology. This situation is particularly unjust for the children of these prisons, imprisoned for the crimes of their parents, still surrounded by a hateful and twisted ideology.
Beyond its horrid conditions, Al-Sina'a has been commonly referred to as a "ticking time bomb" for an ISIS resurgence. Several months earlier the Aisyah, the police of Rojava, had intercepted an earlier attempt by ISIS to attack this very same prison. On January 20th, they were not so lucky.
The ISIS attack was sudden and intense. The first car bomb cleared the way for an ISIS cell to rush into the prison, bringing arms to the prisoners, who had been ready and rioting for their comrades - an indication of the complexity of the operation - before they raided the prison armory. What followed was the beginning of a brutal week of urban warfare. Fighting raged for days as the SDF, with air support from the American led-international coalition, mobilized troops to confront the sudden and massive insurgency. The residents of the Ghweiran neighborhood of Al-Hasakah, where the Al-Sina’a prison is located, found themselves in the midst of a ferocious battle. Approximately 45,000 people were displaced on the first day of fighting alone. It also appeared that the SDF had prematurely declared victory at times - after the battle had been declared over, a new ISIS pocket would either be found in door to door sweeps or would suddenly open fire on SDF forces. When the dust truly did settle, close to 500 militants and escapees were killed, with close to one hundred SDF fighters and prisoner workers dying as well. Worryingly, it is still unclear how many members of ISIS were able to escape.
Though the battle ended with the defeat and capture of the prisoners and their would be liberators, it is frankly too early to conclusively call this operation a victory against the ISIS. It is still unknown who the escapees are and if high level leaders may have been able to disappear and rejoin their organization's insurgency. Notably, experts worry about the attack’s implications. It is a clear propaganda victory for ISIS, demonstrating that they still have the capability to stage large, complex, and deadly operations. This attack was also not an isolated event. On the contrary, the last few months have seen a resurgence in ISIS' activity in both Iraq and Syria. When this prison break is viewed with the proper context - that of an emboldened ISIS willing and able to operate a cross border insurgency - the implications are worrying.
Which leads to the question - what is to be done? Multiple conditions must be addressed in order to remedy the underlying problems that led to this attack. More significant aid must immediately be distributed to the people of Iraq and Syria that are responsible for ensuring hardened ISIS veterans remain behind bars. Assistance should provide for both more humane conditions for prisoners as well as address the ability for inmates to properly repatriate back into normal society. In the case of the SDF in Rojava, the issue of Turkey must be addressed as well. Turkey has been hostile to the Kurdish-dominated SDF since its inception. This hostility can be seen in both the Turkish invasions of Rojava as well as in the allegations that Turkey had bombed SDF reinforcements on their way to the Al-Sina’a prison. Continued Turkish aggression towards the SDF in Rojava only serves to pull resources away from the detention of ISIS fighters and produces the instability that allows for the ISIS to continue to fester.
In the long term, the international community must come to terms with the fact that they cannot merely wash their hands of their own civilians and must repatriate the foreigners that joined ISIS. The presence of thousands of foreign fighters held in detention camps in Iraq and Syria is not a viable solution. Only with the action of the international community can this issue be truly resolved. In the future, these attacks will continue to occur unless these changes are made. The rest of the world needs to begin to repatriate their citizens and must stop delegating the task to the people of Syria and Iraq. If nothing is done, the prospects of an ISIS resurgence remain high and the future of northern Syria looks bleak.